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ABSTRACT  I 
This thesis has examined the 30km long rail corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge, on the 
Stillwater Ngakawau Line, between SNL96 and 126km, using a landslide risk management approach.  
The project area is characterised by high annual rainfall (>2,000mm per year), and steep topography 
(slopes typically ≥20°) adjacent to the rail corridor.  The track formation generally follows the natural 
contour near the base of the hillslope through the Lower Buller Gorge, and consequently involves 
many curves but relatively limited cut slopes into adjacent rock outcrops.  The distance between the 
base of adjacent hillslopes and rail is frequently <2m horizontally. 
A variety of basement and Tertiary lithologies are present, including granite, breccias, indurated 
sandstone/mudstone, and limestone.  The primary focus of this thesis has been on upslope-sourced 
landsliding onto the rail corridor, and on two short lengths (20m and 450m) that currently have a 
25km/hour speed restriction imposed at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha respectively.  Rainfall-induced and 
earthquake-generated landslide triggering mechanisms were examined in detail.   
A landslide inventory has been compiled to determine the characteristics and distribution of identified 
slope failures over time, and to establish any correlation with topography and geology. Sixty 
individual landslide events were identified since the line became fully operational in the 1940s, based 
on desktop reviews, and field inspections for more recent events.  To reflect the presence of small 
magnitude landslide events, a project-specific logarithmic classification of landslides was adopted 
from <10m
3
 (very small volume) to ≥10,000m3 (very large volume).  An absence of a higher 
proportion of ‘very small’ to ‘small’ landslide volumes (<100m3) in the inventory reflects incomplete 
reporting of these comparatively lower magnitude, but higher frequency, events.  The establishment 
of a robust landslide inventory to document future events, in a consistent and readily accessible 
format, is required for continued monitoring and review of landslide risk management practices in the 
Lower Buller Gorge.   
Combining landslide inventory data and physical characteristics of the project area enabled the 
development of a qualitative landslide zonation map that assigned ‘high’, ‘high-moderate’, ‘moderate’ 
and ‘low’ landslide susceptibility classes.  The principal area of slope instability above the rail 
corridor is 22.5km in length between SNL103.5 and 126.0km, associated predominantly with 
basement lithologies (Tuhua Granite; Hawks Crag Breccia; Greenland Group).  The most frequently 
occurring landslides are shallow, typically less than 3m deep, translational failures triggered in 
regolith or colluvium materials.  Rainfall-induced debris slides and flows are dominant, given the high 
annual rainfall and associated high frequency of high intensity or long duration rainfall events.  Very 
small to medium landslides (<1,000m
3
) have the potential to impact the rail corridor with an average 
frequency of around one every two years, causing damage to infrastructure or affecting rail 
operations. Very large landslides (≥10,000m3) can be expected every 10 to 20 years based on a limited 
historical record.  The narrow rail corridor and absence of sufficient catch areas above or adjacent to 
the rail causes continual operational challenges due to upslope-sourced landslide debris, and high 
susceptibility to slope failures, particularly west of SNL103.50km.  Development of a rainfall-
threshold for proactive inspection of the rail corridor is recommended, including the establishment of 
a rain gauge network through the Lower Buller Gorge. 
Earthquake-generated landslides significantly impacted the rail during the magnitude 7.1 Inangahua 
earthquake in 1968 and to a much lesser extent during the magnitude 6.1 Westport earthquake in 
1991.  The rail was not fully constructed through the Lower Buller Gorge at the time of the 
magnitude 7.8 Buller (Murchison) Earthquake in 1929, which generated widespread landsliding in the 
Buller and Nelson regions.  Earthquake-generated landsliding can be expected through the Lower 
Buller Gorge from earthquakes of magnitude ≥6, and track inspection is recommended in the event of 
magnitude 5 or greater earthquakes. 
Detailed geological characterisation and mapping at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha was conducted, 
including a LiDAR survey at Whitecliffs that enabled visualisation of the ground surface without the 
interference of vegetation.   The limestone outcrop at Whitecliffs comprises 60-70m high near-vertical 
cliffs with a well-established talus apron at the base, extending to the rail corridor.  Three widely 
spaced open fractures sets are present at the top of Whitecliffs that propagate into the cliff-face.  
There has been no detectable movement on selected key fracture sets since monitoring commenced in 
1993 and there is no confirmed evidence of large-scale cliff collapse during the 1968 Inangahua 
earthquake.  Whitecliffs is not as susceptible to failure as other slopes inspected in the project area 
due to structural controls, primarily being the dipping of strata back into the cliff-face and widely 
space joint sets.  Establishment of inspection protocols for earthquake events impacting the area, 
including real-time monitoring of selected fractures at Whitecliffs is recommended. 
A 2km-length corridor site model produced for Te Kuha demonstrated ‘high’ landslide susceptibility 
is not confined to slopes above the existing 450m speed restriction zone.   Removal of the speed 
restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha can be considered, as the increased exposure time is not 
considered sufficient justification given the extent of other susceptible areas to landsliding affecting 
the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor.   
The principal conclusion from this thesis project is that there is on-going risk to rail operations 
predominantly from shallow translational landsliding in regolith-colluvium materials.  The majority of 
these will be generated by long-duration or intense rainfall events.  Development of threshold-based 
methods for effective track management is recommended, including the establishment of a rain gauge 
network through the Lower Buller Gorge, and landslide inventory database.  Site-specific engineering 
measures could be adopted, such as catch benches or avalanche-type shelters, where justified on a 
cost-benefit basis. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Project background 
The Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor forms part of the Stillwater to Ngakawau Line (SNL), located 
between Inangahua and Westport on the West Coast of New Zealand.  The project area is defined on 
Figure 1.1, which incorporates the 30km length of rail corridor between SNL96km (eastern end) and 
SNL126km (western end).  The rail corridor is aligned adjacent to the northern bank of the Buller 
River.  The track formation generally follows the natural contour near the base of the hillslope 
through the Lower Buller Gorge, and consequently involves many curves but relatively limited cut 
slopes into adjacent rock outcrops.   
The typically steep terrain, access limitations and climatic conditions (high annual rainfall) in the 
region pose many challenges to the effective on-going maintenance of the rail infrastructure and 
operations.  Information provided by KiwiRail (ONTRACK Rail Operating Procedures, Section: L6 – 
page 15) indicate that there are currently two 25km/hour speed restrictions imposed within the project 
area due to potential slope stability hazards.  The general location of the speed restriction areas are 
indicated on Figure 1.1, labelled as: 
 Whitecliffs:  20m length of rail between SNL97.510km and 97.530km  
 Te Kuha:  450m length of rail between SNL124.050km and 124.500km  
Whitecliffs and Te Kuha are respectively located near the eastern and western extent of the Lower 
Buller Gorge rail corridor (Figure 1.1).  Speed restrictions within rail corridors have an economic 
impact on the long-term efficiency of operations.  The timing and rationale behind the implementation 
of the two permanent 25km/hour speed restrictions in the Lower Buller Gorge are not well 
documented and KiwiRail have expressed an interest in quantifying any geotechnical risk associated 
with removal of the restrictions.  In addition to the two speed restrictions, locomotive engineers are 
advised in the Rail Operating Procedures to be aware of slope stability hazards between 
SNL124.256km and 125.500km (1,244m length), with specific reference to rockfalls.  This area 
incorporates a section of the 25km/hour speed restriction zone referred to above at Te Kuha.   
To enable a robust assessment of geotechnical risks associated with landslide hazards above the rail 
alignment, landslide occurrence, characterisation and susceptibility through the entire rail corridor 
shown on Figure 1.1 has been conducted, including detailed research at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.  
This thesis presents the findings of the research and is intended to provide KiwiRail with a tool for 
use in future Landslide Risk Management in regards to rail operations in the Lower Buller Gorge. 
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Figure 1.1:  Project area – Stillwater to Ngakawau Line (Lower Buller Gorge) between SNL96km and 126km.  Labels shown indicate the location of 
Te Kuha and Whitecliffs that have a permanent 25km/hour speed restriction.  Inset indicates location of the project area (circled) in the South 
Island, New Zealand. 
N 
Project Area (adjacent to rail) 
Te Kuha 
Whitecliffs 
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1.2 Context and methodology  
The context for this thesis is landslide risk management.  This is based on recognition that landslide 
hazards in rail corridors pose risks to the safety of locomotive engineers, and other personnel working 
in these areas.  Economic impacts in terms of potential damage to rolling stock, infrastructure and the 
associated risk reduction measures also need consideration.   
The consequences of a landslide occurring can range from the worst case scenario of human fatalities 
or injuries, to economic effects related to service disruption, recovery and rebuilding.  The 
methodology adopted for conducting the research, and presentation of results in this thesis, follow the 
general risk management process outlined in Figure 1.2.   
 
Figure 1.2:  Risk management process (based on AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2009) 
A flowchart produced by the Australian Geomechanics Society (AGS) in 2007 expands the general 
process outlined in Figure 1.2 specifically for landslide risk management, including detail on the type 
of methodology and information requirements for each component of the framework.  A copy of the 
framework is provided in Appendix 1.1 for reference, with the main components summarised on 
Figure 1.3.   
The landslide risk management framework was also adopted by the Joint Technical Committee on 
Landslides and Engineered Slopes (Fell et al, 2008a).  This thesis generally follows the guidelines for 
landslide susceptibility, hazard and risk zoning outlined by Fell et al (2008a), which is weighted 
strongly towards the work completed by AGS (2007) but also incorporates a uniformity for 
terminology and quantitative risk management principles.  A commentary to the guidelines (Fell et al, 
2008b) provided additional background information and references to supplement the original paper.  
Definitions of terms used by Fell et al (2008a) in regards to landslide zoning and risk management are 
based predominantly on IUGS (1997).  A list of definitions is provided in Appendix 1.2. 
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Figure 1.3:  Framework for landslide risk management (based on Fell et al, 2008a) 
Risk analysis is the first stage of the Landslide Risk Management framework, which involves hazard 
and consequence analysis (Figure 1.3).  Risk estimation is the outcome of considering hazard and 
consequence analysis that can be incorporated into a risk assessment, including value judgements and 
risk tolerance criteria.  The scope of the thesis does not include components of the framework 
subsequent to risk estimation.  These aspects, and subsequent stages of the Landslide Risk 
Management process, require evaluation from KiwiRail, and can be developed further upon 
completion of this thesis (Figure 1.3).       
The occurrence of landslides is coupled closely with a number of possible triggering mechanisms, in 
the present context primarily being precipitation and seismicity.  Hazard analyses consider these 
mechanisms by interpretation of the data collected and development of a landslide susceptibility map 
for the project area, including site-specific models for Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.   
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Recommendations regarding possible mitigation measures and options are summarised where relevant 
in this thesis.  This stage of the risk management process (treating the risks) will be completed, and 
decisions regarding implementation made, by KiwiRail personnel upon review of findings from this 
thesis and any other independent studies.   
Monitoring and communication is an important component of all risk management processes 
(Figures 1.2 and 1.3).  This has been achieved through progress reports and frequent consultations 
with KiwiRail, University of Canterbury supervisory staff and liaison with consulting companies 
involved with other relevant projects in the area. 
1.3 Research hypotheses 
Based on a preliminary assessment of the available information, the original hypotheses for the thesis 
project were: 
 That the cause of rock mass dilation in near horizontally bedded limestone observed in the 
outcrop at Whitecliffs is at least partly attributable to seismic shaking. 
 That the risk of damage to railway infrastructure between SNL96 and 126km is probable, in the 
event of a large magnitude earthquake, due to rockfalls originating from dilated rock masses on 
the scale observed at Whitecliffs and other locations. 
 That systematic and detailed hazard mapping at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha, and identification of 
other potentially hazardous locations, will enable an assessment of vulnerable sites and 
development of appropriate management strategies. 
As the thesis project has progressed the original hypotheses have been tested and modifications have 
resulted to the overall research objectives presented in the following section.   
1.4 Research objectives 
Permanent speed restrictions at Te Kuha and Whitecliffs are in place to protect the safety of personnel 
working in these areas, and assist in minimising any disruption to rail operations.  The effectiveness, 
reliability and actual need for the speed restrictions have not been quantified to date.  Based on the 
limited information currently available on rockfall hazards, and other slope instability issues affecting 
the rail corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge, the research objectives adopted for this thesis are: 
 Objective A:  Systematic identification and documentation of landslide hazards within the 
project area in order to provide an overall context for hazard management in the Lower Buller 
Gorge.   
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 Objective B:  To identify, and quantify, geological and geotechnical risks at Whitecliffs and 
Te Kuha, with specific reference to the removal of 25km/hour speed restrictions.   
Based on the information obtained, risk management strategies and recommendations for mitigation 
options have been developed.  Identification of areas that require further work is also highlighted.   
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured into the chapters summarised in Table 1.1 to provide a coherent presentation 
of the research conducted.  Each chapter includes an introductory section and a summary of main 
findings and/or limitations encountered.    
Table 1.1:  Thesis chapter summary 
Chapter Title Purpose(s) 
1 Introduction 
Detail presented on project background; thesis scope and methodology; 
Lower Buller Gorge project area, and background information (current 
operations, rail terminology and infrastructure); fundamentals of landslide 
hazards; background geotechnical report.  Thesis objectives and research 
hypotheses based on preliminary information available.   
2 
Physical 
Setting 
Outline of the project area, including climatic conditions; geomorphic 
characteristics (tectonic processes, topography and watercourses); geology 
and seismicity. 
3 
Landslide 
Inventory 
A) Determine bounding conditions in regards to the timing, and 
rationale, for the speed restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.  
Achieved through literature reviews, and interviews with current and 
former rail personnel. 
B) Documentation of all available data sources on landslide hazards  
and occurrence within the rail corridor, including historic aerial 
photograph review, KiwiRail data, West Coast Regional Council 
(WCRC) datasets and other published records; 
4 
Landslide 
Susceptibility 
Presentation of the spatial distribution of landslide occurrences.  
Correlation of landslide occurrence with topography and geological 
controls.  Presentation of a rail corridor landslide susceptibility map using 
four relative categories for zonation (Low to High Susceptibility). 
5 
Landslide 
Hazard 
Landslide characterisation and frequency analysis, including presentation 
of representative case studies involving large volume (>1,000m
3
) events.  
Detailed discussion on rainfall-induced and earthquake-generated 
landslides.  Temporal case study related to impacts from a long duration 
rainfall event in December 2010. 
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Chapter Title Purpose(s) 
6 Whitecliffs 
Geological mapping, site investigations, laboratory testing and collation of 
all data to develop a site model for Whitecliffs in regards to slope 
instability.  Assessment of the 25km/hour speed restriction.   
7 Te Kuha  
Geological mapping, site investigations, laboratory testing and collation of 
all data to develop a site model for Te Kuha in regards to slope instability.  
Consequence analysis conducted relevant to the 25km/hour speed 
restriction.   
8 
Future Rail 
Management 
Outline best practice management options and protocols related to 
landslide risk management in the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor 
between SNL96 and 126km.   
9 
Summary and 
Conclusions 
Presentation of a concise summary of the main thesis findings, 
conclusions and future work recommendations.   
1.6 Project area 
The 30km length of rail corridor that forms the project area shown on Figure 1.1 comprises a dynamic 
physical environment that poses many challenges to the on-going effective operation of commercial 
rail services.  This section provides an outline of the current rail operations, infrastructure and rail-
related terminology referred to frequently in this thesis.  Whitecliffs and Te Kuha are introduced in 
this section to provide background information on the two locations currently with 25km/hour speed 
restrictions imposed. 
1.6.1 Current operations 
There is currently an average of six train movements each day through the Lower Buller Gorge.  The 
majority of trains carry coal sourced from the Stockton Opencast Mine, located approximately 35km 
north of Westport, and operated by Stockton Alliance (a partnership between Solid Energy and 
Downer EDI Mining New Zealand).  A small volume of cement from the Holcim New Zealand 
Westport Plant is also transported though the gorge on a regular basis but the majority of cement from 
Holcim’s operations is carted by cement tankers from their marine terminal.  There are currently no 
passenger trains operating within the Lower Buller Gorge and it is unlikely that any regular tourist or 
commuter operations will be established in the foreseeable future. 
A team of rail personnel, based in Westport, work in the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor using high-
rail inspection vehicles for general maintenance and track upgrading work.  In addition, 
KiwiRail-approved contractors also work in the rail corridor for specific projects, including vegetation 
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clearance and civil works, as required.  Track inspections (wet weather runs) are conducted after high 
intensity and/or long duration rainfall events to ensure the rail is safe for personnel and rolling stock.  
Structural inspections also occur in the event of an earthquake.  It is understood that KiwiRail do not 
currently have established thresholds for determining the requirement for these inspections in 
response to triggering mechanisms that have the potential to cause slope failures or other track 
integrity issues. 
An independent project, separate from this thesis, is in progress to characterise slope stability issues 
through the gorge and development of rainfall thresholds to formalise the implementation of track 
inspections.  It is understood that there is no inclusion within the independent project for specifying 
seismic triggers at this stage.   
1.6.2 Metrage pegs 
To determine locations within the project area the most common reference points used in this thesis 
are metrage pegs.  In the rail corridor, these are triangular marker pegs labelled with a distance 
reference every kilometre.  The SNL125km mark is shown in Figure 1.4.   
 
Figure 1.4:  Metrage peg example (SNL125km) 
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In the Lower Buller Gorge the number on the metrage peg refers to the kilometre distance from 
Stillwater, located approximately 15 kilometres east of Greymouth.  The 500m point between two 
metrage pegs is indicated by a yellow triangular peg.  Bridges, tunnels, signs and signals may also 
display metrage references to three decimal places (metres).  Metrage references are specific to the 
rail line in question, in this case the SNL. 
1.6.3 Track warrant control zones 
There are seven track warrant control (TWC) zones that cover the SNL within the Lower Buller 
Gorge project area.  These zones define working areas along the rail alignment.  When 
communicating a location to train control, located in Wellington, reference is made to the line (SNL), 
TWC zone, and metrage pegs.   
Table 1.2 provides a reference for distinguishing between the TWC zones in the Lower Buller Gorge.  
The seven TWC’s are also shown on Figure 1.5.  As indicated by the ‘length’ column in Table 1.2, the 
zones are typically between 3km and 6km.  It is important to note that the area referred to as Te Kuha 
in this thesis is actually within the Cascade TWC.  The Te Kuha TWC starts from SNL126.50km, 
outside of the project area.  Whitecliffs is located within the Buller TWC. 
Table 1.2:  Track warrant control areas (SNL96.0 to 126.5km) 
TWC area SNL metrage (start of TWC) Length (km) 
Buller 93.50km 6.00 
Mackley 99.50km 3.70 
Rahui 103.20km 2.70 
Berlins 105.90km 4.25 
Twin Bridges 110.15km 5.85 
Tiroroa 116.00km 4.50 
Cascade 120.50km 6.00 (to Te Kuha) 
Reference to rail localities within this thesis arise from a variety of sources, including geological units 
(e.g. Hawks Crag Breccia); topographical features (e.g. Sinclair Castle) or, in the absence of a specific 
feature, the TWC zone is used.  This is particularly relevant for the Berlins, Rahui and Mackley 
TWCs (Figure 1.5) where other topographical or geological references do not dominate. 
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Figure 1.5:  Project area between SNL96 and 126km, showing metrage references and track warrant control zones 
Source:  New Zealand Topographic Maps (NZTM Sheets B20 and B21), 1:50,000 
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1.6.4 Infrastructure 
Detail regarding tunnels and bridges within the project area was obtained from a geographical 
information system (GIS) provided by KiwiRail (valid as of 9 September 2010).  A summary of the 
main details from the GIS, and other infrastructure information sourced from a publication by the 
New Zealand Railway and Locomotive Society Incorporated (NZRLSI, 1964), is provided below.   
 Bridges:  The GIS lists 21 bridges within the project area, which includes structures over natural 
streams, gullies and culverts.  Construction materials vary.  Details for some of the comparatively 
larger structures, respective rivers that they cross, and eastern SNL start metrage, are: 
 100.289km, Bridge 92 (Orikaka/Mackley River):  Steel bridge. 
 108.460km, Bridge 97 (Slaty Creek): Concrete arch bridge. 
 109.923km, Bridge 98 (Newman Creek):  Concrete arch bridge. 
 110.129km, Bridge 99 (Stable Creek):  Concrete arch bridge. 
 116.779km, Bridge 100 (Redmond Creek):  Concrete arch bridge. 
 120.746km, Bridge 102 (Cascade Creek):  Steel girder structure on high piers. 
 Tunnels:  Five tunnels are present between SNL113km and 125km.  The longest tunnel, located 
near SNL113km (Tunnel 2), is formed through Hawks Crag Breccia and is 260m in length.  
Tunnel numbers, start and end metrage references on the SNL, and corresponding lengths in 
brackets, for existing tunnels are summarised below:   
 Tunnel 2:  113.338 and 113.598km (260m) 
 Tunnel 3:  113.855 and 113.909km (54m) 
 Tunnel 4:  120.100 and 120.252km (152m) 
 Tunnel 5:  121.178 and 121.329km (151m) 
 Tunnel 6:  124.208 and 124.256km (48m) 
Tunnel 7 was originally located near SNL125.40km.  This tunnel was daylighted in 1987 after a 
period of rainfall that resulted in major slope movement above the rail alignment. 
 Retaining structures:  There are no detailed records of retaining walls available but there are 
numerous structures within the project area, of varying ages and construction materials, for the 
purpose of retaining ballast, fill material or mitigating slope stability issues above the rail.   
 Grades:  The steepest track gradient was initially 1 in 32 just east of Te Kuha (NZRLSI, 1964).  
This was subsequently reduced to 1 in 120 and remains the steepest grade heading east (with the 
exception of a short 1 in 90 section prior to Inangahua).     
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 Curvature:  Between the Te Kuha TWC and Rahui TWC there are approximately 100 curves in 
the rail alignment, with only 30 curves for the next 21km (NZRLSI, 1964), which extends 
eastwards away from the project area.  The average curve radius is reported around 200m, and 
the overall range between approximately 150m and 800m.   
There are currently no early warning systems established within the project area relating to landslide 
hazards.  Rain gauges and water level monitoring data for the region are available via a network 
operated by the WCRC, but there are no gauges within the project area itself.  Information regarding 
the WCRC network is detailed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.   
1.6.5 Whitecliffs 
The risk of rockfalls from Whitecliffs is immediately apparent due to the presence of near vertical 
limestone cliffs, detached blocks and a talus apron located adjacent to the railway (Figure 1.6). Metal 
pins are located across selected displaced limestone blocks at the top of Whitecliffs for the purpose of 
monitoring any movement over time.  Displacement monitoring has generally been undertaken by 
KiwiRail personnel annually since December 2001, with the first monitoring round conducted in 
January 1993.   
 
Figure 1.6:  View of Whitecliffs.  Photograph taken from State Highway 6, looking north across 
the Buller River. 
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There has been no movement measured between the selected limestone blocks at the top of 
Whitecliffs to date.  A summary of all monitoring results, and the methodology adopted by KiwiRail, 
is provided in Appendix 1.3, including photographs of the metal pin locations.  The frequency of 
monitoring, and the absence of telemetered information, will not enable an early warning of a large-
scale cliff collapse, but has been useful to show that the seemingly precarious and detached blocks at 
Whitecliffs have been stable under current environmental and climatic conditions for at least the past 
18 years.   
1.6.6 Te Kuha 
The scale of the potential landslide hazards at Te Kuha is not as immediately evident (Figures 1.7 and 
1.8).  Slope failures are known to have impacted rail operations within the speed restriction area 
between SNL124.05km and 124.50km.  Tunnel 6 is located within the 450m zone and large slope 
failures (≥10,000m3) are evident on the western side of this tunnel.  In addition, there have been minor 
cuts to form the rail alignment around Te Kuha and it is this human element interacting with the 
physical environment that has exacerbated the risk of failure by daylighting discontinuities in cut 
slopes.  Detailed mapping and landslide characterisation at Te Kuha is presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Figure 1.7: View west from SNL124.0km (start of the speed restriction area). 
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Figure 1.8:  View east near SNL124.5km (end of speed restriction area). 
1.7 Landslide hazards 
This section introduces the fundamental basics of landslide hazards in regards to causes, processes 
and common terminology.  On an international scale landslide hazards have historically caused 
significant loss of life, damage to property, infrastructure and economic costs.  Economic losses can 
be either direct costs associated with repair and maintenance work; or indirect costs, including 
implementation of mitigation measures to reduce impacts from future landslide occurrences and/or 
loss of productivity.  A trend for increasing susceptibility for landslide hazards over time is 
considered by Schuster (1996) to be as a result of: 
 Increased urbanisation and development in marginal environments that are prone to landslides; 
 Deforestation, which increases landslide frequency; and 
 Increased regional precipitation due to changing climate conditions.   
Within the project area it is only the third aspect that has the potential to increase landslide occurrence 
rates over time as there is limited vegetation removal in the Lower Buller Gorge, and further 
development adjacent to the rail corridor is not feasible for urban land use or other development.   
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1.7.1 Landslide causes and processes 
In terms of understanding the causes for slope movements, and the associated hazards, it is important 
to recognise that the processes governing slope stability are complex.  Both ambient and triggering 
factors determine slope stability.  Within the project area the ambient factors comprise the existing 
geological structure, geomorphic landform expression and climatic conditions.  A hazard only exists 
due to the presence and current use of the rail corridor.  Human activities associated with track 
formation can potentially exacerbate pre-existing physical characteristics within the project area, 
including daylighting joints, fractures and/or bedding planes in rock cuts; destabilising old landslide 
features during track formation and mitigation measures required to control overland flow of water.   
Cruden and Varnes (1996) infer that of the many causes influencing slope movement potential, there 
is only one triggering factor, being an external stimulus.  Rainfall-induced and earthquake-generated 
triggering mechanisms for slope movement are the most dominant processes in the project area with 
the potential to create hazards for rail users and operational procedures.  An inventory of reported 
landslides within the 30km length of rail corridor, and associated triggering mechanism, is 
documented in Chapter 3. 
The transfer of geological material in a predominantly downslope direction under the direct influence 
of gravity is the underlying principle for slope movement (Cruden and Varnes, 1996).  Landslide 
processes recognised by Varnes (1978) are broadly characterised by those that have the potential to 
result in:  
(1)  An increase in shear stress;  
(2)  A contribution to low strength of materials; or  
(3)  A reduction in the material strength.   
Earthquakes and tectonic activity can increase shear stress in a region.  Low strength of materials is 
influenced by discontinuities and other rock mass defects that develop over time.  Weathering is the 
main process associated with reducing strength of slope materials.   
1.7.2 Landslide terminology and types 
A definition of the term landslide provided by Cruden (1991) is:  ‘the movement of a mass of rock, 
debris or earth down a slope’.  Following from this definition, slope movement processes involve the 
failure of material, either of mantling soils or rock, by one or a combination of the following styles 
(based on Varnes, 1978): 
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 Falls:  free fall through the air, with possible leaping, bounding or rolling of fragments.   
 Topples:  pivotal rotation of material around the centre of gravity.   
 Slides:  shear displacement along one or several discrete surfaces, or within a relatively narrow 
zone.  Slide movements are typically rotational or translational.   
 Lateral spreads:  lateral extensional movements either without a basal shear surface or due to 
liquefaction. 
 Flows:  extremely slow and non-accelerating movement in bedrock; slow to rapid viscous 
movements in soils.  
Consideration of the type of material dictates the full terminology, or forming name, adopted.  When 
the original material is rock, the above styles of movement are simply classified as rockfalls; rock 
topples; rock slump (rotational slide); rock block or rock slide (both defect-controlled); rock spread 
and rock flow.  The term ‘debris’ is used by Varnes (1978) for predominantly coarse soils that contain 
greater or equal to 20% of individual fragment sizes larger than 2mm.  For soils containing greater 
than 80% of fine material (less than or equal to 2mm in size) the term ‘earth’ is used.   
Distinction between the rates of movement is also commonly used to define slope movements from 
extremely slow (less than 0.06m per year) to extremely rapid (greater than 3.0m per second).  
Descriptions for landslides should incorporate the initial movement type and the style of any 
subsequent movements.  A glossary for forming names of landslides from Cruden and Varnes (1996), 
including the terminology for slope movements listed above, is provided in Appendix 1.4.  The term 
landslip is frequently used in New Zealand but the term is difficult to define and not unanimously 
supported.  The absence of quantifying triggering mechanisms in rock mass descriptions is considered 
erroneous by Pantelidis (2009).  An example of a new system for quantifying slope hazards associated 
with rock cuttings based on rating tables from Pantelidis (2009) and subsequent work by Pantelidis 
(2010) is provided in Appendix 1.5.    
1.8 Pacific Geotech Limited (PGL) Report  
Information provided by KiwiRail when the thesis was initially set up included a geotechnical 
assessment of the SNL between 90km and 126km (PGL, 2007).  This section of the SNL was targeted 
due to it being considered the most at risk from geotechnical hazards.  The assessment included 
identification of the main geological hazards within the rail corridor, and broadly classified these into 
the following slope instability types:   
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 Large-scale cliff collapse:  This mechanism of failure was specifically related to the near 
vertical limestone outcrop immediately adjacent to the rail alignment at Whitecliffs.  The report 
noted that Whitecliffs has been recognised as an at risk area since the 1950s, but does not provide 
an information source to justify the timing. 
 Rockfall:  Loose discrete blocks that have the potential to impact the rail alignment.  The scale 
and frequency of this type of failure was considered highly variable.  
 Rainfall-induced rock debris flows:  This type of failure is regarded by PGL (2007) as 
particularly common in the project area when rock sources mobilise within steeply graded 
streams above the rail during high intensity rainfall events.  The volume of debris mobilised is 
controlled by the catchment area, rainfall duration and intensity.   
 Instability in weathered surficial materials:  Failures of this nature according to the authors of 
the report typically occur due to oversaturation of material located on over-steepened and low 
strength cut slopes.   
 Structurally-controlled landsliding:  Associated with the geological structure of cut slopes and 
batters.  The report identified that this type of failure is of most concern where bedding planes 
have daylighted in cut slopes, particularly in low strength sedimentary rocks.   
Issues associated with drainage, including culverts, embankments and box cuttings, were also 
examined in the PGL (2007) report.  Inadequate (under-sized) culverts are unable to effectively 
manage overland water flow.  Surface flooding of the rail at a number of localities does occur during 
long duration rainfall events.  The importance of adequate drainage design is recognised, including 
the recommended upgrades at localities identified by PGL (2007), but these issues are not specifically 
included within the scope of the current thesis.  
1.8.1 Key risk sites  
PGL (2007) concluded that there is a high risk of rockfall or block failure from Whitecliffs at 
SNL97.520km that will progressively increase over time as rock mass strength is reduced through 
continued weathering and seismic activity.  Stabilisation of the cliff-face and rockfall barriers were 
not considered feasible mitigation options due to the height of the cliffs (Figure 1.3) and potentially 
large volume of individual rocks released (>200m
3
).  The development of an updated monitoring 
regime was recommended as the most appropriate measure to address this perceived risk, including a 
remote alarm monitoring system.  The current monitoring regime and results to date are presented in 
Appendix 1.3.   
A summary of additional key risk sites identified by PGL (2007) are outlined below from east to west 
through the project area.  Locations are referred to using the relevant SNL metrage and a brief 
description is provided. 
 98.450km:  Failing retaining wall. 
 101.901km:  Eroding culvert inlet and outlet. 
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 106.650km:  Landslide risk, stabilisation required. 
 107.550km:  Landslide risk, stabilisation required.   
 114.221km:  Embankment determined to have a medium to high risk of failure due to inadequate 
drainage. 
 118.500km:  Rainfall-induced rock debris flows. 
 118.900km:  Inadequate drainage through narrow box cutting. 
 122.200km:  Inadequate drainage through narrow box cutting. 
 123.850-124.050km:  Inadequate drainage through narrow box cutting. 
 124.300km:  Rainfall-induced rock debris flows. 
 124.500km: Inadequate drainage through narrow box cutting. 
The speed restriction at Te Kuha incorporates the site identified by PGL (2007) at SNL124.300km.  
The permanent speed restriction in this area is not mentioned.  An entry in the summary table 
appended to the report also includes SNL125.400km as a site that has experienced a large historic 
landslide.  This feature at SNL125.400km (daylighted Windy Point Tunnel) is classified by PGL 
(2007) as a medium risk site with a recommendation of monitoring the landslide.     
Detail in the PGL (2007) report provided an introduction to the location and types of slope instability 
issues that had been recognised within the rail corridor to date.  The PGL (2007) report focussed on 
rainfall as the predominant triggering mechanism for slope failures between SNL90 and 126km.  
Seismic activity was not considered, aside from acknowledging the risk of failure at Whitecliffs 
during an earthquake.   
1.9 Summary 
KiwiRail have expressed an interest in research through the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor between 
SNL96 and 126km for the purpose of characterising two areas that currently have a 25km/hour speed 
restriction imposed (Whitecliffs and Te Kuha).  To enable a robust assessment of the entire project 
area, the Landslide Risk Management framework adopted by AGS (2007) and Fell et al (2008a) has 
been reviewed and the general approach adopted for this thesis.   
A review of landslide hazards, including theoretical information, and a site-specific geotechnical 
assessment completed by PGL (2007), has enabled key research hypotheses and objectives to be set.  
Rainfall-induced and earthquake-generated landslides appear the dominant triggering mechanisms for 
slope movement in the project area.  To determine the susceptibility to, and hazards associated with, 
landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge, the physical environment needs to be understood and previous 
landslide occurrences documented.   
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CHAPTER 2:  PHYSICAL SETTING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The physical environment considered in Chapter 2 includes climate, geomorphology and geology.  
Interactions between these elements produce the landscape, vegetation and natural processes that 
characterise, and continue to shape, the Lower Buller Gorge.  An outline and discussion of these 
physical characteristics, and associated processes, is presented in the following sections to provide an 
understanding of the context for Landslide Risk Management within the project area.   
2.2 Climate   
Information from the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd (NIWA) indicates the 
average annual rainfall for most areas in New Zealand is between 600mm and 1,600mm.  In 
comparison, the West Coast region experiences comparatively higher annual rainfall of between 
2,000mm and 4,000mm.  The mean annual rainfall reported for Westport by NIWA in the period 1971 
to 2000 is 2,274mm.  Ambient air temperatures are generally mild, with a range for Westport typically 
between 5°C in winter and 20°C in summer.  
Information regarding mean annual rainfall and river water levels specific to the project area was 
obtained from the WCRC website
1
.  The WCRC has a series of water level and rainfall recorders in 
the region that collectively form a flood warning network.  There are three recorders within, or in 
close proximity to, the project area.  Table 2.1 provides a summary of the information available from 
the WCRC website relevant to the project area.   
High flood water levels of 6.7m (Landing) and 8.4m (Woolfs) were recorded in May 1988.  Typical 
water levels for these two sites are 1.0m and 1.2m respectively (Table 2.1).  In August 1970 a high 
flood level of 11.8m was recorded at Te Kuha, which has a typical level of around 1.4m.  Water level 
rises at a rate of 0.4m per hour are reported by WCRC as not uncommon at the Te Kuha recorder site 
during periods of high intensity rainfall in the southwest-northeast trending Paparoa Ranges.  This 
data highlights the importance of recognising hazards associated with rainfall-induced slope stability 
issues within the West Coast region.   
 
 
                                                     
1 WCRC Website:  http://www.wcrc.govt.nz/river_level_rainfall/24_hour/river_level_rainfall_site_map.htm.  Accessed in 
February 2011. 
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Table 2.1:  West Coast Regional Council water level and/or rainfall recorder information 
Recorder 
name 
Location and description 
Catchment 
area 
Water levels 
(summer low and 
typical levels) 
Mean annual 
rainfall 
Landing 
Inangahua River, 10km 
upstream of the Inangahua 
and Buller River confluence 
~1,000km
2
 
0.7m 
1.0m 
2,460mm (daily 
falls up to 170mm) 
Woolfs 
Buller River, 3km upstream 
of the Inangahua and Buller 
River confluence 
~4,560km
2
 
0.8m 
1.2m Not recorded (no 
rainfall gauge at 
the site) 
Te Kuha 
Buller River, 16km 
upstream of the Westport 
township 
~6,350km
2
 
0.9m 
1.4m 
2.3 Geomorphology 
Geomorphology considers the surface expression of landforms and the associated earth surface 
processes that have shaped them.  The predominant landforming processes that have shaped, and 
continue to characterise, the Lower Buller Gorge are tectonic, fluvial and hillslope processes.  The 
tectonic setting is outlined in this section, including a brief outline of topography and steep 
catchments within the project area.  It is also recognised that mass movement processes, including 
sediment transportation and deposition, are constantly active in any landscape and that these 
determine the comparatively more recent surface expression of landforms, and influence the 
geotechnical properties affecting slope stability.     
2.3.1 Tectonic setting 
The tectonic setting of the project area in the context of New Zealand is shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  
The South Island straddles the Australian and Pacific Plates (Figure 2.1).  The collisional movement 
between the plates is oblique in the South Island.  The right lateral movement between the two plates 
is predominantly accommodated by the Alpine Fault, which has average slip rates of 25-30mm per 
year (Ghisetti and Sibson, 2006).  The geomorphic expression in landforms due to the continued plate 
motion in the South Island is mountainous terrain, including the Southern Alps that are bounded to the 
west by the Alpine Fault.   
The Lower Buller Gorge is located on the western side of the Alpine Fault in a tectonically active 
region.  Tectonic provinces shown on Figure 2.2 indicate the project area is within the Nelson-North 
Westland Province, characterised by reverse faults.  Tectonic processes on a local scale are directly 
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linked to the underlying geological structure and lithologies, including igneous intrusions and eruptive 
sequences.  Lithological units present within the project area are outlined in Section 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Plate tectonic setting of New 
Zealand (based on Stafford et al, 2008) 
Figure 2.2:  Tectonic provinces in New 
Zealand (based on Stirling et al, 2002) 
Research conducted by Ghisetti and Sibson (2006) looked at the crustal architecture in the northwest 
region of the South Island.  The research was based around reconstructing structural contours at the 
base of the Oligocene carbonate sequence to determine how compressional inversion is 
accommodated in this region.  The findings of the research are relevant to this project in terms of 
understanding the tectonic processes that have formed the current landscape in the region and the 
implications for seismic activity.  A summary of the tectonic history and interpretations made by 
Ghisetti and Sibson (2006) are provided below: 
 Late Cretaceous-Paleocene and Eocene:  period of extension in pre-existing basement, and the 
development of high-angle faults (dipping at >60°). 
 Early Miocene:  compressional inversion of the high-angle faults due to right-lateral 
displacement and transpression on the Alpine Fault.  Faults typically trend between N-S and 
NNE-SSW, and dip at the surface between 45° and 75° both to the east and the west.  The active 
reverse faulting cuts sub-parallel folds that deform Tertiary sequences overlying Paleozoic-
Mesozoic basement rock. 
Project 
Area 
Project 
Area 
N 
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The current tectonic processes occurring in the region are considered by Ghisetti and Sibson (2006) to 
involve a mixed style of inversion.  The style inferred comprises reactivation of a number of high-
angle normal faults and thrusting on comparatively more recent, moderately-dipping and cross-cutting 
faults.  The thrusting results in segments of basement rocks becoming detached, as well as flexural 
folding of overlying sedimentary rocks.  Seismic activity within basement rocks at shallow depths 
(10-15km) was determined as likely controlled by these potentially blind or concealed faults.   
Understanding the tectonic regime in the northwest of the South Island provides a context for the 
historic seismic activity experienced in the region and the probability of future earthquake events.  In 
terms of a slope movement triggering mechanism, seismic activity is a comparatively low frequency 
but potentially high impact hazard.  Seismic data relevant to the project area from 1900 to 2010 is 
presented in Section 2.5. 
2.3.2 Topography and rivers 
The topography of the hills above the rail is typically very steep, bush-covered slopes, with the 
dominant vegetation type of beech and dense podocarp forests.  Due to the combination of steep 
topography and high annual rainfall, the project area is potentially subject to each mechanism of 
failure outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.7 (falls, topples, slides, lateral spreads and flows).  Falls and 
slides appear to be the dominant mechanisms of failure in the project area, based on the review of 
PGL (2007).    
The rail alignment follows the natural topographic contours near the hillslope base in the Lower 
Buller Gorge, above the true right bank of the Buller River.  New Zealand Topographic Maps (NZTM 
Sheets B20 and B21) at a scale of 1:50,000 (Figure 1.5) show the rail alignment within the project 
area is at an elevation between 50m amsl (eastern end) and 15m amsl (western end).  Figure 1.5 
indicates 34 watercourses that transect the rail.  The majority of watercourses shown are unnamed 
tributaries to the Buller River.  Those that are named are detailed below, moving from east to west 
through the project area, including the closest SNL metrage peg for reference: 
 Welshman Creek (97km) 
 Mackley River (100km) 
 Muddy Creek (103km) 
 Tracy Stream (104km)  
 Filtons Creek (106km)  
 Browns Creek (108km) 
 
 Payne Creek (109km)  
 Newman Creek (110km) 
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 Stable Creek (110km) 
 Redmond Creek (117km) 
 Cascade Creek (121km) 
 Little Cascade Creek (122km)   
Due to the steep catchments in the project area, the watercourses have the ability to erode and 
transport often large volumes of rock and finer sediment.  The deposition of the material forms 
alluvial fans on the Buller River floodplain.  The largest alluvial fan in the project area is associated 
with deposition from the Mackley River, near SNL100km.  In terms of landslide hazards the 
development of alluvial fans is not in itself a concern, but fluvial processes associated with overland 
flow of water during high intensity rainfall can result in rainfall-induced slope movements.  Saturation 
of soil also causes shallow regolith failures in cut or steep natural slopes adjacent to the rail. 
2.4 Geology 
The geological structure of units, degree of weathering and impact of cut slopes to form the rail 
alignment is critical to characterising hazards associated with slope movement within the project area.  
This section introduces the main geological units present and known fault traces in close proximity to 
the rail alignment.  Seismic data relevant to the project is presented in Section 2.5. 
Previous research related to geological characteristics in the Lower Buller Gorge include:  Wellman 
(1950); Beck et al (1958); Nathan (1978); Nathan et al (1986); Tulloch and Kimbrough (1989); and 
Tulloch and Palmer (1990).  Hawks Crag Breccia is one of the most extensively researched units in 
the Lower Buller Gorge, largely due to the presence of uranium and the associated prospecting that 
occurred from the 1950s (Beck et al, 1958; Wodzicki, 1959).  The following excerpt is from Beck et 
al (1958) and relates directly to observations in rail cut slopes in the vicinity of Sinclair Castle (shown 
on Figure 2.6):  
“In the railway cutting near Sinclair’s Castle a radioactive quartz veinlet containing 
uraniferous hydrocarbon cuts granite-gneiss, on the surface of which meta-autunite is not 
uncommon.  Radioactivity has also been detected in quartz-pyrite veins in granite-gneiss in 
Mispickel Creek, near Sinclair’s Castle, and in quartz-pyrite-molybdenite lodes in 
Greenland rocks in Quartz Creek, a tributary of Cascade Creek” 
Mispickel and Quartz Creeks are not major tributaries and their exact locations are unknown but 
Cascade Creek is shown located between SNL120 and 121km.  Beck et al (1958) also refer to at least 
ten uraniferous horizons on the northern side of the Buller Gorge that range between approximately 
50mm and 600mm in width.  
 24 
 
Published geological maps that incorporate the project area include Nathan et al (2002); 
Rattenbury et al (1998); Nathan (1978) and Bowen (1964).  Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the mapped 
geological units present in the Lower Buller Gorge, based on Bowen (1964) and Nathan et al (2002) 
respectively.  Metrage references are labelled every 5km, denoted also by a blue symbol.   
 
Symbol Description Age 
 sg 
SPEARGRASS FORMATION:  Local fan and river aggradation 
gravel. 
Pleistocene 
 Lwh-d 
COBDEN LIMESTONE:  Sandy slightly glauconitic limestone 
with basal calcareous grit overlying hard, muddy limestone with 
bands of calcareous mudstone.  
Oligocene 
 Ak-r 
KAIATA SILTSTONE and MARIUA FORMATION:  Massive, 
moderately calcareous siltstone (Kaiata Formation).  Carbonaceous 
siltstone interbedded with sandstone (Mariua Formation). 
Upper 
Eocene 
 Af Quartz sandstone, grit and conglomerate with coal seams. 
 
Khc 
HAWKS CRAG BRECCIA:  Unsorted, non-marine conglomerate 
and breccia in coarse, angular sandstone matrix.  Rare siltstone and 
sandstone. 
Jurassic 
 
Koh 
OHIKA BEDS:  Coarse quartz sandstone and conglomerate, vitric 
tuff, dark fissile shale, carbonaceous mudstone, greywacke and 
quartz-porphyry basal conglomerate.   
 bp 
BERLINS PORPHYRY:  Coarsely crystalline quartz-porphyry, 
locally with greywacke and argillite xenoliths. 
Late 
Jurassic 
 
Zgl 
GREENLAND GROUP:  Undifferentiated, indurated, dark grey 
greywacke with greenish grey argillite showing slaty cleavage.  
Strikes northwest. 
Precambrian 
 tu 
TUHUA GRANITE:  Undifferentiated, massive or porphyritic, 
white, grey or pink potash-alkali or calc-alkali granite banded 
gneiss, adamellite, granodiorite and diorite. 
? Permian to 
Precambrian 
Figure 2.3:  Geological map of the project area (based on Bowen, 1964).  
125 
120 
115 
110 
105 
100 
N 
 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbol Description Age 
 Q2a River gravel and sand, and fan deposits  Quaternary 
 On 
Limestone, predominantly shallow-water bioclastic varieties 
(Nile Group) 
Oligocene 
 Erk 
KAIATA FORMATION:  Brown carbonaceous mudstone, 
locally containing conglomeratic debris-flow beds 
Eocene 
 Koh 
HAWKS CRAG BRECCIA:  Breccia and breccia-
conglomerate composed of varying proportions of granitoid 
rocks and Greenland Group 
Cretaceous  Ko 
Undifferentiated fluvial conglomerate and sandstone, locally 
hematitic (Pororari Group) 
 Krm Leucocratic muscovite granite (Rahu Suite) 
 Krt Biotite granodiorite and tonalite (Rahu Suite).   
 Ɵg 
GREENLAND GROUP:  Undifferentiated greenish-grey 
quartzose sandstone and shale, hornsfelsed close to granitoid 
plutons 
Ordovician 
Figure 2.4:  Geological map of the project area (based on Nathan et al, 2002). 
The following summary of geological units present in the project area refers frequently to Figure 2.4, 
and only those units not incorporated into the legend are represented in the following text with their 
relevant identifying letters.     
125 
120 
115 
110 
105 
100 
Lower Buller Fault Mt William Fault 
Inangahua Fault 
Major faults listed below that intersect the rail corridor.  Solid black lines = accurately mapped; Dashed black lines = 
approximate location; Red line = active fault.  Ticks represent downthrown side of fault (Nathan et al, 2002). 
N 
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2.4.1 Basement rocks 
Pre-Cenozoic basement rocks in the project area comprise Buller terrane (part of the Tuhua composite 
terrane); Cretaceous plutonic rocks and Devonian-Carboniferous plutonic rocks (Bowen, 1964 and 
Nathan et al, 2002).  Figure 2.5 shows these basement rocks in the vicinity of the project area, 
including major fault structures that delineate the units.   
 
Figure 2.5:  Pre-Cenozoic basement rocks of the project area and surrounding region in the 
South Island, subdivided into tectonostratigraphic terranes (based on Nathan, 2002) 
Within the project area the oldest rocks present (Buller terrane) are Greenland Group sedimentary 
rocks (Ordovician), comprising interbedded green-grey muddy sandstone (greywacke) and shale 
(argillite) (Nathan et al, 2002).  Greenland Group rocks are predominantly located on the northern 
side of the Buller River with a thin sliver mapped across the river around SNL118km (Figures 2.3 
and 2.4).   
Cretaceous granitoids are the next oldest unit, including Rahu Suite plutons of leucocratic muscovite 
granite (Krm) and biotite granodiorite and tonalite (Krt) (Nathan et al, 2002).  These units are mapped 
on Figure 2.4 between SNL119km and 125km on both sides of the Buller River, and are bounded by 
the Lower Buller Fault to the west, and an unnamed fault trace to the west.  Bowen (1964) maps this 
sequence as Tuhua Granite (Figure 2.3) at the same metrage locations.  Other outcrops of Rahu Suite 
(krt) are shown on Figure 2.4 at SNL109km and SNL104-105km.  Bowen (1964) labels the outcrop at 
SNL109km as Berlins Porphyry (Figure 2.3). 
N 
0                           20km 
Project 
area 
LEGEND 
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Early Cretaceous units in the project area comprise Hawks Crag Breccia and Pororari Group coarse-
grained, non-marine rocks (Nathan et al, 2002), which are predominant in the project area between 
SNL110km and 117km).  Bowen (1964) shows the fault-bounded contact between Hawks Crag 
Breccia (Khc) and Ohika Beds (Koh) on Figure 2.3 and this intersects the rail alignment just to the 
east of the SNL114km metrage peg, trending northwest-southeast.   
Hawks Crag Breccia is described by Nathan et al (2002) as a poorly-sorted, matrix-supported breccia 
and breccia-conglomerate.  State Highway 6 (SH6) in the Lower Buller Gorge is cut through Hawks 
Crag Breccia and a rail tunnel (Tunnel 2) was required through the unit (260m long between 
SNL113km and 114km).  Clasts within the breccia in this area are Greenland Group-derived hornfels, 
and have been measured up to 500mm in length (Nathan et al, 2002). 
2.4.2 Tertiary rocks 
The oldest Tertiary sedimentary rocks in the region are the Brunner Coal Measures, located to the 
north of the western extent of the project area (labelled ‘Eb’ in Figure 2.4, north of SNL123km to 
126km).  In relation to the project area this unit is not known to directly intersect the rail alignment 
and is not discussed further.   
Eocene sedimentary rocks within the project area include Kaiata Formation.  This unit is a massive, 
dark brown carbonaceous mudstone that contains interbedded mass-flow deposits near Westport 
(Nathan et al, 2002).  Exposures of Kaiata Formation in the rail corridor are intermittently present 
between SNL99km and 103km (Figures 2.3 and 2.4).  Site visits made during this thesis also 
identified Kaiata Formation sandstones and mudstones around SNL107.50km. 
Oligocene sedimentary rocks are particularly relevant to the research project as they incorporate 
calcareous sediments present at Whitecliffs (Figure 2.4).  The depositional history for this end of the 
project area, and moving more towards the margin of the Murchison Basin, is presented in Chapter 6.  
The youngest tertiary rocks that intersect the rail alignment are Miocene muddy sandstones (O’Keefe 
Formation) of the Blue Bottom Group (Nathan et al, 2002).  Outcrops of this unit occur only on the 
western side of the Paparoa Range.  O’Keefe Formation (labelled ‘Mbo’ on Figure 2.4) is present on 
the western side of the Lower Buller Fault at SNL126km.   
2.4.3 Quaternary deposits 
Quaternary alluvial deposits are mapped in the project area around SNL100km to 101km and 
SNL103km to 104km.  Typical deposits comprise rounded boulders in a sandy matrix (Nathan et al, 
2002).  While large alluvial fan deposits are often present at the confluence of steep streams that drain 
range fronts, there are no such features mapped within the Lower Buller Gorge west of the Mackley 
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River due to the velocity and flow of the Buller River carrying sediment from the surrounding 
catchments further downstream.  The closest mapped alluvial fan deposit is located near the western 
extent of the project area (Q2a), and north of this unit are weathered (and locally cemented) river 
gravel and sand (denoted by ‘eQa’ on Figure 2.4, Nathan et al, 2002).  This fan deposit is situated at a 
remote distance from the Buller River.   
2.4.4 Faults 
Three main faults are mapped as intersecting the rail:  The Lower Buller Fault, Mt William Fault and 
Inangahua Fault, shown on Figure 2.4.  Recent papers by Stirling et al (2002) and Stafford et al (2008) 
detail the structure and characteristics of these fault lines in regards to the development of seismic 
hazard models.  The Lower Buller Fault typically trends NE-SW, dipping towards the east at 
approximately 45-60° (Stirling et al, 2002), and bounds the western extend of Tuhua Granite in this 
section of the rail (between SNL125 and 126km).   
The Mt William Fault is inferred to intersect the rail alignment near SNL115.5km.  The fault trends 
NE-SW and dips towards the east at around 45° (Stirling et al, 2002).  The Inangahua Fault is mapped 
to the east of the project area, trending NE-SW and dipping steeply towards the west.   
2.5 Seismicity 
The tectonic setting of the project area presented in Section 2.3.1 shows that the rail corridor is 
located in a seismically active region, characterised by reverse faults. Seismic activity is a central 
component to the potential risk of failure at Whitecliffs and other localities in the project area due to 
the steep topography adjacent to the rail alignment.  The two largest magnitude earthquakes that have 
occurred in close proximity to the project area in the last 100 years are (from Downes, 1995):  
 1929 Buller (Murchison) earthquake – magnitude 7.8ML (local magnitude); and 
 1968 Inangahua earthquake – magnitude 7.1MS (surface wave magnitude).   
The epicentres for these two events are shown on Figure 2.10.  The 1929 event is hereafter generally 
referred to as the Buller earthquake.  This section presents information regarding seismicity relevant 
to the project area, obtained from GeoNet
2
.  Reported impacts to the rail corridor as a result of 
earthquake-generated landslides, following the Buller and Inangahua events, are presented in 
Appendix 3.1.   
 
                                                     
2 GeoNet is the name given to a project between the Earthquake Commission and GNS Science that comprises a network of geophysical 
instruments, automated software applications and staff.  The role of GeoNet includes detecting, analysing and responding to geological 
hazards in New Zealand.   
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2.5.1 GeoNet data 
Information available from GeoNet was reviewed to establish recent seismic activity in the project 
area and immediately surrounding region.  Records for earthquakes with a magnitude (M) of M5+ are 
provided on GeoNet’s ‘Quake Search’ facility from the early 1900s.  The historic record for 
comparatively lower magnitude events (<M5) is available from 1940.  It is recognised that various 
magnitudes have been used historically, and the generic term magnitude is used without specification. 
 
Figure 2.6:  Distribution of magnitude 4.0-4.9 earthquakes (1940-2010) and magnitude 5.0-7.9 
earthquakes (1900-2010).  1 = 1929 Buller Earthquake epicentre; 2 = 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake epicentre.   
Magnitudes are predominantly recorded as ML (only four as MW) in the GeoNet database.  A 
summary of the data provided on Figure 2.10 is discussed below.  The year and number of 
earthquakes recorded between magnitude 4.0 and 7.9 are summarised graphically on Figure 2.7. 
 
1 
2 
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Figure 2.7:  Seismic record for magnitude 4.0-7.9 earthquakes between 1900 and 2010 (refer Figure 2.6 for geographical coverage) 
SEISMIC RECORD FROM 1900 TO 2010 FOR THE PROJECT AREA AND IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING REGION 
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 Magnitude 5.0-7.9 seismic data:  There were 26 earthquakes of M5 or greater reported on 
GeoNet between 1900 and 2010.  Figure 2.10 shows 22 of these events
3
.    All of these 
earthquakes had a focal depth of <40km, with the exception of the easternmost location shown 
on Figure 2.6 that had a focal depth of 94km in 2006 (ML = 5.9).     
 Magnitude 4.0-4.9 seismic data:  The distribution of M4.0-4.9 earthquakes is presented on 
Figures 2.6 for the period 1940 to 2010.  Of the 269 M4.0-4.9 earthquakes recorded, only five 
had a focal depth greater than 40km and are all located near the eastern extent of Figure 2.6.   
 
Figure 2.7 shows that the majority of earthquakes and related aftershocks are associated with the M6.7 
Inangahua earthquake in 1968 and M7.8 Murchison earthquake in 1929.  The epicentres of these two 
earthquakes are shown on Figure 2.6.  The data record does not include aftershocks from the 1929 
event below M5. 
2.6 Summary 
The Lower Buller Gorge project area is characterised by steep topography that is covered with dense 
native vegetation.  High annual rainfall (>2,000mm per year), combined with steep catchments, 
indicates that the slope adjacent to the rail corridor are susceptible to rainfall-induced landsliding.  
Seismic data available for the region indicate the Lower Buller Gorge is also located in a seismically 
active area, characterised by reverse faults.  Two large (>M7) earthquakes occurred in close proximity 
to the eastern extent of the project area in 1929 (Buller) and 1968 (Inangahua).   
The geology of the project area is well documented, comprising various geological units, including 
basement sedimentary rocks (Greenland Group), granites and sedimentary breccias (Hawks Crag 
Breccia).  Tertiary sedimentary rocks are present at the eastern end of the project area, including 
limestone that forms the outcrop at Whitecliffs, around SNL97.5km.  Quaternary alluvial deposits, 
sourced from the Buller River and its catchment, form the most recent geological units.   
To characterise landslide susceptibility and hazards, the historical record requires review to determine 
previous slope areas that have failed along the rail corridor; the relevant triggering mechanism, and 
future susceptibility.  The landslide inventory developed is fully documented in Chapter 3. 
  
                                                     
3 One event in 1929 did not have a magnitude specified and three events were reported with the same coordinate reference 
(two in 1929 and one in 1968). 
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CHAPTER 3:  LANDSLIDE RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Development of a landslide inventory is a key component to assessing the geotechnical risk of slope 
failures within the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor, including the permanent speed restriction areas at 
Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.  AGS (2007) define a landslide inventory as:  ‘an inventory of the location, 
classification, volume, activity and date of occurrence of individual landslides in an area’.  The 
objective of Chapter 3 is to collate all available historical information related to the rail construction 
and landslide occurrences for the purpose of:  
 Risk identification (landslide inventory);  
 Establishing information gaps; and  
 Understanding and outlining the thesis limitations.   
In addition to the information requirements outlined by AGS (2007), the triggering mechanism that 
initiated slope movement is also important.  The research hypothesis of a seismic trigger being the 
most likely source for a large-scale failure at Whitecliffs, and other locations within the project area, 
requires a review of available information to determine whether there is any evidence to suggest 
previous failures directly attributable to seismic shaking.   
A desktop study was conducted to achieve the above objectives.  Information for the desktop study 
was obtained from KiwiRail, and a variety of other sources, including those outlined in Table 3.1.  
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide detailed background information relating to the rail construction history, 
and the timing, and rationale, behind the permanent speed restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha, 
based on literature reviews and discussions with key railway personnel.  All information not sourced 
directly from KiwiRail (Section 3.4) is provided in Appendices 3.1 to 3.4.   
The main outcome of the desktop study has been the development of a landslide inventory, presented 
in Section 3.5.  This inventory is applied further in Chapter 4 in terms of landslide susceptibility 
mapping for the project area and identification of key risk sites. 
Details regarding landslide occurrences adjacent to SH6 are included in the desktop study, where 
relevant, as a result of high intensity and/or long duration rainfall events.  The inclusion of these 
records is considered relevant in terms of establishing landslide frequency since impacts to transport 
corridors would rarely be constrained to one side of the gorge only, despite the absence of direct 
reports specific to the rail corridor in many cases.   
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Table 3.1:  Desktop study items and information sources 
Item 
Information source(s) and summary of detail 
obtained 
Thesis 
section 
B
a
ck
g
ro
u
n
d
 
Rail construction history A review of the publication by the NZRLSI (1964) 
provided detailed information regarding 
construction of the Lower Buller Gorge rail 
corridor. 
3.2 
Permanent speed 
restrictions 
Discussions were had with key railway personnel 
to establish whether the rationale and timing 
behind the permanent 25km/hour speed 
restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha is known. 
3.3 
L
a
n
d
sl
id
e 
in
v
en
to
ry
 d
a
ta
 s
o
u
rc
es
 
KiwiRail information Review of data and reports provided by KiwiRail 
relevant to landslides, derailments and track 
inspections, including discussions with key 
railway personnel. 
3.4 
West Coast Regional 
Council records  
Collation of relevant entries reported in the 
WCRC natural hazards review document (DTec 
Consulting Limited, 2002) to establish the 
frequency of reported flooding and landslide 
incidents relevant to the Lower Buller Gorge, 
including the triggering mechanism. 
A3.1* 
Aerial photography  Stereoscopic viewing and interpretation of historic 
aerial photography flown in 1946, 1959 and 1985 
from NZAM.  Review of aerial imagery available 
from Google Earth and MapToaster.   
A3.2* 
1929 Buller earthquake Literature reviews conducted regarding landslide 
occurrence in the region as a result of the 
magnitude 7.8 (Ms) earthquake. 
A3.3* 
 
1968 Inangahua earthquake Literature reviews conducted regarding impacts to 
the rail corridor and landslide occurrence as a 
result of the magnitude 7.1 (Ms) earthquake.  
Landslide occurrence was also established through 
a search of information held in the Inangahua 
Earthquake Museum, and a review of aerial 
photography flown in 1970. 
A3.4* 
Final landslide inventory  Collation of all data sources available to produce a 
landslide inventory for the project area, including 
triggering mechanisms (where available). 
3.5 
*A = Appendix 3 references 
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3.2 Rail construction history 
The SNL was formerly known as the Stillwater to Westport Line (SWL).  This changed to SNL in 
2009 to incorporate the Ngakawau branch line
4
.  Construction of rail within the project area occurred 
over a 37 year period between 1906 and 1943 (NZRLSI, 1964).  A 9km length of rail between 
Westport and Te Kuha was initially opened in 1912, while the operation of trains through the entire 
Lower Buller Gorge was only officially opened in 1943.  The following timeline provides greater 
detail regarding the rail corridor construction history.  The timeline and subsequent discussion is 
based on information from NZRLSI (1946): 
1885:   Minister for Public Works advises the Government proposes to construct a branch line 
between Westport and Inangahua to connect this section with the main line. 
1906:   First steps in rail construction undertaken following surveys that identified the Buller 
Gorge as the most suitable link between Westport and Inangahua.   
1910:   The section of line between Westport and Te Kuha is completed.  Flax and timber were 
the predominant supplies being transported at this stage.    
1915:   Construction halted due to World War I. 
1926:   Formation of the rail from the Inangahua (eastern) end of the corridor commenced. 
Construction also started again from western end due to the formation of the Westport-
Cascade Coal Company Ltd, which had a rail connection at Cascade Creek. 
1927: The first train load of coal from Cascade Creek departed on 20 July 1927.  A siding at 
Cascade Creek contained coal bins that received the product via approximately 12km of 
water races that sluiced the coal through flumes from the mine entrance.   
1928:   Hawks Crag is reached.  Progress is typically slow due to the requirement for: excavations 
into rock; filling of large areas (embankments); culvert, bridge and tunnel construction. 
1932:   Construction halted at both ends of rail corridor in response to a pending world 
depression.  The report noted that foundations for a curved viaduct over Cascade Creek 
had been completed by 1932, but no specific date was provided. 
1936:     Construction work resumed.  Despite the advances in machinery and tools available, the 
landscape and rainfall made progress slow.   
1939:     Reduced machinery and workers available at the start of World War II. 
1941:   Final spike was driven at Slaty Creek (approximately 29km from Westport). 
1942:   
 
Rail is operational for transportation of supplies after track formation has been stabilised 
and cuttings completed.  Vulcan Railcars began operating between Westport and 
Greymouth on 7 September 1942. 
1943:   Official opening date of the rail between Te Kuha and Inangahua.  Formally handed over 
to the Railways Department.   
                                                     
4
 http://www.linz.govt.nz/placenames/consultation-decisions/a-to-z/railway-lines/report.aspx 
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Stations listed in the NZRLSI (1964) report, from east to west along the rail corridor, were:  
Inangahua; Buller; Mackley Ballast Pit; Rahui; Tiroroa; Cascade; Te Kuha; New Zealand Cement 
Company Siding; Westport; and Queen Street.  It was noted that the stations at Te Kuha and Cascade 
had already been closed by 1964.   
Rainfall was highlighted in the report as a constant challenge to construction.  An example provided 
from 1938 was the occurrence of over 5,000mm of rainfall recorded within 176 days.  The report also 
commented that despite ‘high speeds’ not being possible due to the curvature of the line, the track was 
laid to modern standards, including automatic signalling.  The frequency of train movements in the 
1960s through the Lower Buller Gorge was typically one or two goods train per day (each way), and a 
twice daily railcar service with travel times of 1.5 hours and 50 minutes respectively.   
3.3 Permanent speed restrictions 
To assess the risk of removing the existing 25km/hour speed restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha, 
the rationale and timing of when the restrictions were imposed needs to be understood.  KiwiRail 
provided contact information for current and former rail personnel that had knowledge of the history 
and operations within the project area.  The objectives of the discussions were to ascertain: 
A. Timing: When were the two 25km/hour speed restrictions imposed. 
B. Rationale: Why the speed restrictions were implemented and was there justification for 
25km/hour. 
C. Impacts: Previous direct impacts to the rail corridor at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha due to 
slope movement. 
The template used for the discussions is provided on the following page.  Questions asked were all 
specific to rail.  Table 3.2 summarises the outcome of the personal communications in terms of the 
detail provided specific to Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.  General information obtained during the 
discussions regarding slope movement hazards within the rail corridor is summarised in Section 3.4.4. 
Table 3.2:  Summary of information available regarding permanent speed restrictions at 
Whitecliffs and Te Kuha 
Objective Whitecliffs  Te Kuha 
A:  Timing Late 1960s to early 1970s. Late 1980s (indicative) 
B:  Rationale Unknown Unknown 
C:  Impacts Infrequent* 
 
Frequent (around once every two years)  
Late 1980s – rainfall induced failure 
*One small-scale incident recalled around 2005 (limestone blocks with a total volume <1m
3
). 
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University of Canterbury – HAZM thesis (Kristel Franklin) 
SWL 96km – 126km 
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There is uncertainty regarding the date the speed restrictions were imposed, as indicated in Table 3.2.  
Background information regarding the dates shown is discussed further in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  
There is no information available, or prior knowledge, that provided any clarification of why 
25km/hour was specified.  The maximum allowable speed through the two sections is considered to 
be 40-50km/hour based on track curvature and limited visibility at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha.    
Discussions to date with railway personnel indicate that people with knowledge of the area accept that 
the physical environment poses continued operational and maintenance challenges in the Lower 
Buller Gorge.  The removal of speed restrictions at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha was not considered a 
major concern provided that improved monitoring procedures at Whitecliffs were sufficient to enable 
early warning of a major rockfall event. 
3.3.1 Whitecliffs 
An important finding of the conversations was that there has been no recollection of a rockfall 
originating from Whitecliffs of sufficient volume to cause major rail disruptions.  One small-scale 
incident of rocks falling onto the rail was recalled to have occurred around 2005 (H. Armstrong, 
personal communication, November 2010).  This event did not cause a derailment or major disruption 
to rail operations (total volume <1m
3
).  This suggests that the talus apron that has formed at the base 
of Whitecliffs retains the majority of blocks that may topple or fall from the cliff-face.   
At a minimum, the speed restriction at Whitecliffs has been in place since the 1980s (B. Lancaster, 
personal communication, March 2010).  This date was based on the opinion that the potential for 
failure at Whitecliffs was identified as a risk after a resurgence in coal production in the mid to 
late-1980s, and the introduction of 70 tonne wagons (laden) being transported through the Lower 
Buller Gorge.   Another opinion was that the restriction at Whitecliffs has been in place since at least 
1968, after the magnitude 7.1 Inangahua Earthquake on 24 May 1968 (H. Armstrong, personal 
communication, November 2010).  It is noted that collapse of the limestone cliffs on the southern side 
of the Buller River resulted in loss of life and significant damage to road infrastructure during this 
event. 
A series of photographs taken of Whitecliffs between 1975 and 1981 were provided by KiwiRail for 
review.  The photographs were taken from the same location on each occasion to determine any 
discernible changes in the cliff-face profile over time.  Examples of the photographs are shown in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in comparison to the profile evident in 2011.  From the perspective shown in 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, there are no visible changes in the cliff-face profile between 1975 and 2011.  The 
focus on Whitecliffs evident at this time (from the mid-1970s) indicates awareness of the potential 
rockfall hazard, and corresponds to the speed restrictions being implemented prior to the 1980s.  It is 
unknown why this photographic monitoring technique was not continued after 1981. 
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Figure 3.1:  Whitecliffs profile comparing 1979 (left) and 2011 (right) photographs 
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Figure 3.2:  Defects in near vertical limestone outcrop at Whitecliffs in 1976 (left) and 2011 (right).  
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3.3.2 Te Kuha 
Background knowledge regarding the speed restriction at Te Kuha is less certain than for Whitecliffs.  
It is considered that it was likely imposed in 1987 due to rainfall over a six day period (14 to 
20 January 1987) that caused widespread disruption to transportation routes throughout the region 
(B. Lancaster, personal communication, March 2010).  Damage during this event specific to the rail 
corridor included a large landslide that destroyed half of the Windy Point rail tunnel (Tunnel 7) near 
Te Kuha.  This tunnel was subsequently daylighted. 
The area in general around Te Kuha between SNL124 and 126km is frequently regarded by rail 
personnel as one of concern in terms of landslides, with a high frequency (about one every two years) 
of debris impacting the rail corridor.  No details on volumes or run-out distances were provided.   
3.4 KiwiRail information  
Section 3.4.1 summarises information provided by KiwiRail in regards to reported incidents between 
SNL96 and 126km that involved landslides, including any derailments directly attributable to 
movement from upslope sources.  Sites listed by PGL (2007) relating to slope instability features are 
discussed in Section 3.4.2.  One site-specific report for a landslide in 2006 at SNL112.96km is 
presented in Section 3.4.3.  General information from various discussions with KiwiRail and Ontrack 
staff is summarised in Section 3.4.4. 
3.4.1 Landslide data 
Information was requested from KiwiRail regarding reported landslides, flooding events and 
derailments on the SNL.  Landslides are generally referred to as ‘slips’ in the KiwiRail data sets.  The 
historic record provided was based on relatively recent data.  For landslide and flooding incidents that 
impacted rail operations, data was provided for the period 1 July 2004 to 5 April 2011.  For 
derailments that occurred due to landslides, data was provided for the period 1 August 2006 to 
27 April 2011.   
A review of the information provided by KiwiRail indicated that 503 incidents relating to slips and 
flooding were reported nationally between 1 July 2004 and 5 April 2011.  Of these, 28 occurred on 
the SNL, including 12 within the project area between SNL96km and 126km.  Only one recorded 
derailment occurred on the SNL due to a slip during the period 1 August 2006 to 27 April 2011 (out 
of nine reported nationally).  The incident occurred at SNL105.60km.  A summary of relevant 
information provided by KiwiRail is provided in Table 3.3, including the incident date, SNL metrage 
and description. 
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Table 3.3:  Flooding, landslide and derailment incident reporting during the period 1 July 2004 
to 5 April 2011 (based on KiwiRail data) 
Date  
Location 
(metrage on 
the SNL) 
Description 
17 February 2005 105.30 Digger dispatched to site.  Services suspended pending slip 
clearance. 
7 March 2005 107.50 Slip reported by AC Transfield Services.  Suspected that service 
841 struck small slip, and the Train Controller imposed a 10kmh 
speed restriction. 
25 March 2005 113.00 846 struck rock on track between Tiroroa - Berlins, no damage. 
AC Transfield Services completed inspection, and track clearance 
was received at 1845 hours. 
3 June 2005 118.50 Locomotive Engineer reported removing a "large bush".  No 
damage reported. AC Transfield Services imposed a 10kmh speed 
restriction until track inspection completed. 
18 January 2006 119.00 Slip in the Buller Gorge located by wet weather track inspection. 
23 April 2006 104.85 845 struck slip in the Buller Gorge.  Locomotive Engineer made an 
emergency brake application travelling on 25km/hour speed 
restriction and reported a collision with a small slip and tree with 
further movement noted on the above hillside.  A severe weather 
warning was in force at the time. 
30 July 2008 124.00 Slip in the Buller Gorge.  124.00 - 124.50km line closed (Te Kuha). 
31 July 2008 123.80 Tree reported across track at 123.80km.  Ganger doing run through 
Buller Gorge, after clearing slip, came across it. High-rail digger to 
assist, estimated track clearance at 1140 hours. 
10 January 2010 119.00 Slip in the Buller Gorge at 119.00km found by gang on wet weather 
run. 
4 August 2010 120.00 Large boulder landed on, and damaged, one rail. 
13 August 2010 112.00 845 struck a tree 112.00km SNL.  Track was checked by Westport 
ganger and all clear given at 1100 hours.  No damage to locomotive 
845, no delays. 
13 January 2011 105.60 846 derailed at 105.60km on SNL between Inangahua and Tiroroa.  
Derailed five wagons. 
6 March 2011 125.50 Work Train 82 struck a slip at approximately 125.50km SNL 
between Tiroroa and Westport.  Slip about 2 to 3 metres above rail 
level. Damage to cowcatcher fuel tank punctured. 
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The reported incidents on the SNL do not include details regarding volume of material or the nature of 
failure.  It is recommended that future reporting attempts to characterise the nature of the landslides, 
including a photographic record, and basic details regarding volume of soil/rock released and 
dimensions of the area impacted.   
The occurrence of trees and vegetation slipping onto the rail is highlighted in the reported incidents.  
Of the thirteen entries in Table 3.3, four refer specifically to trees on the rail (3 June 2005, 23 April 
2006, 31 July 2008 and 13 August 2010).  Two reports refer to possible rockfalls (25 March 2005 and 
4 August 2010).  There were no reported incidents of rockfalls in the vicinity of Whitecliffs.  Two of 
the entries are related to known slope stability issues around Te Kuha (SNL124.00km on 30 July 2008 
and SNL125.50km on 6 March 2011). 
Information from an additional KiwiRail database for a similar period (February 2004 to June 2011) 
included entries not recorded in Table 3.3.  The additional incidents are presented in Table 3.4, but 
only limited detail was provided. 
Table 3.4:  Landslide related incident reporting during the period February 2004 to June 2011 
Date  Location (SNL metrage) Description 
28 February 2004 Not stated Slip-derailment Westport. 
22 November 2006 Not stated Slip in the Buller Gorge. 
6 August 2007 102.80km Possible slip. 
24 November 2008 97.50km Bad slip at Whitecliffs. 
17 April 2009 Cascade  Surface flooding. 
19 December 2009 120.50km Flooding at Cascade. 
13 September 2010 Not stated Small rockfall in Buller Gorge. 
23 April 2011 125.80km Slip. 
24 April 2011 123.10km Slip. 
 
3.4.2 Geotechnical assessment (PGL, 2007) 
The PGL (2007) report discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.8, included an itemised list of sites labelled 
‘issues’ that required remediation.  The following list is based on sites that PGL (2007) identified as 
being of concern in terms of slope stability (labelled by SNL metrage and a brief description based on 
text by PGL).  Interpretations based on the PGL (2007) photographic record are in brackets, where 
relevant.  
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 97.60 Whitecliffs, rockfall potential 
 101.65 Slip (shallow regolith failure) 
 104.80 Slip blocked water table drain (surficial material only, <1m depth) 
 105.05 Slip (surficial material only, <1m depth) 
 106.65 Large historic landslide  
 107.55 Large historic landslide, including derailment in 2004 
 110.95 ‘Historic landslip’ (photograph appears recent, small-scale shallow regolith failure) 
 111.57 Historic landslip (re-vegetated) 
 111.63 Slip on batter above track (shallow failure) 
 112.92 Historic landslide (shallow failure, partially re-vegetated) 
 115.95 Active landslide (shallow failure, slope angle <20°) 
 116.00 Active slip (shallow failure, slope angle <20°) 
 118.86 Sinclair Castle (historic rockfall site) 
 119.72 Rockfall potential 
 124.27 Historic rockfall site, western portal of Tunnel 6 
 125.40 Large historic landslide  
The terminology adopted by PGL (2007) is variable and little or no detail was provided on landslide 
dimensions, volumes, mechanism of failure or the triggering event.  Photographs presented by PGL 
(2007) do give an indication of the landslide feature scale, which is incorporated into the landslide 
inventory, where relevant, in Section 3.5.   
3.4.3 SNL112.96km landslide report (Ontrack, 2006) 
An initial report provided by KiwiRail relating to a landslide that occurred at SNL112.96km was 
reviewed (Ontrack, 2006).  The geology at this location comprises Hawks Crag Breccia (refer 
Chapter 2, Figures 2.3 and 2.4).  The shallow landslide had dimensions of approximately 20m (width) 
by 30m (height), as indicated in Figure 3.3.   
This event closed the SNL for three days (12-15 June 2006).  Slope angles were estimated at near 
vertical (over-steepened) from the rail alignment up to 10m, reducing to 40-50° from 10m height to 
the headscarp.  A volume estimate was not given but due to the shallow (<2m) failure surface 
approximately 100m
3
 of material was released.     
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Figure 3.3:  View of landslide at SNL112.96km from State Highway 6 (based on Ontrack, 2006). 
Rainfall was the triggering event, which also caused an approximate 20,000m
3
 landslide adjacent to 
SH6, resulting in a road closure for three days (Ontrack, 2006).  The main conclusions from the initial 
report are summarised below: 
 The change in slope angle at 10m above the rail alignment was interpreted as delineating the 
change from a cut slope to natural slope. 
 A loose boulder (>3m in diameter) was noted precariously positioned a few meters above the 
landslide headscarp. 
 The mode of failure was interpreted as a shallow translational slide. 
 No evidence to suggest further regression of the headscarp will occur, based on previous similar 
types of failures noted around this location that have re-vegetated naturally without on-going 
stability issues. 
 A detailed investigation was recommended to determine the most appropriate long-term 
management strategy for the landslide. 
General comments made in the report relate to the on-going challenges faced in regards to small to 
medium-scale slope stability issues throughout the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor, and the 
associated difficulty in prediction or mitigation of geotechnical hazards.  The closing comment 
highlighted a recommendation for a dedicated excavator (high-rail or heavy-duty trolley) for rapid 
response, in the event of landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge, to improve general route security.     
~30m 
~20m 
Buller River 
gRailg 
galignmentg 
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This landslide does not appear in Table 3.3 or 3.4.  Previously reported events have occurred in close 
proximity to the 2006 landslide at SNL112.96km, including 13 August 2010 at SNL112km, and 
25 March 2005 at SNL113km (refer Table 3.3). 
3.4.4 General information 
During discussions held with rail personnel, as outlined in Section 3.3, a question was asked regarding 
details on known historic rockfall or other slope movement hazards in the project area.  Three 
locations additional to Whitecliffs and Te Kuha were highlighted, as outlined below: 
 SNL107.50km:  Site of large landslide that caused a train derailment in 2004 (PGL, 2007).  This 
event is not recorded in Table 3.3 or 3.4.  
 SNL118.50km:  Sinclair Castle – on-going slope stability issues, including a landslide that 
closed the rail for a few hours in January 2006.  This event is recorded in Table 3.3 at 
SNL119.00km.  
 SNL121.00km:  Cascade – numerous rock avalanches, particularly in the late 1980s.   
Site specific details from these sites obtained during field work conducted between 2009 and 2011 are 
presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix 5.1.  Problems associated with loss of ballast, retaining 
structures and erosion from the Buller River were brought up by KiwiRail personnel to highlight that 
line integrity is often more at risk, in terms of safety, time and cost, when material beneath the railway 
line is compromised, rather than material falling onto the line from above.  The importance of 
adequate drainage design, ballast and retaining structures is recognised but does not form a part of this 
thesis.  These features have been investigated and reported previously by PGL (2007).    
3.5 Final landslide inventory 
The desktop study has identified a number of historic and comparatively more recent landslide 
features of varying scales in the project area that have impacted the rail corridor.  This section 
presents the final inventory (hazard identification) that will be used for analysis and further evaluation 
in Chapter 4 (Landslide Susceptibility).  The following discussion outlines the information gaps and 
associated limitations of the thesis based on the available historic record of landslide occurrence.   
The predominant landslide triggering mechanism in the Lower Buller Gorge is rainfall.  Earthquake-
generated landslides have been recorded primarily as a result of the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake.  
Limited detail was available for landslide occurrence in the Lower Buller Gorge after the 1929 
Murchison earthquake since the rail corridor was not fully completed at this time (Appendix 3.3 
and 3.4).   
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Specific details regarding landslide volumes, mechanism of failure, run-out distance and remedial 
works are very limited.  Table 3.5 summarises all available information from the various sources 
outlined in this chapter that had a specific metrage location.  The majority of events listed have 
directly impacted the rail corridor and operations.  The exception is a few entries by PGL (2007) that 
did not necessarily disrupt rail operations either due to the small volume of material released or 
comparatively low slope angles (<20°), which combined with distance from the rail, would not likely 
have caused any impacts aside from blocking culverts.  Specific events that resulted in an impact with 
a train and/or a derailment are represented by ‘T’ and ‘D’ respectively in the volume estimate column.  
Slope movement features identified from the aerial photograph review at locations remote from the 
rail alignment were not incorporated into the final inventory.   
The data presented is in order of distance, from SNL96km to 126km.  A full inventory would 
encompass hundreds of rainfall-induced failures of varying sizes, many of which would have minimal 
impact on the railway operations, and the data presented in Table 3.5 represents only a fraction of 
actual occurrences.  The triggering mechanism, information source(s), and date of occurrence, where 
known, are also noted.  Given the absence of accurate volume measurements, a logarithmic scale from 
<10m
3
 (very small) to >10,000m
3
 (very large) has been adopted to provide a comparison of the event 
scale, as indicated below: 
 <10m3 Very small 
 10-100m3 Small 
 100-1,000m3 Medium 
 1,000-10,000m3 Large 
 >10,000m3 Very large 
In cases where ‘slip’ is the only reference made to a landslide, and there are no photographs, it is not 
possible to assign a volume estimate (denoted by ‘unknown’ in Table 3.5).  Landslide travel distances 
and velocity are not shown on Table 3.5 due to the absence of this information in the historic record.  
The rail was formed onto the side of natural hillslopes at many locations in the Lower Buller Gorge, 
rather than by cutting and/or benching, and the distance between the base of slope and track is 
frequently <2m horizontally.  Based on these track formation characteristics, the travel velocity and 
distance factors are less variable components, in terms of direct impacts to rail, as slope failures 
originating on steep slopes (typically ≥20°) above to the corridor are likely to intersect the track 
regardless, with the exception of some smaller-scale landslides.  The situation at Whitecliffs differs 
from this generalised scenario due to the established talus apron at the base of the cliffs that 
effectively captures the majority of blocks from the outcrop.     
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Table 3.5:  Final landslide inventory for the project area   
Metrage 
(SNLkm) 
Volume Estimate 
Triggering 
Mechanism(s) 
Event Date 
Information 
Source 
95.96 Unknown (assumed at 
least medium) 
Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM 
96.00 Various – small to 
medium 
Rain, 
earthquake 
Various API 
~97.50 Very small (rockfall) Unknown 2005 KiwiRail 
97.50 Unknown Unknown 24 November 2008 KiwiRail 
97.74 Unknown Earthquake 24 May 1968 Duckworth (1968) 
98.00 Small (rockfall) Earthquake May 1968 
(assumed) 
API 
101.65 Very small to small Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
102.80 Unknown Rain 6 August 2007 KiwiRail 
104.80 Very small Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
104.85 T – Small Rain 23 April 2006 KiwiRail 
105.05 Very small Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
105.30 Unknown Rain 17 February 2005 KiwiRail 
105.60 TD – Unknown Rain 13 January 2011 KiwiRail 
106.65 Medium to large Unknown Unknown PGL 
107.50 Small to large Rain Various  KiwiRail, PGL 
107.50 Very small Rain 7 March 2005 KiwiRail 
107.55 T – Medium to large Rain 2004 PGL 
108.60 Small to medium Unknown Pre-1985 API 
108.63 Medium to large Earthquake 24 May 1968 Duckworth (1968) 
110.95 Small Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
111.00 Small Unknown Pre-1985 API 
111.04 Unknown Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM 
111.57 Small to medium Unknown Pre-2007 PGL 
111.63 Small to medium Unknown Pre-2007 PGL 
112.00 T – Very small (tree) Rain 13 August 2010 KiwiRail 
112.92 Small to medium Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
112.96 Small to medium Rain 12 June 2006 KiwiRail 
113.00 T – Very small Rain 25 March 2005 KiwiRail 
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Metrage 
(SNLkm) 
Volume Estimate 
Triggering 
Mechanism(s) 
Event Date 
Information 
Source 
113.00 Various Unknown Pre-1947 API 
113.80 Large Unknown Pre-1947 API 
114.00 Large to very large Unknown Pre-1947 API 
115.95 Small Rail Pre-2007 PGL 
116.00 TD – Unknown Rain 10 February 1944 WCRC 
116.00 Very small Rain Pre-2007 PGL 
116.50 Small Unknown Pre-1959 API 
116.68 Unknown Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM 
117.28 Unknown Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM 
117.44 Unknown Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM 
117.48 Large to very large Earthquake 24 May 1968 IEM, Duckworth 
(1986) 
118.50 Very small 
(vegetation) 
Rain 3 June 2005 KiwiRail 
118.80 to 
119.50 
Very large Unknown Pre-1947 API 
118.86 Small to large Rain, 
Earthquake 
Various KiwiRail, PGL 
119.00 Unknown (rail closed) Rain 25 March 1964 WCRC 
119.00 Small to medium Rain Pre-1985 API 
119.00 Unknown (rail closed) Rain 18 January 2006 KiwiRail 
119.00 Unknown Rain 10 January 2010 KiwiRail 
120.00 Very small (rockfall) Rain 4 August 2010 KiwiRail 
120.00 Small to medium Unknown Pre-1985 API 
121.00 Small to large Rain Various KiwiRail 
121.50 Various (small to 
large) 
Unknown Various API 
122.43 Small to medium Earthquake May 1968 IEM 
123.10 Unknown Rain 23 April 2011 KiwiRail 
123.80 Very small (tree) Rain 31 July 2008 KiwiRail 
124.00 Small to medium 
(track closed) 
Rain 30 July 2008 KiwiRail 
124.27 Large Rain  Pre-2007 PGL 
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Metrage 
(SNLkm) 
Volume Estimate 
Triggering 
Mechanism(s) 
Event Date 
Information 
Source 
124.40 Medium Unknown Between 1985 and 
2001 
API 
125.00 Large Rain 14 January 1987 WCRC 
125.40 Very large Unknown Pre-2007 PGL 
125.50 T - Small Rain 6 March 2011 KiwiRail 
125.80 Unknown Rain 23 April 2011 KiwiRail 
Volume estimate key: 
T = train struck landslide 
D = derailment  
Information source key: 
PGL = Pacific Geotech Limited (2007) 
API = Aerial Photograph Interpretation  
WCRC = West Coast Regional Council 
IEM = Inangahua Earthquake Museum 
 
AGS (2007) also included landslide classification as an important component of a landslide inventory.  
The dominant mechanism of failure in the Lower Buller Gorge is shallow translational slides, 
comprising weathered bedrock, soil and vegetation.  Rock avalanches with source material originating 
from catchments many hundreds of metres above the rail alignment occur at Cascade and Sinclair 
Castle.  Rockfalls and topples are typical mechanisms of failure at Whitecliffs and other locations that 
occur in over-steepened rock outcrops (defect-controlled failures).  
3.6 Summary and synthesis 
Challenges related to steep topography, geological characteristics, high annual rainfall and access 
limitations within the Lower Buller Gorge were encountered during the construction of the rail 
corridor between 1912 and 1942, in addition to economic and societal influences.  These challenges 
still exist for the effective on-going operation of the SNL today.   
Existing speed restrictions at Te Kuha and Whitecliffs indicates awareness by rail operators of the 
possible slope movement hazards at these two locations.  There is very limited information available 
for the timing and rationale behind the speed restrictions.   
The purpose of landslide inventory development (Table 3.5) is risk identification as it highlights 
specific locations in the project area that have been impacted by slope movement originating from 
sources above the rail corridor.  Based on the research conducted regarding landslide occurrence, and 
triggering mechanisms, information gaps are present in terms of: 
 Temporal data prior to 2004; 
 Failure mechanisms (classification); 
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 Landslide volumes, and material; and 
 Run-out distances. 
Despite the limitations the inventory developed provides a basis for analysis.  Collation of landslide 
occurrences from all sources listed in Table 3.5 enables the most robust assessment currently possible 
for the project area in terms of documented slope failures.   
It is recommended that future reporting should characterise the nature of the landslides, including a 
photographic record, and basic details regarding volume of soil/rock released and dimensions of the 
area impacted.  The initial report for the landslide at SNL112.96km in 2006 provides a good example 
of the level of detail possible and even an abbreviated version of this type of report would be 
sufficient for establishing a more robust database.  
Detailed interpretation of the data provided in this chapter is presented in Chapter 4, including spatial 
representation of the landslide occurrences using ArcGIS as a platform for data presentation, and 
correlation to slope angles and geology characteristics of the project area.  The ‘hazard’ component of 
the Landslide Risk Management framework is outlined in Chapter 5, including case studies in 
Appendix 5.1 for selected key risk sites.  Information obtained specific to Whitecliffs and Te Kuha is 
incorporated into site models in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.   
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CHAPTER 4:  LANDSLIDE SUSCEPTIBILITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The focus of Chapter 4 is landslide susceptibility and zonation within the project area.  The primary 
objective of Chapter 4 is to present a qualitative landslide susceptibility zonation map based on the 
dataset developed in Chapter 3, and physical characteristics of the project area.   
The two basic principles to consider in preparing a landslide susceptibility zonation map, as outlined 
by Fell et al (2008a), are:  (1) ‘The past is the guide to the future’, in meaning that areas which have 
experienced landsliding in the past are likely to experience landsliding in the future; and (2) Areas 
with similar topography, geology and geomorphology as the areas which have experienced 
landsliding in the past are also likely to experience landsliding in the future.  There are exceptions to 
these assumptions, including a landslide that exhausts source material after one event, but the general 
principles can be easily adopted for the project area.   
The most basic method of describing a slope or area is as ‘susceptible’ or ‘not susceptible’ to 
landsliding.  In addition, susceptibility mapping descriptors can be either qualitative or quantitative.  
Examples provided by Fell et al (2008a) for natural slopes are provided on Table 4.1 of both types of 
descriptors applicable to rockfalls, small and large landslides.  The volume of material applied to the 
‘small’ and ‘large’ landslides was not specified by Fell et al (2008a). 
Table 4.1:  Landslide susceptibility mapping descriptors (based on Fell et al, 2008a) 
Susceptibility 
Descriptor 
Rockfalls 
Small landslides on 
natural slopes 
Large landslides on 
natural slopes 
Q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e 
Relative Geomechanical 
descriptors (e.g. 
SMR) 
Scores of contributing 
factors from data 
treatment techniques 
No detail provided by 
Fell et al  (2008a) 
Absolute Factor of safety values 
from stability models 
Factor of safety values 
from stability models 
Factor of safety values 
from stability models 
Q
u
a
li
ta
ti
v
e 
Field 
geomorphologica
l analyses 
Presence or absence 
of instability factors 
Number of landslides per 
square kilometre 
Presence or absence of 
landslides and their 
degree of preservation 
Density of scars on a 
rock slope 
Percentage of area 
covered by landslide 
deposits 
Presence or absence of 
activity indicators 
Index or 
parameter map 
Overlapping of index maps with or without 
weighting 
No detail provided by 
Fell et al  (2008a) 
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There are 60 reported landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge project area listed in Table 3.5.  The 
estimated volume(s) vary between ‘very small’ (<10m3) and ‘very large’ (>10,000m3).  To display the 
inventory data in an easily assessable format, the following table summarises the location and assigns 
a single volume estimate category for each entry between small (<100m
3
), medium (100 to 1,000m
3
) 
and large (>1,000m
3
).  A fourth category is required for landslides with unknown volumes because of 
the large proportion of occurrences (25%) that did not have a volume estimate reported. Volumes 
assigned are weighted towards the larger end of the scale in cases where a range is defined on 
Table 3.5.  
Table 4.2:  Individual landslide locations (SNL km) and assigned volume category   
Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Volume 
category 
 Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Volume 
category 
 Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Volume 
category 
95.96 Medium  111.00 Small  118.80 Large 
96.00 Medium  111.04 Unknown  118.86 Large 
97.50 Small  111.57 Medium  119.00 Unknown 
97.50 Unknown  111.63 Medium  119.00 Medium 
97.74 Unknown  112.00 Small  119.00 Unknown 
98.00 Small  112.92 Medium  119.00 Unknown 
101.65 Small  112.96 Medium  120.00 Small 
102.80 Unknown  113.00 Small  120.00 Medium 
104.80 Small  113.00 Large  121.00 Large 
104.85 Small  113.80 Large  121.50 Large 
105.05 Small  114.00 Large  122.43 Medium 
105.30 Unknown  115.95 Small  123.10 Unknown 
105.60 Unknown  116.00 Unknown  123.80 Small 
106.65 Large  116.00 Small  124.00 Medium 
107.50 Large  116.50 Small  124.27 Large 
107.50 Small  116.68 Unknown  124.40 Medium  
107.55 Large  117.28 Unknown  125.00 Large 
108.60 Medium  117.44 Unknown  125.40 Large 
108.63 Large  117.48 Large  125.50 Small 
110.95 Small  118.50 Small  125.80 Unknown 
Of the 60 reported landslides in the project area to date, 15 are classified as large; 12 as medium; 18 
as small; and 15 as unknown.  The ‘small’ category incorporates incidents of single rocks or trees 
falling onto the rail corridor.  Limitations of landslide inventories are considered the greatest source of 
error in landslide zoning (Cascini et al, 2005).  The methodology and limitations in developing the 
present landslide inventory have been documented in Chapter 3. 
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It is recognised that the steep natural slopes present above the majority of the rail corridor between 
SNL96 and 126km are critical for determining landslide susceptibility, particularly in conjunction 
with high annual rainfall experienced in the region and seismic activity.  The spatial distribution of 
landslide occurrences from the inventory developed in Chapter 3, and Table 4.2, are presented in the 
following sections in regards to landslide volume, slope angle and geology.  Based on the figures 
presented, a qualitative landslide susceptibility zonation map is developed, and methodology 
described, in Section 4.5.  
4.2 Spatial trends 
Locations and volume estimates from the landslide inventory are shown on Figure 4.1 to illustrate the 
spatial distribution of known and/or reported landslide occurrences.  Colours assigned to the landslide 
events reflect the magnitude (volume of material released).  The volume scale used is as specified in 
the legend of Figure 4.1.  To interpret the dataset, it is important to note the following:  
 Metrage locations are not shown to avoid visual confusion with symbology associated with 
landslide occurrence. 
 The scale of the symbology used is for comparison purposes and does not reflect the areal extent 
of the landslide.  
 53 of the 60 landslide events listed in Table 4.2 are clearly depicted on Figure 4.1.  The seven 
occurrences not shown are due to the close proximity of a number of locations, including:  one 
large event at 107.55km; medium events at 95.96 and 112.96km; one small event at 97.50km; 
one unknown volume events at 97.74km and two unknown volume events at 119km. 
A complete inventory would typically show a comparatively larger number of <100m
3
 (very small to 
small) landslides in comparison to 100-1000m
3
 (medium) or >1,000m
3
 (large) volume landslides.  
The absence of more ‘very small’ to ‘small’ landslides reflects the incomplete reporting of these 
comparatively lower magnitude, but higher frequency, events.  Landslide volumes in this order, 
particularly very small volumes <10m
3
, will not necessarily cause a major disruption to rail 
operations.   
The density of landslide occurrences increases from east to west, with a higher frequency of larger 
magnitude events between Hawks Crag Breccia (from SNL110km) and the western end of the project 
area at SNL126km (labelled near Te Kuha on Figure 4.1).  Historic failures of varying magnitudes 
have undoubtedly occurred at Whitecliffs prior to the rail construction in the 1940s.  This also applies 
to the remainder of the project area due to the steep topography and natural processes that occur over 
geologic time.  The purpose of Figure 4.1 is to characterise reported landslides based on the current 
inventory.   
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Figure 4.1:  Spatial distribution of reported landslide occurrence based on volume estimates through the project area.  
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4.3 Slope analysis 
Steep topography characterises the Lower Buller Gorge and, combined with high annual rainfall, is 
one of the main contributing factors to slope stability in the project area.  Fell et al (2008a) and AGS 
(2007) suggest the following physical topographical characteristics in terms of determining landslide 
susceptibility that are relevant to the project area: 
 Near vertical cliff-faces  
 Natural slopes steeper than 35° (landslide travel is likely to be rapid) 
 Natural slopes between 20° and 35° (rapid landslide travel is possible) 
 Steep rail cuttings 
Near-vertical cliffs within the project area are primarily limited to Whitecliffs, around SNL97.50km.  
Steep cuttings are also present in the gorge but the vertical and lateral extent is restricted due to the 
construction practice of attaching the rail to the natural contour of the Lower Buller Gorge hillslopes.   
Based on the slope categories recommended by Fell et al (2008a), a digital elevation model (DEM) 
for the project area was used to represent slope angles of <20°, 20-35° and >35°.  The cell size for the 
DEM shown in Figure 4.2 is 25m x 25m.  The area classified on Figure 4.2 as >35° is considered to 
be representative of natural slope angles adjacent to the rail due to the absence of high cut slopes 
within the track formation.   
Landslide occurrence is overlain on Figure 4.2, as per Figure 4.1, to show the relationship between 
topography and the available historic record of landslide events.  The symbology size has been 
reduced to increase the visibility of slope angles adjacent to the rail corridor.  Location references 
above the alignment have also been removed for the same purpose and any location references made 
in Section 4.3.1 can be correlated with Figure 4.1. 
4.3.1 Interpretation 
With the exception of landslides from SNL110.0 to 112.0km, and SNL101.5 and 103.5km, the 
locations shown on Figure 4.2 typically correlate with slope angles greater than 35°.  Considering the 
proportion of the rail corridor that has slope greater than 35° immediately adjacent to it makes this 
correlation not surprising and landslide susceptibility is considered comparatively high for the 
majority of the project area based on topography alone.   
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Figure 4.2:  Spatial distribution of reported landslide occurrence in relation to slope angles above the rail corridor  
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Other main features of Figure 4.2 are summarised below (discussed from east to west through the 
project area): 
 Small to medium volume landslides associated with the low elevation (around 140m amsl) 
hillside in the vicinity of SNL96km correlate to a narrow band of slope angles >35°.   
 Landslide occurrence at Whitecliffs will always be associated with slope angles >35° due to the 
near vertical cliff-face.  No medium or large-scale rockfalls (>1,00m
3
) have been reported in the 
project area since the rail became operational in the 1940s. 
 Only two landslides are shown in the 6km length of rail corridor between SNL99 to 104km.  This 
length of rail is associated with slope angles predominantly <20°.  
 Variable slope angles are associated with hillsides (typically less than 450m amsl) between 
SNL104 and 110km, which accounts for a range of landslide occurrences.  There are ten shown 
in this 6km section of rail, including two large landslides at SNL107.50km and one large volume 
event at SNL108.63km (partially obscured by a medium volume landslide at SNL108.60km). 
 Six landslides of small, medium and unknown volumes are shown between SNL110 and 112km 
associated with slopes predominantly less than <20°. 
 The terrain in the vicinity of Hawks Crag Breccia (SNL113km) is dominated by slope angles 
>35° on the east facing hillside and a range of landslides are shown of all volume categories.  
 Two large landslides recorded on the western side of Hawks Crag Breccia are confined within in 
a relatively small area of steeper terrain >35° (near the western portal of Tunnel 3).  The highest 
elevation point above this section (Mt Cassin) is 706m amsl. 
 Between SNL117 and 126km the topography immediately adjacent to the rail alignment is 
dominated by the >35° slope angle class.  This 9km length of rail corridor also accounts for eight 
of the recorded large to very large landslides (out of fifteen for the entire 30km project area 
length, as listed in Table 4.2).  The maximum elevation of the mountain ranges north of the rail 
exceeds 800m amsl (north to northeast of Cascade).   
Geological controls on slope stability are an influencing factor, particularly for areas of the rail 
corridor that have an absence of reported large volume landslides associated with slopes >35°, which 
includes Whitecliffs.  Consideration of geological influence on slope stability is presented in the 
following section. 
4.4 Geological controls 
A geological map developed from data supplied by GNS Science (QMAP raster data based on Nathan 
et al, 2002) is presented in Figure 4.3 with reported landslide occurrence overlain to determine any 
discernible correlations between slope failure and geology.  Metrage locations are provided below the 
geological map for reference at the same map scale.   
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The three main faults are labelled on Figure 4.3 (Lower Buller, Mt William and Inangahua).  The 
Mount William Fault trace terminates at the Buller River, but it is assumed to continue south of the 
project area.  Fault locations shown are consistent with available QMAP spatial data provided by 
GNS Science.  Fault-bounded contacts are also shown between granite and Greenland Group outcrops 
near SNL118.50km (Ohika Fault, inactive), and between granite and Kaiata Formation around 
SNL103.50km. 
4.4.1 Interpretation 
The Buller River cuts through the Paparoa Anticline, which extends from south of Greymouth to the 
Buller River, and is a major developing tectonic feature (Tulloch and Kimbrough, 1989).  The 
progressive incision of the Buller River coupled with the high annual rainfall, and periodic stripping 
of surficial materials, maintains a shallow regolith unit on most of the slopes above the rail corridor.   
The distribution of landslides is not confined to a particular geological unit (Figure 4.3), but there is 
an increase in landslide density towards the west.  This infers that weathered granite and Hawks Crag 
Breccia (from around SNL110km to 126km) have a comparatively higher susceptibility for landslide 
generation, which is also related to the steep slopes in the area, and to defect (joint) controlled 
failures.  A summary table is provided in Table 4.3 which divides the rail corridor into seven 
categories based on the predominant geological unit.  The length and number of landslides reported 
within each category is also shown on Table 4.3.   
Detail in Table 4.3 illustrates that landslide occurrence is greatest in Hawks Crag Breccia and the 
granitic rocks from SNL110km to the western extent of the project area at SNL126km.  This 16km 
length of rail accounts for 68% of the total (60) reported landslide occurrences.  The absence of 
landslides within the short lengths of rail corridor from SNL109.0-110.0km (Berlins Porphyry) and 
SNL118.0-118.5 (Greenland Group) does not decrease the susceptibility of these two locations to 
future landslide events, particularly at SNL118.0-118.5km where the slope angle is >35° immediately 
adjacent to the track formation (Figure 4.2). 
The absence of large volume rockfalls or topples originating within limestone outcrops at Whitecliffs 
on the northern side of the Buller River is in stark contrast if the southern outcrop of limestone 
adjacent to SH6 is considered.  The earthquake-generated failures in 1968 that resulted in a fatality 
and impacts to road infrastructure from Whitecliffs on the southern side of the Buller River are 
controlled by bedding and joint orientation.  These structural controls for stability are further 
discussed in Chapter 6 but essentially the limestone on the north bank dips at gentle angles (<10°) into 
the face and joints are very widely spaced (>10m). 
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Figure 4.3:  Spatial distribution of reported landslide occurrence and main geological units within the project area (based on GNS Science QMAP data and Nathan et al, 2002).  Reference metrage locations are shown in the 
lower section at the same map scale.  
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Table 4.3:  Landslide occurrence and geological units 
SNL metrage 
(km) 
Predominant geological 
unit 
% of rail 
corridor 
(A)
 
% of 
landslides 
(B)
 
Volume range
 (C)
 
96.0 - 97.0 Kaiata Formation 3% (1.0km) 3.5% (2) Medium 
97.0 - 99.0 Limestone (Whitecliffs) 7% (2.0km) 7.0% (4) Small and unknown 
99.0 - 103.5 Quaternary deposits 15% (4.5km) 3.5 % (2) Small and unknown 
103.5 - 109.0 Various 
(D)
 18% (5.5km) 18% (11) Small to large 
109.0 - 110.0 Berlins Porphyry 3% (1.0km) 0 - 
110.0 - 118.0 Hawks Crag Breccia 27% (8.0km) 33% (20) Small to large 
118.0 - 118.5 Greenland Group  2% (0.5km) 0 - 
118.5 - 126.0 Granite 
(E)
 25% (7.5km) 35% (21) Small to large 
Notes:  
(A) 
(B)      
h 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
Approximate extent of outcrop based on available mapping expressed as a percentage, and length in brackets 
Percentage and number of landslides (in brackets) recorded within specific geological units (refer inventory in 
Table 4.2, total of 60 landslides) 
Volume range based on Figure 4.3 and inventory details from Table 4.2  
Includes Kaiata Formation around 107.50km 
Schistose Greenland Group inclusions noted in vicinity of Te Kuha 
The extent of deep weathering within bedrock through the Lower Buller Gorge is minimal due to high 
annual rainfall, and subsequent periodic removal of surficial materials as a function of normal 
weathering and erosion processes.  There is limited potential for development of regolith materials 
under these conditions, and typical depths in landslide headscarps are in the order of 2-3m, based on 
observations along the rail corridor during site inspections between 2009 and 2011.  This is confirmed 
by relatively high intact rock strengths obtained using Schmidt Hammer testing at Te Kuha (granite 
and Greenland Group) where rock sampling and analysis was undertaken.  Results and detailed 
discussion regarding these tests are provided in Chapter 7. 
4.5 Landslide susceptibility zonation map 
A qualitative landslide susceptibility zonation map is provided on Figure 4.4 showing a relative scale 
of ‘high’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ for the Lower Buller Gorge project area.  The rationale for the relative 
scale is based on the susceptibility mapping presented in this chapter, as outlined below: 
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 ‘High’ susceptibility:  incorporates SNL110.0 to 126.0km, which accounts for the steepest slope 
angles (typically ≥35°), and 68% of all landslides reported for the project area to date, including 
12 of the 15 ‘large to very large’ volume landslide occurrences.  Hawks Crag Breccia and 
granitic rocks are the dominant geological units between SNL110km and 126km.  Steep 
catchments above this length of rail are comparatively higher (up to ~800m amsl above Cascade) 
than the remainder of the rail corridor, which results in a higher volume of source material 
availability for landslides.    
 ‘Moderate to High’ susceptibility:  shown on Figure 4.4 between SNL103.5 and 110.0km.  The 
remaining three ‘large to very large’ volume landslides (of 15) occurred within this length of rail. 
The landslide inventory indicates 18% of the landslide occurrences take place in this section, in 
Kaiata Formation and Greenland Group bedrock. Slope angles are predominantly ≥20°, with 
some areas also ≥35°.  Adjacent hillsides are generally around a maximum of 450m amsl, 
allowing for comparatively less source material availability than the ‘High’ category described 
above.  
 ‘Moderate’ susceptibility:  shown on Figure 4.4 between SNL96.0 and 99.0km, including 
Whitecliffs limestone outcrops.  No large volume landslides have been reported in this section of 
the rail corridor since the track became operational in the 1940s.  The near vertical cliffs around 
SNL97.5km have released many limestone blocks of varying sizes over time, but most are 
captured within the well-established talus apron and only four small or unknown volume 
incidents have been recorded around Whitecliffs to date.  Shallow regolith and/or colluvium 
failures around SNL96km account for <5% of the total landslide occurrences, but other failures 
of small to medium volumes are likely in the future based on detailed API and site inspections.   
 ‘Low’ susceptibility:  applied to the section of rail between SNL99.0 and 103.5km due to the 
slopes immediately adjacent to the rail corridor being predominantly <20°, mainly within 
Quaternary deposits, and only two recorded landslides have been reported in this 4.5km length of 
rail to date (<5% of the total).   
Small sections of rail corridor within ‘High’ and ‘Moderate - High’ zones will have lower 
susceptibility, but have not been separated at the map scale presented in Figure 4.4.  The present map 
is based on desktop information only, and can be refined by site-specific investigation as at Te Kuha 
between SNL124 and 126km (Chapter 7). 
Susceptibility mapping can also take triggering mechanisms into account.  All slopes that have a 
developed regolith or colluvium layer (typically ≤3m depth within the project area) are susceptible to 
rainfall-induced landsliding.  In terms of earthquake triggering events, Wyllie and Mah (2004) lists 
five main parameters that they consider to have the most influence in relation to rock slope stability 
during seismic activity.  These are outlined, together with a decision tree developed by Keefer (1992) 
that adopts the five parameters, and provides a ranking between ‘Extremely High’ and ‘Low’ in terms 
of his susceptibility of rock slopes to earthquake-generated failure (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.4:  Qualitative landslide susceptibility zonation map.  Metrage locations (SNL km) and main location references are overlain.   
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Parameters listed by Wyllie and Mah (2004) that have the most influence in relation to rock slope 
stability during seismic activity are: 
1. Slope angle:  An angle of 25° or greater is typically required for rockfalls or slides to occur. 
2. Weathering:  Highly weathered rocks that comprise core material in a fine soil matrix of 
residual soil are most prone for failure.   
3. Induration:  Weakly bonded rock is more likely to fail.  
4. Discontinuity (defect) characteristics:  Closely spaced and open discontinuities within a rock 
outcrop are more at risk of failing than massive outcrops with closed discontinuities. 
5. Water:  Areas with high water tables or antecedent rainfall are most susceptible to failure.   
Application of the decision tree process to rock outcrops at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha both result in a 
‘High’ rank for susceptibility primarily as a result of climatic conditions and associated impacts of 
antecedent rainfall.  Rock outcrops are often free draining, which could result in a ‘Moderate’ rank if 
the influence of rainfall is considered minimal for Whitecliffs.  This type of screening tool is useful 
for broadly classifying slope stability hazards.   
 
Figure 4.5:  Decision tree for earthquake-generated landslide susceptibility of rock slopes (based 
on Keefer, 1992). 
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4.6 Summary 
Chapter 4 has focused on developing a qualitative landslide susceptibility map and zonation of the 
30km rail corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge.  The zonation map was intentionally designed for 
a simplistic overview of the project area in terms of landslide susceptibility based on a desktop 
evaluation of key controls for slope stability (topography and geology) correlated with actual 
landslides occurrences.  
Four zones have been identified in which the landslide susceptibility has been defined as ‘high’, ‘high 
to moderate’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low’.  The key conclusion from the susceptibility mapping and analysis 
is that ~75% by length of the rail corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge is classified as moderate to 
highly susceptible to landsliding from upslope sources.  Susceptibility is a function of the high annual 
rainfall (typically between 2,000 and 4,000mm per annum), long steep (≥20°) slopes, and the absence 
of catch or detention areas above track level.  Chapter 5 follows on from assessing landslide 
susceptibility to landslide hazards, including a detailed overview of the primary triggering 
mechanisms for slope instability affecting rail operations from upslope sources.  
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CHAPTER 5:  LANDSLIDE HAZARD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
‘Landslide Hazard’ in risk management terminology considers the annual probability of occurrence 
based on both actual and potential landslides (susceptibility) for a specified area.  The landslide 
inventory established in Chapter 3 presents recorded incidents of slope instability only, but does 
provide a basis for analysis.  Limitations for determining annual probability based on data collected to 
date for the Lower Buller Gorge project area include: 
 Of the 60 landslides in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5) only half of these (30) had a specific date associated 
with the event due to incomplete documentation of impacts to the rail corridor. 
 Records made available by KiwiRail are applicable from 2004, which accounts for 60% (18) of 
the 30 events with a specific date.   
 Nine of the events (30%) with dates are associated with the 1968 Inangahua earthquake, based on 
research conducted to date.   
 The frequency of reported landslide occurrences that have impacted rail operations since 2004 is 
around 3 to 4 per year, which is considered an underestimation of the actual number. 
 Landslide frequency would vary in terms of magnitude; frequency of high intensity, or long 
duration, rainfall triggers; and episodic seismic activity.     
In determining the feasibility of developing a quantitative hazard or risk zonation map, 
Fell et al (2008a) states that:  ‘Quantitative hazard and risk zoning cannot be performed where data 
on frequency of landslides either do not exist or are so uncertain as not to be relied on’ (Fell et al, 
2008a, page 89).  In the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor detailed temporal analysis is not realistic 
given the limited data-set for the project area but despite the limitations, ‘Landslide Hazards’ and 
triggering mechanisms can be still be characterised.  The objectives of Chapter 5 are therefore to: 
 Determine the spatial distribution of landslides based on triggering mechanism (rainfall-induced 
and earthquake-generated) and frequency of occurrence. 
 Provide a temporal case study of rainfall-induced landslides that occurred within the project area 
in late December 2010 and early January 2011.  
In addition, detailed summaries of three key risk sites identified during discussion with KiwiRail 
personnel (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4) that have exhibited medium to large volume landslides (100m
3
 to 
>1,000m
3
) or high frequency (a one incident every two years) are presented Appendix 5.1.  These 
three locations are at SNL107.5, 118.5 and 121.0km. 
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5.2 Triggering mechanisms  
Earthquake-generated and rainfall-induced landslides are recognised as the predominant triggering 
mechanisms for slope failures in the Lower Buller Gorge project area.  The spatial distribution for 
each category, including those with unknown triggering mechanisms is shown of Figure 5.1, based on 
data from the landslide inventory presented in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5).  The percentage of each category 
identified in the project area is also presented graphically in Figure 5.1. 
Fifty-five percent of entries in the landslide inventory (Chapter 3, Table 3.5) are directly attributable 
to rainfall as the triggering mechanism.  The high proportion of entries having an unknown triggering 
mechanism (27%) reflects incomplete documentation, and rainfall is considered more realistically 
accountable for up to approximately 80% of all entries.  Eighteen percent of landslides are listed on 
Table 3.5 as being generated by the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake.   
In comparison to the data collated specific to the project area, the proportion of triggering 
mechanisms attributable to landslide generation for the entire West Coast region is also shown in 
Figure 5.1, based on research conducted by DTec Consulting Ltd (2002).  The different relative 
percentages between the two pie graphs in Figure 5.1 is the higher weighting of site specific data from 
the Lower Buller Gorge project area to landslides generated by the Inangahua Earthquake.  The DTec 
Consulting Ltd (2002) inventory (Appendix 3.1) incorporates the triggering mechanism as a single 
event, and not the resultant number of landslides generated.  
5.3 Rainfall-induced landslides 
Rainfall is undoubtedly the most dominant triggering mechanism for slope movement in the project 
area in terms of landslide frequency.  The annual rainfall experienced in the Lower Buller Gorge is 
typically greater than 2000mm, at times double this figure.  Rainfall intensity can vary between 
adjacent tributary catchments through the Lower Buller Gorge during rainfall events.  The 
establishment of rainfall triggering levels is recognised as an important component for Landslide Risk 
Management within the project area.   
As outlined in this section, there are considerable gaps in the regional rainfall gauge network that 
makes correlation to actual landslide occurrence difficult to accurately assess.  A temporal case study 
is presented in Sections 5.4 for a rainfall event classified by WCRC as 1 in 10-year.  Observed 
impacts to the rail corridor are outlined in Section 5.5.  For comparison, a case study by Jaiswal and 
Weston (2009) is presented within Section 5.3.3 to highlight recent research in this area applicable to 
a rail corridor, and emphasising the importance of measurement of local catchment rainfall.   
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Figure 5.1:  Spatial distribution of reported landslide occurrence and triggering mechanism, including pie graphs showing the proportional 
representation of available data for the project area (this study) and West Coast Region (based on DTec Consulting Ltd, 2002)
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To enable the frequency of rainfall-induced landslides to be established from the historic record, 
rainfall intensity and duration data specific to the Lower Buller Gorge requires analysis.  Using the 
rainfall data for actual recorded landslide occurrences, and establishing the return period of the event, 
would provide an indication of long-term frequency.  Discussions with staff from WCRC indicate an 
absence of rainfall recorders within the project area, which is recognised as a gap in the network.   
The closest two rainfall recorders within the WCRC network are located at Westport and Reefton.  
Rainfall also appears to be recorded at Landing (10km upstream of the Inangahua and Buller River 
confluence).  Data from this site was summarised in Chapter 2, Table 2.1.  While rainfall data from 
these locations could be used to correlate landslide occurrences, the spatial variability is considered 
too high to allow for an accurate assessment for rainfall-induced landslide triggering levels, 
particularly for lower magnitude events that generate very small to small volume (<100m
3
) landslides.  
The consideration of antecedent rainfall also needs to be incorporated into any model for developing 
threshold levels, as discussed in Section 5.3.2. 
In the absence of site specific rainfall data, a literature review was conducted to determine the 
availability of relevant research regarding rainfall as the predominant triggering factor for slope 
stability issues, including antecedent patterns and case studies.  Bell (1976; 1994) established the 
importance of 6-hour and 12-hour rainfall durations in initiating catchment-wide slope stability, 
including debris slides and flows affecting the South Island Main North Line, during Cyclone Alison 
in March 1975.  The following sections summarise the findings of the literature review, including 
New Zealand and international research from the following sources:  Rahardjo et al (2001); Borja and 
White (2010); Jaiswal and Weston (2009); and Glade (1998). 
5.3.1 New Zealand literature 
Previous studies related to the determination of reliable thresholds for triggering rainfall-induced 
landslides, dated from the 1980s, was summarised by Glade et al (2000) as all requiring a robust 
database of historic occurrences.  In New Zealand there are a number of databases available, including 
landslides of a specific magnitude (IGNS, 1993), and rainfall data that triggered ‘highly damaging’ 
landslides (Harmsworth and Page, 1991).  This inventory factor should be recognised for any hazard 
assessment conducted in the area.  Future reporting of incidents, in an appropriate manner, is 
necessary to enable the development of more reliable rainfall thresholds in the future.   
The frequency and magnitude of rainfall-induced slope movement is a relevant field of research for all 
areas of New Zealand.  Relevant papers on the topic specific to New Zealand are dominated in the late 
1990s to 2000 by Thomas Glade, including:  Glade et al (2000); Glade and Crozier (1997); Glade 
(1997 and 1998).   
 69 
 
The basis of research for the Glade et al (2000) paper was that applying data from the climatic record 
in New Zealand makes it possible to differentiate between input conditions that did, or did not, trigger 
landslides.  Rainfall thresholds can subsequently be developed for specific regions.  Glade et al (2000) 
also discuss that temporal variability in climatic regimes does not affect the rainfall threshold, but the 
frequency that the threshold is exceeded.  Importantly for the project area, this also implies that for an 
area with a high annual rainfall that could potentially trigger regolith or rock slope failures, the 
likelihood of future occurrences for a particular location can at times be reduced due to decreased 
availability of material on the slope.  This could be applied to the shallow failures observed around 
SNL95-97km in February 2011, where the likelihood of future occurrences of a similar nature is 
limited due to the exposure of bedrock (refer Section 5.5).  Instead, the mechanism of failure is 
applicable to comparable slopes that have not failed, or not reported to have failed, during the 
operational history of the rail corridor.   
Research by Glade (1998) indicated that the project area is in a region that experiences a 
comparatively higher frequency of landslide-triggering rainfall events, when considered on a national 
scale.  Glade (1998) classified the region as experiencing one storm every 2-4 years that results in a 
landslide, based on recorded landslide triggering rainfall in New Zealand between 1870 and 1995.  It 
is assumed that the magnitude of the landslide generated is of sufficient volume to cause disruption 
and/or inconvenience to impacted areas, otherwise the frequency for smaller-scale events would be a 
lot higher.  It is accepted that the definition of landslide impacts is subjective. 
Glade (1998) also conducted regional scale analyses for three areas (Hawke’s Bay, Wairarapa and 
Wellington) and correlated landslide-triggering rainfall events with 24-hour precipitation data.  All 
areas resulted in a minimum probability threshold of 20mm daily rainfall to trigger a landslide.  The 
maximum probability threshold varied between 120mm/24-hours and 300mm/24-hours.  The 24-hour 
data does not take antecedent conditions into account and Glade (1998) recognised this as a topic for 
future research.  The significance of antecedent moisture conditions is relation of landslide triggering 
is well recognised in New Zealand (Bell, 1976; Eyles et al, 1978). 
5.3.2 Antecedent rainfall 
Rahardjo et al (2001) highlights the role of antecedent rainfall on slope stability through a case study 
based in Singapore.  Rainfall intensity measuring 95mm in 150 minutes was record in February 1995 
in Singapore that caused more than 20 shallow landslides.  Similar magnitude events presented by 
Rahardjo et al (2001) did not trigger landslides and the cause for the February 1995 slope movements 
was interpreted as being due to antecedent rainfall patterns during the preceding five days.  This 
conclusion was supported by numerical modelling for a specific slope that simulated different rainfall 
patterns, and calculated differences in the factor of safety for the slope.   
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The quantification of hydrologic and geotechnical processes that govern slope failures are considered 
by Borja and White (2010) to remain inadequate, despite extensive research in this area and 
development of many slope-stability models.  The simplification of physics, and neglect of partial 
saturation effects, is the main limitation identified within existing models.  Borja and White (2010) 
describe the influence of rainfall infiltration on a slope with the following main points: 
 The surface tension between soil particles will eventually break when saturation levels are 
increased during periods of intense or prolonged rainfall; 
 A down-gradient frictional drag on the slope will occur when the inter-granular fluid flow within 
a soil becomes mobilised; and   
 When the capacity for rainfall to infiltrate slope soil is exceeded, surface runoff and associated 
erosion processes will result.   
The case study presented by Borja and White (2010) adopted a physics-based approach for 
quantifying rainfall-induced slope deformation and a finite element model that considers both solid 
deformation and fluid pressure in an unsaturated soil.  The main finding of the research highlights the 
limitations of modelling complex processes and cautions against applying simplified analyses for 
hazard mitigation purposes.   
5.3.3 Case study:  Southern India 
A case study by Jaiswal and Weston (2009) was the most relevant research article obtained in regards 
to a rail corridor project.  The paper focussed on the establishment of rainfall thresholds using a 
temporal probability model for cut slopes adjacent to a 19km length of rail in southern India.  The 
model developed by the authors provides the likelihood of occurrence of rainfall that can trigger 
landslides with a particular density per unit area.   
The study area was chosen to test the methodology adopted based on the availability of a complete 
landslide inventory between 1987 and 2007, including date of occurrence.  A total of 790 landslides 
were recorded within the study area (25km
2
).  Information was predominantly sourced from rail 
maintenance records, and other technical reports.  In addition to a robust set of landslide data, there 
are 15 rainfall gauges within the study area.   The main difference between the rail corridor studied by 
Jaiswal and Weston (2009) and the Lower Buller Gorge project area is the proportion of landslides 
originating in cut slopes.  In the Southern India case study, cut slopes accounted for 94% of events 
(which were defined as failures due to rainfall).  This reflects the rail construction methods and local 
geological characteristics.   
The average landslide volume provided by Jaiswal and Weston (2009) was around 400m
3
, with a 
median volume of 50m
3
.  These volumes are comparable to the Lower Buller Gorge project area and 
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highlight that despite the typically medium to small landslide events (≤500m3), the frequency (35-40 
events per year in Southern India case study) causes considerable impacts to on-going rail operations.  
Jaiswal and Weston (2009) indicated that the rail company in Southern India spends around 
US$250,000 on restoration works each year as a direct result of landslide damage.  A summary of 
methodology, and main outcomes, of the research completed by Jaiswal and Weston (2009), are 
discussed below: 
 The 19km rail corridor length was divided into sections based on topography. 
 Rainfall thresholds were developed for the initiation of shallow translational debris slides and 
debris flows based on the database of landslide occurrences (790 incidents in total), and daily 
rainfall data for the same period that was obtained from a network of fifteen rain gauges.   
 Rainfall data was used to establish the relationship between antecedent and daily rainfall patterns 
and landslide occurrence. 
 The temporal probability calculation was a joint condition that considered both the annual 
exceedence probability of the rainfall threshold and the landslide occurrence probability once the 
rainfall threshold is exceeded. 
 Rainfall events that could trigger one or more landslides within each section of the rail corridor 
required the definition of four thresholds. 
 For the entire 19km length of rail, one rainfall threshold was developed that could potentially 
trigger 15 or more landslides.   
 A range between 0.27 and 0.49 for the annual temporal probability was calculated. 
The study area in Southern India was chosen on the basis of the availability of complete data sets for 
both rainfall and landslide occurrence.  The model developed by Jaiswal and Weston (2009) still had 
many limitations despite the robust data sets.  Model limitations included the non-applicability to 
other mechanisms of slope failure, and processes such as rockfall, that occur in the unmodified slopes 
above the rail corridor.   
Applying a similar methodology to the Lower Buller Gorge project area is not recommended based on 
the limited rainfall data and lack of detailed incident reporting at present in regards to landslides.  The 
Jaiswal and Weston (2009) model simplification of not considering natural slopes above the corridor 
would also need modification if a similar type of methodology was adopted for the Lower Buller 
Gorge project area where the source of slope movements that could impact rail infrastructure is not 
confined to the very limited extent of cut slopes. 
Following on from the 2009 case study, Jaiswal et al (2010) used the same study area to apply a 
quantitative approach for landslide risk assessment applicable to transportation corridors.  The method 
used enabled the estimation of direct (people, infrastructure and vehicles) and indirect risks 
 72 
 
(economic).  The methodology and approach is outside the scope of this current thesis, but does 
illustrate the application of landslide risk management as a facilitation tool for future mitigation and 
work prioritisation.   
5.4 Temporal case study (December 2010 to January 2011) 
In December 2010 the West Coast Region experienced rainfall that caused flooding and landslides 
from Haast to Karamea.  A report produced by the WCRC collated all available information to 
describe the extent of the flood event (WCRC, 2011).  The publication date was not specified in the 
report but it is assumed to be early 2011.  Data relevant to the project area is summarised in this 
section based on WCRC (2011) to highlight the impacts from rainfall-induced landslides, including a 
photographic log and descriptions of landslides observed during a site inspection as part of this thesis 
in February 2011 (Section 5.5).  
The rainfall originated from a warm, moist north-easterly flow that was followed by a large cold front.  
Antecedent conditions were a contributing factor as the area was already moderately saturated 
(WCRC, 2011) by rainfall on 21 and 24 December 2010.  Peak flow rates, and corresponding water 
levels; estimation of return periods; rainfall frequency analysis, and total daily rainfall between 21 and 
29 December 2010, were reported by WCRC (2011).   
Of the 16 water level monitoring sites listed in the West Coast Region, data from the three closest to 
the project area is provided in Table 5.1.  Monitoring sites/recorder names are the same as referred to 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 of this thesis.  Hydrographs from WCRC (2011) for the Inangahua River at 
Landing and Buller River at Te Kuha are shown on Figure 5.2.  The hydrographs show the peak at 
Inangahua dropped comparatively more quickly than for the Buller River, which reflects the different 
catchment sizes. 
Table 5.1:  Peak flow, water levels and return period analysis (WCRC, 2011) 
River and gauge 
reference 
Date and time of 
peak flow 
Peak level 
(mm) 
Peak flow 
(m
3
/s) 
Estimated return 
period (years) 
Buller River 
(Te Kuha) 
28/12/2010 at 1815 10,927 6,714 10 
Buller River 
(Woolfs) 
28/12/2010 at 1540 7,229 3,847 9 
Inangahua River 
(Landing) 
28/12/2010 at 0830 6,255 2,250 16 
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Figure 5.2:  Hydrographs from the 28 and 29 December 2010 for the Inangahua River at 
Landing (top) and Buller River at Te Kuha (bottom).  Graphs sourced from WCRC (2011). 
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Rainfall duration and frequency data is only available for the Inangahua River location at Landing.  
Information from WCRC for the period 26 to 29 December 2010 indicated that the rainfall intensity 
was greatest over a 12-hour period between 27 and 28 December 2010, with 117mm recorded, which 
correlated to a 10-year return period.  Data from the West Coast Region as a whole lead WCRC to 
interpret the event as ‘an intense medium to long term duration event with 6-24 hours producing 
significant rainfall depths and in some cases 48 hour significant falls’ (WCRC, 2011, p5).   
The effect of antecedent conditions was recognised by WCRC, with daily rainfall measurements 
recorded for the Inangahua River Landing between 21 and 29 December 2010 shown on Figure 5.3. 
Rainfall in the region on 21, 22 and 24 December would have influenced the level of pre-existing soil 
saturation levels prior to the comparatively more intense and longer duration rainfall on 27 and 
28 December 2010.   
 
Figure 5.3:  Antecedent rainfall pattern from the rainfall gauge at Inangahua (Landing) 
between 21 and 26 December 2010 prior to the rainfall that caused landslides in the Lower 
Buller Gorge on 27 and 28 December 2010.  Rainfall data obtained from WCRC (2011). 
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Rainfall-induced landslides were not a focus of the WCRC (2011) report, but road closures were 
mentioned, including a closure for 1.5 days around Inangahua due to landslides.  The Buller River 
flow levels and rates were considered moderate only (Table 5.1), but it was noted that landslides and 
road closures were frequent during the event throughout the Buller River catchment area.  No direct 
reference to the rail corridor was made.  Flooding also occurred in the region less than one month later 
(around 18 January 2011), which caused additional landslides and disruption to transportation routes, 
including the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor.  No report was identified related to the January 2011 
rainfall event. 
5.5 Impacts to the rail corridor (December 2010 – January 2011) 
The following photographic record and descriptions of failures types, material and volume estimates 
are provided for areas that were visited during a site inspection on 24-25 February 2011.  Access was 
restricted due to the 22 February 2011 magnitude 6.3 earthquake in Christchurch that required rail 
personnel scheduled to provide assistance to be called to more urgent works in the response phase of 
the disaster.  The following discussion is provided to highlight the types and small to medium 
volumes of landslides that impacted the rail corridor during rainfall events in December 2010 and 
January 2011, this being considered typical of the scale of landsliding causing track closure with a 
frequency of once per decade. 
5.5.1 SNL95 to 97km 
The section of rail between SNL95 and 96km is not within the project area but inclusion of landslides 
in this section, as observed in February 2011, is relevant to understanding the impacts from the 
December 2010/January 2011 rainfall events.  Published geological maps for this section of the rail 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.4) indicate Greenland Group bedrock with overlying Kaiata Formation in close 
proximity to the north.  Intermittent exposures of rock in the steep (≥25°) slopes adjacent to the rail 
confirmed the presence of Greenland Group bedrock from around SNL96km and towards the east.  
Limestone bedrock is present in the area closer to SNL97km. 
Four landslides were observed between SNL95 and 97km on 24 February 2011.  Three of these are 
shown on Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.  A summary of landslide dimensions and volume estimates for 
each is provided in Table 5.2.  The material released at SNL96.95km (Figure 5.4) comprised silty 
clay-bound gravels (well-graded, angular, up to 600mm maximum diameter), with some fine sand.  
The shallow colluvium failure did not expose bedrock at this location, but the angular blocks observed 
were limestone that had presumably been sourced from nearby outcrops upslope of the site.   
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At SNL95.60km (Figure 5.5) the colluvium failure comprised a volume of ~700m
3
 (Table 5.2) of fine 
silty to sandy clay with rounded alluvial gravels.  Greenland Group bedrock was visible beneath the 
shallow (1.8m maximum depth) failure.  Two failures originating on steeper (around 50°) slopes 
occurred within very shallow (<1m depth) regolith overlying Greenland Group bedrock, as seen in the 
example at SNL95.30km in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.4:  Shallow colluvial failure in clay- 
bound angular gravel near SNL96.95km 
 
 
Figure 5.5:  Shallow colluvial failure in clay- 
bound alluvial gravels near SNL95.60km 
 
 
Table 5.2:  Summary of dimensions and volume estimates for rainfall-induced landslides 
between SNL95 and 97km (H = height; W = width adjacent to base of rail alignment) 
Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Dimensions on slope Headscarp depth  
Slope 
angle 
Volume 
estimate 
95.25 24m (H) x 14m (W) ≤1.0m 50° ~300m
3
 
95.30 8m (H) x 7m (W) ≤1.0m 50° ~50m
3
 
95.60 19m (H) x 21m (W) 1.8m  27-30° ~700m
3
 
96.95 22m (H) x 26m (W) 1.0m 27-33° ~500m
3
 
Figure 5.6:  Shallow regolith failure on 
Greenland Group bedrock near SNL95.30km 
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Previous failures in this area have been documented in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5) due to both rainfall and 
earthquake triggering mechanisms.  The scale of previous shallow failures is visible in Figure 5.7, 
which also shows that natural re-vegetation is rapid (≤5 years) along the rail corridor. 
 
Figure 5.7:  Shallow regolith failures (circled) visible in the vicinity of SNL96km in aerial 
photography from 1985.  Aerial photograph interpretation shows these are not related to track 
construction. 
 
5.5.2 SNL112.96km 
Bedrock in the vicinity of SNL112.96km comprises Hawks Crag Breccia (Chapter 4, Figure 4.3). 
There have been many reported landslides within Hawks Crag Breccia between SNL110 and 118km 
(Chapter 3, Table 3.5), triggered by both rainfall and earthquakes.  Previous events include large 
volume landslides (>1,000m
3
) that pre-date rail construction in the 1940s between SNL113 and 
114km, and numerous smaller volume landslides.  KiwiRail reported a train hitting a small rockfall at 
SNL113km, as a result of rainfall in March 2005, and a tree being struck by a train at SNL112km in 
August 2010.   
SNL96km 
N 
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A shallow landslide in close proximity to the feature described in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3 (occurrence 
date of June 2006) was observed from SH6 on 23 February 2011 and was subsequently inspected on 
25 February 2011 (Figure 5.8).   
 
Figure 5.8:  View of partially re-vegetated June 2006 landslide at SNL112.96 (lefthand side) and 
recent December 2010 landslide, with a 10m
3 
loose block of Hawks Crag Breccia (circled) near 
the middle of the failure.  Inset A: shows a view from rail height looking up the slope.   
The dimensions of the feature on the right-hand side of Figure 5.8 from December 2010 were 
~25m (height) by 5m width (adjacent to the rail).  The shallow failure depth appeared variable (≤2m), 
and the slope angle averaged around 40°.  The landslide is a small-scale feature with the volume of 
material released ~250m
3
.  The loose block (estimated at 10m
3
 or >25t) midway up the failure surface 
poses an imminent risk of dislodging and landing on, or in close proximity to, the railway.   
The rate of re-vegetation in the Lower Buller Gorge project area following landslide occurrences is 
illustrated in Figure 5.8.  The 2006 failure appeared inactive, with the majority of the failure surface 
now covered in vegetation within the past ~5 years.  Aside from the loose block visible in the 2010 
landslide (Figure 5.8), the landslide is not expected to cause on-going maintenance issues, or 
headscarp regression, because of re-vegetation resulting in progressively increased stability over a 
short time period (≤5-years).     
Hawks Crag Breccia typically has very widely spaced joints, and is a strong cemented unit as can be 
seen at Hawks Crag itself on SH6. The potential for blocks of several tonnes to several tens of tonnes 
to impact the rail corridor has to be an on-going management concern between SNL110 and 118km 
because of both block size and strength of the intact rock. 
 
xJune 2006x 
xlandslidex 
xDecember 2010x 
xlandslidex 
A 
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5.5.3 SNL121.35km (Cascade) 
The location of a rock debris slide that occurred at SNL121.35km is shown on Figure 5.9, near the 
western portal of Tunnel 5.  The scale of the landslide was not easy to capture from the rail alignment, 
and is not visible from SH6.  Figures 5.9 and Insets A and B show views of the rock type (granite and 
gneiss), and the irregular slope failure surface on bedrock at the base of the landslide.  Two distinct 
steps in the profile were observed for a total estimated visible slope failure distance of 50m.     
 
Figure 5.9:  Location of landslide at SNL121.35km near the western portal of Tunnel 5 (edge of 
failure surface visible on lefthand side of photograph).  Insets A and B show the failure surface 
and the granitic/gneissic rock type.   
The landslide resulted in an estimated 500m
3
 of debris directly impacting the rail corridor.  It took 2 to 
3 days to clear the debris using a single excavator.  An old concrete crib retaining structure was 
present at the base of the landslide (~4m in height from rail level), which remained partially intact.  
The presence of the retaining structure, and a concrete-lined drainage channel that flows into a culvert 
on the eastern limit of the landslide, indicates that the site has previously been problematic.  These 
measures to retain the base of the slope and control overland water flow do not remove the risk of 
slope failures associated with large volumes of rock debris in storage within the catchment, and/or 
mobilisation under sufficiently high rainfall triggering levels.    
 
xEastern edge ofx  
xDecember 2010 failurex 
A 
B 
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5.5.4 Discussion 
Data relevant to the Lower Buller Gorge project area from WCRC (2011) included peak water levels 
and flow rates recorded for the Buller and Inangahua Rivers that indicated return periods of around 10 
and 16 years respectively for the two catchments.  The event was a medium to long duration rainfall 
occurrence that is not considered uncommon in the region, and it can be expected to recur at least 
once every 10 years with consequential impacts on rail operations.  
The role of antecedent rainfall between 21 and 26 December 2010 was recognised as exacerbating the 
rainfall-induced landslide triggering effects on 27 and 28 December 2010.  Rainfall-induced 
landslides triggered in the project area caused track closure and disrupted rail operations for up to one 
week.  Roads in the area were also closed, including SH6 between Inangahua Junction and Westport.   
Landslides resulting from this event in the project area involved small to medium, volumes but 
occurred throughout the 30km length of rail.  The typical mechanisms of failure observed in February 
2011, included shallow (≤2m) colluvium or regolith failures, and rock debris slides comprising 
granitic rock sourced from natural slopes within steep catchment areas above the rail corridor. 
Other landslides and geotechnical problems of typically small volume (<100m
3
) occurred throughout 
the project area as a result of the rainfall in December 2010 and January 2011, including subsidence 
of ballast and underlying foundation material at Berlins around SNL107.4km.  Geoscience 
Consulting (NZ) Limited (2011) also noted that landsliding had occurred from upslope sources at 
SNL111.7, 115.9 and 118.8km.   
The main management issue encountered during the response to the landslides was access to clear the 
debris, which is available from either end of the project area, but with SH6 closed access into the 
Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor was only possible from the Te Kuha end, near Westport. There is 
only limited vehicular access for earthmoving machinery to the Lower Buller Gorge, and it is not 
feasible for rail-mounted equipment to access more remote sites under such conditions.  
Limited data regarding rainfall duration and intensity is available for the project area that resulted in 
landslide initiation, but the following examples from the inventory produced by DTec Consulting 
Limited (2002), as discussed in Appendix 3.1, are applicable: 
 29-31 March 1975:  Westport, 80mm rainfall recorded, Buller Gorge (130mm in 24-hours).  
Large number of landslides. 
 2-4 July 1967:  Inangahua (73mm).  Few minor landslides in the Buller Gorge. 
 26-27 April 1966:  Westport (63mm), Inangahua (51mm in 24-hours).  Landslide closed the 
Buller Gorge railway near Rahui. 
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 16-19 February 1955:  Inangahua (90mm in <48-hours).  Train struck a landslide (no mention of 
location) in the Buller Gorge. 
Each of the above entries represents a rainfall event that resulted in numerous landslides in the Buller 
Gorge.  Any site-specific rainfall trigger levels developed for the project area will be less than these 
(i.e. 50mm in 24-hours is the minimum reported rainfall intensity for slope instability), and the role of 
antecedent rainfall requires consideration.  The absence of rainfall gauges throughout the 30km length 
of rail is currently the main limiting factor in establishing reliable thresholds. 
5.6 Earthquake-generated landslides  
It is recognised that the rail corridor is located in a seismically active area characterised by reverse 
faults, and that the Lower Buller Gorge is located only ~50km from the Alpine Fault.  Impacts from 
the two most recent large magnitude earthquakes in 1929 and 1968 are summarised in Appendix 3.3 
and 3.4.  This section outlines recent research regarding earthquake-generated slope movement 
relevant to the New Zealand setting to determine likely future frequency of earthquake-generated 
landslides within the Lower Buller Gorge. 
5.6.1 Earthquake-induced landslide distribution in New Zealand 
Previous studies regarding the number and distribution of landslides induced by seismic ground 
motion indicate that the concentration of events can be up to 50 per square kilometre (Wyllie and 
Mah, 2004).  In New Zealand, the distribution of known landslide events triggered by seismic activity 
between the period 1840 and 1997 is shown on Figure 5.10 (from Hancox et al, 2002).   
The distribution of landslide events in the vicinity of the project area is highlighted on Figure 5.10 and 
also shows the close proximity of the 1929 Murchison (Buller) and 1968 Inangahua earthquake 
epicentres (labelled 8 and 15 on Figure 5.10 respectively).  The inset on Figure 5.10 shows the 
distribution of magnitude 5 and greater earthquakes in New Zealand between 1840 and 1997 and the 
list on the right-hand side provides basic details on the earthquake location and respective magnitudes.   
Within the South Island of New Zealand the map on Figure 5.10 would look quite different based on 
seismic activity in the last fourteen years.  Earthquake-generated slope movement occurred as a result 
of the magnitude 7.8 earthquake in Fiordland in 2009 and more recently in Canterbury as a result of 
three earthquakes measuring 7.1, 6.3 and 6.3 in magnitude on 4 September 2010, 22 February 2011 
and 13 June 2011 respectively.  A map showing the distribution of magnitude 6 and greater 
earthquakes in the South Island during the period January 1997 to August 2011, and associated 
summary table, is provided in Appendix 5.2. 
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Figure 5.10:  Epicentres of historical earthquakes that resulted in substantial landslides within 
New Zealand.  Dashed lines indicate the areal extent of landslide-affected regions (based on 
Hancox et al, 2002). 
 
Project area 
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Hancox et al (2002) indicate a minimum magnitude of 5 is required for earthquake-induced rock 
slides or falls in New Zealand, with significant landslides expected in the event of magnitude 6 or 
greater earthquakes.  A case study regarding the 1929 Murchison (Buller) Earthquake was presented 
by Hancox et al (2002), with the main summary points: 
 Landslides predominantly occurred over an area of ~4,500km2, extending ~90km north of the 
epicentre but only 20km to the south.  This delineation is shown on Figure 5.11 and does not 
include the project area.  The total area impacted by landslides of all scales was ~7,000km
2
. 
 Five landslides are mapped adjacent to SH6 in the Lower Buller Gorge (Figure 5.11), including 
one that appears to correlate to Whitecliffs (south bank of the Buller River).  It was noted by 
Hancox et al (2002) that landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge blocked the road for a few days. 
 Landslides were most frequent on steep slopes (greater than 20°) and the susceptible geological 
units included: 
 Granitic and older sedimentary rocks; 
 Tertiary mudstone, sandstone, limestone, calcareous siltstone, conglomerate; and 
 Pleistocene gravels. 
 The comparatively larger and most frequent landslides originated from dip slopes in Tertiary 
sandstone and mudstones, and in weathered, closely-jointed granite.   
The maximum areas that are likely to be affected by landslides for different earthquake magnitudes 
are listed by Hancox et al (2002) as:  100km
2
 (M5); 500km
2
 (M6); 2000-3000km
2
 (M7); 7000km
2
 
(M8); and up to 20,000km
2
 for M8.2.  It is recognised that different magnitude scales may have been 
involved with different earthquakes (ML; MS; MW).  The impacted area for the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake that resulted in landslides was stated by Hancox et al (2002) as 3,200km
2
 (Ms7.4). 
5.6.2 Slope thresholds 
From the distribution of the earthquake-induced landslides recognised by Hancox et al (2002), the 
following two tables summarise natural slopes and rock types (Table 5.3); and typical slope thresholds 
for the predominant types of slope failure (Table 5.4).  These are New Zealand-specific, and provide 
useful guidelines for future earthquake-initiated slope instability in the Lower Buller Gorge.  
Table 5.3 shows that only 10% of all earthquake-initiated landslides occur on slopes less than 25° and 
that 90% can be expected to occur on slopes of 26° or steeper. Given that the majority (approximately 
75%) of slopes within the Lower Buller Gorge are steeper than 20° (Chapter 4, Figure 4.2), 
widespread slope instability could be anticipated from an earthquake of magnitude 6.0 or greater 
centred within 30km of the rail corridor. This is consistent with the effects of the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake, where numerous slope failures (including debris slides and rockfalls) impacted rail 
operations. 
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Figure 5.11:  Landslides and liquefaction effects caused by the 1929 Murchison Earthquake 
(Hancox et al, 2002).  Location of Whitecliffs is highlighted, with the small black dots adjacent 
to SH6 through the Lower Buller Gorge representing landslides with volumes ranging between 
1,000 and 100,000m
3
. 
 
 
Whitecliffs 
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Table 5.3:  Natural slopes and rock types affected by earthquake-generated landslides in New 
Zealand (from Hancox et al, 2002) 
Slope range 
Approximate % 
of landslides* 
Typical slope and rock types 
0-10° <1% 
Few failures, several low angle dip slope slides in Tertiary 
mudstone. 
11-25° 10% 
Many dip slope slides in interbedded Tertiary sandstone and 
mudstone, and limestone. 
26-35° 30% 
Dip slope failures in bedded Tertiary rocks (as above); steeper 
slopes in hard rocks (greywacke, schist, granite etc). 
36-45° 40% 
Steep cliffs, escarpments, and gorges in Tertiary limestone; 
scarp slopes in hard rocks (greywacke, schist, granite etc). 
>45° 20% 
Steep cliffs, scarps, gorges in Tertiary sediments, greywacke, 
schist, granites etc, especially in steep glaciated and alpine 
areas. 
Note: Comparatively smaller failures from gravel banks, terrace edges, road, railway, and other cuttings are not 
represented in the % values.  
* Earthquake-generated landslides 
 
Table 5.4:  Typical slope threshold levels for main types of earthquake-generated landslides in 
New Zealand (from Hancox et al, 2002) 
Landslide type Occurrence characteristics (refer table note for volumes) 
Rock and debris falls Very common, very small to large.  Minimum slope angle 40°. 
Rock and debris slides 
Very common, very small to large.  Minimum slope angle 25-35°.  Less 
common on slopes <20. 
Rock and debris 
avalanches 
Very common, moderate to very large.  Minimum slope angle 25°, more 
commonly 35-40° or greater.  Minimum slope height 150m. 
Rotational slides Moderately common.  Minimum slope angle 15°. 
Rock block slides Uncommon, large.  Minimum slope angle 15°. 
Mudflows (slow 
earthflows) 
Uncommon.  Minimum slope angle 10°. 
Rapid soil flows Relatively common overseas, but not in NZ.  Liquefaction flows 2°. 
Landslide volumes referred to are:  Very small (<103 m3); Small (103-104 m3); Moderate (104-105 m3); Large (105-106 m3); 
Very large (1-50 x 106 m3); Extremely large (>50 x 106 m3).  Note that these volume categories differ from the landslide 
volumes adopted for this thesis. 
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Table 5.4 indicates that rock and debris falls are very common on slopes steeper than 40°, whereas 
rock and debris slides typically occur on minimum slope angles of 25-35°.  Rock and debris 
avalanches could occur from steeper (>35°) slopes where the height of fall exceeded 150m, but there 
is no evidence for these types of slope failure in previous earthquakes (including the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake).  Translational debris and rock slides are considered the most likely types of future 
earthquake-induced landsliding in the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor, but high vertical or horizontal 
accelerations (>1.0g) could be expected to initiate falls from steeper (>35°) slopes. 
It is noted that the logarithmic volume classification shown in Table 5.4 differs from that used in the 
present study.  Hancox et al (2002) define very small earthquake-initiated landslides as being less than 
1,000m
3
 in volume, whereas this volume range includes very small, small and medium landslides as 
used in the present study (Chapter 4, Figure 4.2). The reason for this is that from a railway 
management perspective, debris even less than 100m
3
 in volume could easily cause a derailment if the 
train was not able to stop in time.   
5.6.3 Seismic sources 
Recent studies by Stafford (2006) and Stafford et al (2008) looked specifically at the development of 
a seismic source model for the Buller and Northwest Nelson region to be used in probabilistic seismic 
hazard analyses (PSHA).  One of the goals of the study was to determine whether the observed 
historic record of seemingly high seismic activity in the region is representative of longer term 
earthquake activity.  The methodology used in the study included a review of previous research, 
which generally considered that the observed seismic rates are anomalously high for the region, 
coupled with consideration of all available information sources that could provide bounding criteria 
for long-term seismic rates (Stafford et al, 2008).   
Information sources for the study included geodetic analyses, plate-motion modelling, structural 
geology, paleoseismic data, tree-ring analyses, precarious rock information, observed seismicity and 
fundamental mechanics.  Fourteen fault sources were incorporated into the Buller and Northwest 
Nelson seismic source model by Stafford et al (2008), as shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.12.  The 
study concluded that the historic record of observed seismicity in the Buller and Northwest Nelson 
region can be used for modelling future earthquake occurrence, and that previous research in this area 
has overestimated the degree of uncharacteristically high seismic rates.   
The historic record shows three principal earthquakes since 1929 affecting the Lower Buller Gorge, 
these being Murchison (Buller) in 1929, Inangahua in 1968, and Westport in 1991.  All produced 
magnitudes in excess of 6.0, and resulted in damage to road and/or rail facilities, allowing for the fact 
that the railway was not completed between Inangahua Junction and Westport in 1929. 
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Table 5.5:  Fault sources and geometrical parameters (based on Stafford, 2006) 
Fault Number and name 
(refer Figure 5.12) 
Number of segments and 
total segment length (km) 
Fault dip  
(°) 
Fault area 
(km
2
) 
1. Kongahu 5 segments, 156.5km 60 3390.0 
2. Glasgow 4 segments, 47.7km 60 1005.2 
3. Inangahua 2 segments, 44.7km 125 974.9 
4. Lyell 1 segment, 51.9km 75 967.1 
5. White Creek 3 segments, 89.5km 75 1756.3 
6. Mt William 1 segment, 35.1km 73 367.0 
7. Cape Foulwind 4 segments, 189.0km 65 3801.0 
8. Maimai 1 segment, 25.2km 125 553.5 
9. Kohaihai 2 segments, 47.5km 60 995.1 
10. Wakamarama 2 segments, 72.3km 75 and 120 1506.3 
11. Karamea 3 segments, 85.6km 60 1785.1 
12. Pikikiruna 3 segments, 63.9km 75 1256.1 
13. Pisagh 2 segments, 16.5km 75 296.4 
14. Alpine 7 segments, 197.9km 45 5172.4 
   
 
Figure 5.12:  Fault sources mapped in the Buller region (Stafford, 2006) used for developing a 
seismic source model.  Numbered faults are detailed in Table 5.5.  New Zealand Map Grid 
(NZMG) coordinates are shown with units of kilometres.   
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An updated probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) for New Zealand was presented by 
Stirling et al (2002).  New methods were applied by Stirling et al (2002) for the treatment of historical 
seismic data that were combined with geologic data for 305 major active earthquake faults.  Maps 
produced included peak ground accelerations (PGA) and 5% damped response spectral accelerations 
that were expected for return periods of 150, 475 and 1,000 years at average soil sites (defined as 
Class B site conditions in Standards New Zealand, 1992).   
The 150-year return period probabilistic seismic hazard map is shown in Figure 5.13.  The project 
area is indicated in Figure 5.13, which shows PGA values of ≥0.3 to ≤0.5g, which are considered 
realistic for regolith-type failures. 
 
Figure 5.13:  Probabilistic seismic hazard map for New Zealand from Stirling et al (2002) for 
site class B (intermediate soil), showing expected peak ground accelerations with a return 
period of 150 years (10% probability in about 10 years). 
Project 
area 
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5.7 Summary 
Chapter 5 has focused on the ‘hazard’ component of the Landslide Risk Management framework, 
particularly with the nature of the upslope-sourced landslide hazards affecting rail operations along 
the 30km corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge.  Examples were provided of the geological 
controls and spatial distribution of slope instability, and of the temporal effects related to specific 
storms including the importance of antecedent moisture conditions.   The principal types of landslide 
hazard recognised in the Lower Buller Gorge are: 
1. Rock and debris falls from very steep (≥35°) bedrock faces triggered by either earthquake or 
extreme rainfall;  
2. Debris slides associated with regolith or colluvial failures from moderately steep to steep (>20°) 
slopes along most of the rail corridor; and  
3. Channelised debris flows in steep catchments due to bank erosion or landsliding into the 
watercourse.  
In addition to the topographic control of instability in the steep-sided Lower Buller Gorge for the 
majority of the total length (30km), the main basement units (Tuhua granites; Hawks Crag Breccia; 
Greenland Group) all source debris slides and flows along much of their outcrop length with few 
specific areas identified of preferential slope failure.  Tertiary bedrock units (Kaiata Formation; 
Whitecliffs Limestone) show localised block failures on bedding where these rock mass defects 
daylight or dip out of the face towards the rail.  Between SNL98km and 104km Quaternary alluvium 
is present on the floodplains of the Mackley River and Muddy Creek, with no associated slope 
instability issues. 
The temporal case study has represented a 1 in 10-year recurrence interval storm event that caused 
landslide-induced damage and track closure.  This event is regarded as typical of the intermediate 
return period storm event that can be anticipated in a deeply incised gorge with steep sides and an 
annual rainfall generally exceeding 2,000mm. 
Landslide damage and track closure is expected from earthquakes of magnitude 6.0 or greater centred 
within 30km of the rail corridor.  It is noted that limited landsliding can occur in the event of a 
magnitude 5 earthquake (Hancox et al, 2002).  Storm events producing rainfalls of 20mm or more in a 
24-hour period can be considered to be landslide-triggering (Glade et al, 1998), but specific study of 
rainfall triggering levels is required in the Lower Buller Gorge.  Particular attention needs to be 
focussed on antecedent moisture conditions in determining a rainfall trigger level.  The absence of any 
rain gauges within the Lower Buller Gorge or catchments is identified as a future rail management 
issue to be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 6:  WHITECLIFFS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Whitecliffs is a prominent feature of the landscape in the Lower Buller Gorge with massive limestone 
outcrops on both sides of the Buller River.  A lot of attention has been given to the outcrop adjacent to 
SH6 after the fatality that occurred as a result of the 1968 Inangahua earthquake-generated rockfalls 
and slides.  In comparison, literature reviews and discussions with rail personnel have provided very 
limited information regarding the limestone outcrop adjacent to the rail alignment, including any 
rationale, timing or justification for the 25km/hour speed restriction between SNL97.51 and 97.53km. 
The objective of Chapter 6 is to describe the physical characteristics of the limestone cliffs adjacent to 
the rail corridor for the purpose of assessing any geotechnical risk associated with the removal of the 
25km/hour speed restriction.  The extremely short section of rail (20m) specified in the Ontrack Rail 
Operating Procedures, Section L6L: page 15 that has the speed restriction imposed is inconsistent 
with observations made on site.  It is assumed for the purpose of the assessment in Chapter 6 that the 
area of concern is as depicted on Figure 6.1, and is approximately 500m within the boxed area, which 
encapsulates the rail corridor adjacent to the cliffs, and zone of limited visibility, between SNL97.40 
and 97.90km.  
Chapter 6 is structured into the following sections to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
physical, geological and mechanical rock properties at Whitecliffs, including a historical review 
summary of available information regarding rockfall occurrences, and triggering mechanisms: 
 Section 6.2:   Geology – based on the depositional history, structure, plan views, and cliff-face 
profiles. 
 Section 6.3:   Rock material characterisation – strength, elasticity, density, porosity and thin 
section study. 
 Section 6.4: Slope stability assessment – qualitative evaluation from historic record, aerial 
photographs, and triggering mechanisms. 
 Section 6.5:   Future management considerations and speed restriction zone. 
Information for this chapter was obtained from a variety of sources, including literature reviews, 
aerial photographs, geological and structural mapping, laboratory testing of selected samples, and 
preparation of thin sections.  Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) survey data was used as the base 
for a number of figures in the chapter.  The methodology and output of the survey is described in the 
following section. 
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Figure 6.1:  Aerial view of Whitecliffs showing the area adopted for the risk assessment and 
SNL97.50km metrage location (aerial base from NZ Aerial Mapping Ltd).  Star indicates the 
location of a very large (~20,000m
3
) displaced limestone block immediately adjacent to the rail 
corridor around SNL97.60km. 
6.1.1 LiDAR survey 
KiwiRail commissioned NZAM to conduct a LiDAR survey for Whitecliffs in March 2010.  LiDAR 
is considered as a cost effective alternative to ground surveying for medium to large scale terrain 
modelling projects.  The ground surface is characterised by collecting dense sets of elevation points 
by light transmission onto the target area, which then gets reflected back to the instrument being used 
for analysis.  Additional background information regarding the LiDAR survey conducted at 
Whitecliffs is provided in Appendix 6.1. 
LiDAR survey data has enabled visualisation of the ground surface at Whitecliffs without the 
interference of vegetation.  A 3D-model of Whitecliffs was developed by Dr. Rouwen Lehné using 
the LiDAR data, and gOcad software from Paradigm, to illustrate the elevation and topographical 
features of the limestone outcrop (Figure 6.2).  Data limitations included a number of points 
incorporated into the LiDAR by NZAM that represent either single rocks or vegetation features near 
the cliff edge.  This has resulted in a pillar-type effect down the near vertical face in the 3D-model.  
Despite the limitations, it is clear that the prominent feature focussed on in Chapter 6 (circled on 
Figure 6.2) is the most probable area for failure in the event of a large magnitude earthquake, 
particularly when taken into consideration with geological features and rock composition discussed in 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3.  The ~20,000m
3
 displaced block is clearly depicted in Figure 6.2 near the bottom 
of the outlined focus area for Chapter 6.   
97.50 
N 
Whitecliffs 
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Figure 6.2:  Three-dimensional representation of Whitecliffs based on LiDAR survey data 
supplied by NZAM  
The top of the near vertical cliffs above the rail is at an elevation of 140m amsl, with the rail 
alignment around 55m amsl.  Widely spaced (>10m) sub-vertical fractures are visible in the cliff-face, 
both parallel to and normal to the face aligned roughly parallel to the rail (Chapter 3, Figures 3.1 and 
3.2).  Bedding planes, numerous ledges and vegetation are visible down the vertical profile 
(Chapter 1, Figure 1.6).  A well-established talus apron is present from around 75m amsl, sloping on 
average at 35° to ~50° down to the rail alignment.  The very large displaced block (in the order of 
20,000m
3
) immediately adjacent to the rail at SNL97.60km provides an indication of the scale of 
previous failures, and its location is indicated by the star on Figure 6.1. 
6.2 Geology 
Previous studies relevant to the geological profile at Whitecliffs, and surrounding area, include 
Anderson et al (1994), Carter et al (1962), Lever (2001) and Lindqvist (1972).  References to 
Whitecliffs in these papers generally consider the exposure on the southern side of the Buller River, 
Elevation (m amsl) 
50 
am
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am
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adjacent to SH6.  Published geological maps for the area, detailed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) variously 
map the outcrop at Whitecliffs as the following stratigraphic units:   
 Nile Group:  Limestone, predominantly shallow-water bioclastic varieties (Nathan et al, 2002); 
 Cobden Limestone:  Sandy slightly glauconitic limestone with basal calcareous grit overlying 
hard, muddy limestone with bands of calcareous mudstone (Bowen, 1964); and 
 Whitecliffs Formation:  Sandy conglomeratic limestone, massive muddy limestone, interbedded 
muddy limestone and calcareous mudstone (Nathan, 1978). 
To establish a more accurate geological profile for the limestone outcrop adjacent to the rail corridor, 
and the context for the units present, the depositional history is summarised and site specific 
geological observations are described in the following sections. 
6.2.1 Depositional history 
Whitecliffs is located near the western margin of the Murchison Basin (Lever, 2001).  A composite 
stratigraphic section for the area is shown on Figure 6.3, which is based on Carter et al (1982), and the 
sequence (starting from the basement) is summarised below: 
 Basement rocks are overlain directly by Island Formation limestone and sandstone. 
 A gradational contact exists between Island Formation and the overlying Kaiata Formation 
(mudstone), which is the highest unit of the Maruia Group present near Whitecliffs. 
 Sediment deposition at Whitecliffs is interpreted to have occurred within a basin margin location 
during the Maruia Group transgression and later Cainozoic phases of tectonic and sedimentary 
activity.  The Whitecliffs Formation comprises: (1) A lower breccia lithofacies, with a matrix 
that is predominantly lithic (poorly sorted grains of trachyte, phyllite and greywacke), and (2) an 
upper limestone lithofacies (primarily a sandy, glauconitic and algal biosparite sequence). 
 A variety of minerals and rock fragments from basement units make up the clastic material 
within the Whitecliffs Formation, including quartz and biotite. 
 An unconformity is inferred between the breccia lithofacies and underlying Kaiata Formation.   
 The Inangahua Formation overlies the Whitecliffs Formation.  The contact between these units 
has been interpreted as paraconformable.  The outcrop adjacent to State Highway 6 shows the 
contact as a distinct change in slope.   
 The lower part of the Inangahua Formation comprises 100-300mm thick beds, with up to 400-
1,400mm beds higher up the unit.   
 A minimum thickness of 300m for the Inangahua Formation has been reported, and it is overlain 
by a regressive sequence, including the non-marine coal-bearing Rotokohu Formation. 
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Figure 6.3:  Composite stratigraphic section in the vicinity of Whitecliffs (modified from Carter 
et al, 1982 and based predominantly on rock exposures on the southern side of the Buller River, 
adjacent to SH6).  Kaiata Formation is the highest unit of the Maruia Group, and is overlain by 
Whitecliffs Formation (Cobden Group) and Inangahua Formation (Blue Bottom Group). 
 
BASEMENT 
Glauconitic  
ISLAND FORMATION 
Muddy, glauconitic algal-foram limestone 
 
Well graded, micaceous, quartzose, calcareous fine to medium sandstone 
KAIATA FORMATION 
Dark, micaceous, bioturbated siltstone-mudstone, concretions 
Quartzose calcirudite and lithic breccias (150-200mm diameter, and 1000mm 
clasts) in crude beds 
Quartzose, glauconitic, bioclastic limestone with scattered phosphate 
nodules and calcareous algae 
Channelised and cross-bedded 
INANGAHUA FORMATION 
Alternating graded beds of sandy limestone and siltstone 
Bored, phosphatised, glauconitised limestone intraclasts and fossil casts 
 
WHITECLIFFS FORMATION 
Paraconformity 
Unconformity 
Quartzose, gritty, calcareous sandstone with derived concretions 
~100m thick 
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As indicated in Figure 6.3, the depositional history in the vicinity of Whitecliffs involved a shallow 
marine transgression that was terminated in the Oligocene by a period of faulting and basin formation 
(Carter et al, 1982).  Tilting is also inferred to have occurred around this time, resulting in a slightly 
angular unconformable contact between Maruia Group transgressive sediments, overlying breccias 
and Cobden Group limestone (Carter et al, 1982).  A hardground developed in the mid to late 
Oligocene at the top of the Cobden Group, along a burrowed and bored surface.  A period of renewed 
tectonic activity is inferred later in the Oligocene, associated with the deposition of mudstone.  
6.2.2 Whitecliffs plan view 
To access the top of Whitecliffs, a basic track has been marked by KiwiRail staff to enable annual 
monitoring of pins located across fractured limestone with some detached blocks.  As summarised in 
Section 1.6.5, there has been no detectable movement at the monitoring locations chosen by KiwiRail 
in the 18 years since the first survey round was completed in 1993 (refer Appendix 1.3 for details).   
The ground surface at the top of Whitecliffs is very irregular, comprising broken and semi-detached 
limestone blocks of variable size.  Once the highest point is reached (approximately 155m elevation, 
refer Figure 6.4), the slope drops down towards the southeast at 35° on average to the start of the near 
vertical profile.  Within this area of Whitecliffs there are three open fracture sets, labelled on 
Figure 6.4 as Fracture 1 (northernmost), 2 and 3.  The features are joint-controlled but are being 
described in this chapter using the generic term ‘fracture’. 
The fractures trend generally in the same direction (southwest to east-northeast).  GPS coordinates of 
the fracture locations were taken and this data added into the site model for Whitecliffs using ArcGIS 
software.  Measurements of the open fractures are summarised in Table 6.1, and extrapolated from 
marked locations on Figure 6.4.  A representative cross-section of the fractures and cliff-face profile is 
provided on Figure 6.5, and its location is shown on Figure 6.4. 
Table 6.1:  Description and measurements for open fractures mapped at the top of Whitecliffs  
Reference* Description and measurements 
Fracture 1 
 Western end:  measured for 16m, open horizontally to a maximum of 1.4m, 
decreasing to between 0.3-0.6m towards the east. 
 The fracture extends laterally from a true bearing of 040 (north-east), changing to a 
bearing of 070 (east-northeast) until definition is lost as the ground slope increases 
and material on the downslope side of the fracture has dropped away.  
 Material has infilled the fracture but it is still open down to a maximum of 1.5m 
below ground level (western end). 
 Vertical displacement is less than 0.2m, downthrown towards the south/southeast. 
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Reference* Description and measurements 
Fracture 2 
 Measured for 8m, stepping from a bearing of 060 at the western end to around 090 at 
the eastern end.  
 Open horizontally to a maximum of 1.3m, decreasing to 0.6m towards the east. 
 Maximum vertical displacement was 0.9m, downthrown towards the south. Infilling 
has occurred with the measured fracture depth ranging between 0.4m and 0.8m from 
the downthrown side of the fracture. 
Fracture 3 
 Measured for 9m, orientated east to west.  
 Horizontal opening decreases towards the east (from 0.9m to 0.4m).  
 Maximum measured vertical displacement of 1.2m, downthrown side towards the 
south.  
 Access to the western extent of Fracture 3 was not possible. 
* Refer Figure 6.4 for spatial distribution 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Fractures mapped at the top of Whitecliffs and start of Profiles W1 and W2 
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Figure 6.5:  Representative cross-section of the Whitecliffs profile (location of section A – B shown on Figure 6.4). 
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There is no evidence at the top of Whitecliffs to indicate any active movement of the displaced 
limestone blocks and fracture sets, based on vegetation cover, the degree of infilling of the open 
fractures, and absence of slab failures on the sides of the open fractures.  This observation is 
supported by measurements recorded by KiwiRail staff of metal pins that are located across the 
western end of Fractures 1 and 3 (Appendix 1.3).  The vertical offsets across each fracture show the 
maximum downthrown extent increasing towards the cliff-face from 0.2m (Fracture 1) to 1.2m 
(Fracture 3).  The tapering observed in opening widths of the fractures, to penetrative joints at greater 
depth below the ground surface, does also suggest past toppling movements (Figures 6.4 and 6.5).  
Numerous other openings and fractures at the top of Whitecliffs were noted during the walk up to the 
top of the cliff.  The persistence, depth and width of the fractures varied, some representing only 
single displaced blocks of limestone ≤10m3.  While localised failures and instability may occur within 
other areas of Whitecliffs, the risk of failure, and resultant impacts to rail operations, increases with 
proximity of the slope to the rail alignment.  For this reason, the areal extent mapped in detail for this 
thesis at the top of Whitecliffs is considered the highest risk area at present.   
6.2.3 Cliff-face profiles 
To confirm the stratigraphic sequence detailed by previous studies, two abseil traverses were 
completed down the cliff-face at Profiles W1 and W2.  The start of each descent is shown on 
Figure 6.4.  The objectives of the traverses were to determine bedding and joint orientation; 
identification of any bedding plane shears on which movement has occurred; dilation information on 
fracture sets, including any measureable offsets; and lithological variation within the limestone. 
A tape measure was fixed at the start of each traverse and lowered during the descent to correlate 
observations with locations on the cliff-face.  Measurements from the tape measure are indicative only 
as the cliff-face was not always vertical and allowance has been made in the following sections for 
slope variation based on elevation data from the LiDAR survey.  All distance measurements referring 
to profile lengths have been converted to elevation (m amsl) in Sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5. 
Details regarding bedding attitude and thickness, ledges, and lithology have been incorporated onto 
Figure 6.5.  A photographic record of the vertical profile was also undertaken with relevant 
photographs provided in the following sections.  An attempt was made to abseil down approximately 
midway between Profiles W1 and W2, but the overhang was greater in this area, and the absence of 
any trees or other features to secure the ropes caused safety concerns.  There was also uncertainty 
regarding obtaining useful data due to the large overhang.  
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6.2.4 Profile W1 
The first traverse (Profile W1) was completed by Abseil Access Limited staff only, due to health and 
safety constraints.  The information obtained was useful in terms of observations of the sub-vertical 
fractures on the western side of the prominent outcrop as shown on Figures 6.2 and 6.4.  Only limited 
lithological and structural descriptions were relayed by Abseil Access Limited during the first 
traverse.  Profile W1 focussed on two of the main open fractures, specifically the western expression 
of Fractures 1 and 2.  The following comments, and photographic log, are based on relayed 
information from Abseil Access Limited:   
 Unvegetated rock was exposed from the start of the descent, near the monitoring pins (140m, 
Figure 6.6) to ~98m.    
 Loose (detached) limestone blocks with volumes exceeding 10m3 were predominant between 
140m and 128m.  The western extent of the detached blocks was bounded by Fracture 1 
(Figure 6.7).   
 Fracture 1 between 140m and 128m was described by Abseil Access Limited as near vertical, 
open on average to 400mm, and was estimated to persist into the rock face for at least 10m into 
darkness.  Surface mapping in Figure 6.4 indicates continuity for at least 35m. 
 The first ledge was encountered at 128m, and the limestone down to this level was very well 
indurated and massive.  The ledge itself was estimated at 10m (lateral extent).  The near vertical 
open Fracture 2 at this level (130m amsl) had a width of 200mm, orientated  east-northeast (080) 
into the cliff-face (Figure 6.8). 
 The first obvious lithological change down the main cliff-face below the detached blocks was 
reported at 125m (based on the presence of bedding planes, spaced at ~1m).  A bedding strike 
and dip measurement was not possible at this location but the strata was noted as dipping 
northwards, back into the cliff-face at a shallow angle, as evident in Figure 6.9.  The limestone 
was still very well indurated.  
 A ~4m overhang was encountered at 120m, which persists around the cliff-face.  This level 
marks the base of a detached block displaced horizontally by ~0.5m.  Fracture 2 at this level was 
open 300mm.  
 A change in lithology was noted at 116m, with a 300mm thick grey mudstone unit.   
 Fracture 2 at 108m was recorded as closed.  
 Thick vegetation was present from 98m onwards to the base of the descent for Profile W1, and 
no additional data from the cliff-face was possible below this elevation.   
Limited information regarding bedding planes was obtained during the Profile W1 descent.  Abseil 
Access staff who completed the descent commented on how structural features in the limestone below 
the level of the detached blocks (from 140 to 128m elevation) were consistent laterally around the 
face. 
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Figure 6.6:  Start of Profile W1 descent at 
140m elevation, near monitoring pin location.  
Limestone block on the lefthand side of the 
photograph is completely detached (volume 
of ~10m
3
).   
 
 
Figure 6.7:  View looking up from ~135m 
elevation during Profile W1 descent showing 
detached block on right-hand side of 
photograph and massive, highly indurated 
limestone.   
 
 
Figure 6.8:  View of sub-vertical Fracture 2.  
Open around 200mm in this example from 
~128m elevation. 
Figure 6.9:  View looking east from ~125m 
elevation during Profile W1 descent.  Bedding 
dips back into the face (north) at a shallow 
angle (<15°). 
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6.2.5 Profile W2 
The second traverse (Profile W2, Figure 6.3) was undertaken by abseiling staff, Kristel Franklin and 
thesis supervisor Dr. Rouwen Lehné to collect more detailed geological and structural descriptions.  
Profile W2 focussed on Fracture 3 and results are presented in Table 6.2.  The main observations 
made during the logging of Profile W2 were as follows: 
 From the start of the traverse at 140m amsl to 118m amsl the limestone is massive and strong, 
with layering at about 500mm spacing but with no obvious bedding planes or lithology changes. 
 Over this 22m vertical distance Fracture 3 tapers from a maximum opening width of 400mm to 
about 150mm, and a 300mm thick mudstone unit at ~118m is the only lithology change noted. 
 The massive and strong limestone above 118m is shown in Figures 6.10 to 6.12, and the partially 
slaked and well-bedded 300mm thick mudstone exposure in Figures 6.13 and 6.14. 
 Minor slabbing releasing blocks of a few cubic metres in volume on an irregular sub-vertical and 
very rough fracture surface at ~119m is interpreted as a stress-release feature (Figure 6.15). 
 From 118m to the top of the talus apron at 75m amsl the limestone is strong and well indurated, 
but bedding becomes better developed and spacing is 40-400mm around 90m amsl. 
 Fracture 3 appears to terminate in intact rock at about 110m amsl (Figure 6.5), suggesting that 
the relatively rough fracture has formed by a toppling mechanism on a laterally continuous joint. 
 A second 300mm thick laterally continuous grey mudstone is present at 105m, and some bedding 
release of limestone blocks about 1m
3
 in volume becomes evident at about 85m (Figure 6.16).  
 Close examination of the limestone exposed at the top of the talus apron (about 75m amsl) shows 
it to be brecciated, and to contain some visible glauconite as well as evidence of cross-beds. 
Table 6.2:  Summary of Profile W2  
Elevation 
(m amsl)* 
Description 
Measurements 
(strike/dip)
#
 
140 
Start of descent, massive, very well indurated limestone close to open 
fracture (Fracture 3).  Loose blocks overhanging (Figure 6.10).  
Black lichen covered the limestone from 140 to 134m (Figure 6.11). 
- 
139 
Vertical fracture open 350mm, extends northwest into cliff-face for at 
least 5m, then darkness. 
- 
134 
First ledge encountered.  Layering at 500mm intervals but no obvious 
bedding planes.  Fracture 3 open between 250mm and 400mm, loose 
blocks visible with the fracture, which is sub-vertical, orientated 
north into the cliff-face. 
- 
132 
Descent continues over ledge, through vegetation.  Overhang (~2m), 
no physical contact possible with cliff-face.  Bedding planes observed 
dipping at a shallow angle back into the cliff (north), bed thickness 
ranged between 300mm and 800mm (Figure 6.12). 
- 
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Elevation 
(m amsl)* 
Description 
Measurements 
(strike/dip)
#
 
119 
Next ledge.  300mm thick mudstone unit noted around ~118m (top of 
Figure 6.13 and 6.14).  Localised slab failures evident (Figure 6.15).  
Bed thickness continues to range between 300mm and 800mm.  
Fracture 3 is open 150mm, vertical to sub-vertical, and persists 
northwards into the cliff-face.  Four limestone samples collected.   
250/11°N 
255/09°N 
112 
Descent continues through vegetation from 119 to 112m amsl.  
Fracture 3 is near vertical, 150mm wide within closely bedded 
limestone. 
259/14°N 
105 
Loose limestone blocks on ledge of variable sizes (<1m3).  Grey 
mudstone unit extends laterally around the cliff-face (300mm thick).  
Ledge encountered at 100m amsl. 
- 
90 
Strike and dip measurements taken at 90m amsl.  No contact possible 
with rock from 85m elevation until base of descent (at the top of the 
talus apron at 75m amsl).  Horizontal bedding with thickness ranging 
between 40mm and 400mm.  Figure 6.16 taken from an elevation of 
~85m, showing a bedding-controlled failure surface. 
242/11°N 
284/05°N 
75 
Top of rock talus apron.  Cliff-face is accessible.  Limestone is very 
well indurated and contains numerous clasts at the base of the cliff. 
250/06°N 
* based on LiDAR survey data 
# all measurements from bedding planes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10:  Start of Profile W2, looking 
northwards and back up the cliff at loose 
overhanging rocks.  
Figure 6.11:  Massive, very well indurated 
limestone, looking back up at the first 6m of 
the descent. 
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Figure 6.12:  Fracture 3 (arrow) around 
~128m elevation.  View east. 
 
Figure 6.13:  Mudstone (300mm thick). 
 
Figure 6.14:  Localised fracture observed at an 
elevation of ~118m.  Note the finer grained 
mudstone near top of photograph (also shown 
in Figure 6.13).   
  
Figure 6.15:  Slab failure development in 
weathered surface of exposed cliff-face around 
~119m elevation. 
Figure 6.16:  Cliff-face profile from ~85m 
elevation, view west across the rail corridor 
(indicated by arrow). 
Rail 
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Bedding attitudes where measured between 119m and 75m amsl showed dips consistently into the 
face (to the north) at angles between 5 and 14°.  Fractures 1, 2 and 3 mapped at the top of Whitecliffs 
represent widely-spaced persistent joint sets (~10m spacing), but these are irregular, rough and only 
broadly planar.   
There were no bedding plane shear zones observed during the descents of Profiles W1 and W2, and 
only two 300mm thick mudstone units were recognised.  While these will over time display 
preferential slaking, there was no evidence of significant undercutting initiating large-scale (10m
3
 or 
greater) block release in the overlying limestone.  The existing rock talus apron and the vegetation at 
the base of the limestone bluffs at Whitecliffs, reduce the potential for rockfalls released from the 
cliff-face to reach the rail corridor down the very rough blocky surface. 
6.3 Rock material characterisation  
A limited laboratory testing programme was undertaken to supplement the field mapping.  Samples 
were collected where feasible during Profile W1 and W2 descents.  Due to the hard nature of the rock 
outcrops and access limitations (including overhanging) during abseiling only limited chip samples 
could be recovered.  Sample references detailed below refer to the approximate elevation (m amsl) 
they were collected from in situ using a geological rock hammer: 
 Sample A.  140m elevation (top of Whitecliffs close to the monitoring pins) 
 Sample B.  119m elevation (Profile W2) 
 Sample C.  75m elevation (top of talus apron) 
 Sample D.  55m elevation.  Large displaced limestone block immediately adjacent to the railway 
In addition, three core samples (CS1, CS2 and CS3), with dimensions of 300mm (length) and 43.5mm 
(diameter) were recovered by drilling horizontally into the base of the cliffs close to where open sub-
vertical fractures were identified.  Core sample locations are shown on Figure 6.17.  Cores were 
recovered by Abseil Access Limited using a portable electric diamond drill powered by a generator. 
Point-load strength testing was carried out on Samples A to D.  Testing procedures were in 
accordance with ISRM Standard Methods (Ulusay and Hudson, editors, 2007).  Analytical testing for 
the three core samples is outlined below:   
 Core sample CS1:  recovered from the sedimentary breccia at the base of Profile W1 (Figures 
6.4 and 6.17).  Core recovered was not intact and not scheduled for testing. 
 Core sample CS2:  recovered from a similar stratigraphic position on Profile W2.  Samples were 
prepared for testing, including porosity, density, seismic velocity and UCS determination without 
strain measurement. 
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 Core sample CS3:  recovered from the same stratigraphic position (close to the sedimentary 
breccia contact with the overlying limestone), approximately equidistant between CS1 and CS2 
(Figure 6.17).  The same analytical testing was conducted as for CS2.   
 
Figure 6.17:  Location of core samples CS1 to CS3 
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Test results are summarised in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.  Thin sections prepared from Samples A to D were 
also examined, as outlined in Section 6.3.2.  All testing for this thesis was carried out at the University 
of Canterbury with assistance of the Geological Science Department technicians to ensure best 
practice procedures were adhered to.  The seismic analyser used is shown in Figure 6.18 (GCTS 
Ultrasonic Velocity Test System, ULT-100 CATs).  An example of the UCS test is shown in 
Figure 6.19, including the resulting failure for CS3 (Figure 6.20) and CS2 (Figure 6.21).   
 
Table 6.3:  Materials testing results from Whitecliffs 
Sample 
(elevation) 
IS(50) MPa 
Equivalent UCS 
(MPa) * 
Measured UCS 
(MPa) 
A. 140m 1.72 (8) 41 - 
B. 119m 3.08 (7) 74 - 
C. 75m 3.66 (6) 88 
52.3 (CS2) 
42.4 (CS3) 
D. 55m 2.03 (5) 49 - 
Notes: Outliers removed for Sample A and B.  Averages presented for 
Samples C and D (limited samples). 
- Core samples obtained by drilling into the outcrop at the top of the talus 
apron; two cores obtained. 
- Numbers in brackets represent number of valid results used (point-load 
tests). 
- * Conversion based on equivalent UCS = 24 x IS(50)  
 
 
Table 6.4:  Materials testing results from core samples CS2 and CS3 
Parameter Units 
Core Sample 
CS2 
Core Sample 
CS3 
Porosity-Density 
Diameter mm 43.5 43.3 
Length mm 41.5 38.2 
Dry mass g 149.7 142.2 
Saturated mass g 154.0 144.6 
Dry Mass Density kg/m3 2429 2522 
Porosity % 7.0 4.3 
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Parameter Units 
Core Sample 
CS2 
Core Sample 
CS3 
Elastic Parameter 
Diameter mm 43.5 43.3 
Length mm 41.5 38.2 
P-wave velocity m/s 4785 4364 
S-wave velocity m/s 2511 2343 
Poisson’s ratio - 0.31 0.30 
Modulus of elasticity GPa 40.1 35.5 
Unconfined 
Compressive 
Strength 
Diameter mm 43.5 43.3 
Length mm 110.4 118.2 
Failure load kN 77.7 63.0 
UCS value MPa 52.3 42.4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18:  Seismic analyser Figure 6.19:  UCS testing 
  
Figure 6.20:  Core sample CS3 failure Figure 6.21:  Core sample CS2 failure 
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6.3.1 Interpretation of results 
The mean point-load strength tests (Table 6.3) show a range in IS(50) MPa values from 1.72 in the finer 
grained micritic limestone near the top of Whitecliffs (140m elevation) to 3.66 in the top of the 
underlying sedimentary breccia (75m elevation).  The equivalent UCS values, using a conversion of 
24 x IS(50), suggest a range from 41 to 88MPa (Table 6.3).  The two core samples tested (CS2 and 
CS3) fall within this range at 42 and 52MPa respectively, and minimum limestone strength of 40MPa 
can reasonably be adopted.  It is recognised that only having two strength results from the core 
samples is not a reliable data-set, but logistical and financial constraints did not allow for additional 
coring at Whitecliffs.   
Porosity-density and elasticity data are reported in Table 6.4 for CS2 and CS3.  These indicate a rock 
material density of around 2500kg/m
3
, and a porosity range of 4 to 7%.  Seismic analyser testing gave 
modulus of elasticity (E) values of 35 and 40GPa, and Poisson’s Ratios of 0.30 and 0.31.  Both results 
indicate a moderately strong and elastic material.  Textural data presented in Section 6.3.2 confirms 
that the limestone has a low porosity (~5%). 
The limited testing has demonstrated that the limestone at Whitecliffs has sufficient intact rock 
strength for long-term stability, and there is no evidence for loss of strength by weathering or 
solutioning.  Given the very wide joint spacing, flat-lying bedding attitude, absence of weathering, 
and relatively high material strength, it can be concluded that there is no likelihood of intact rock 
failure in the bluffs above SNL97.5km under normal gravity loading.  
6.3.2 Thin sections and rock textures 
The very hard nature of the limestone rock encountered during abseiling, and restricted sampling 
techniques available, resulted in limited sample collection during the two descents (six samples in 
total).  Representative rock samples were selected for thin section preparation to confirm the rock 
observed during the two descents; top of Whitecliffs; and in situ material at the top of the talus apron.  
A sample was also included from the large displaced limestone block adjacent to SNL97.60km.  
Photomicrographs and descriptions of the thin sections viewed are provided in Figures 6.22 to 6.27. 
Interpretation of the depositional history at Whitecliffs, as deduced from a limited number of samples 
and thin sections from Profile W2, has been developed with assistance from Dr Catherine Reid, 
Geological Science Department, University of Canterbury.   
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Figure 6.22:  Thin section of fine-grained 
deep-water limestone from 140m elevation 
(near monitoring pins), showing high 
proportion of planktic foraminifera with 
internal calcite cement and micrite in voids.   
Figure 6.23:  Thin section of limestone from 
~119m elevation at Whitecliffs. Principally 
composed of benthic foraminifera suggesting a 
water depth of about 200m. 
  
Figure 6.24:  Thin section of limestone from 
~119m elevation at Whitecliffs, showing 
coarser nature of fossiliferous material and 
angularity of quartz grains.  
Figure 6.25:  Thin section of limestone from 
~118m elevation at Whitecliffs. Planktic 
foraminifera dominant, with some deep-water 
molluscs. 
  
Figure 6.26:  Thin section of limestone from 
base of cliff at top of talus apron (Profile W2). 
Shallow water limestone from 50-100m depth. 
Figure 6.27:  Thin section from large displaced 
limestone block shown on Figure 6.2 at 
Whitecliffs.  
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Specific comments are as follows, with discussion from the top of the traverse down for consistency 
with the descriptions in Section 6.2: 
 The sample from 140m amsl, in the vicinity of the monitoring pins, showed a high proportion of 
planktic foraminifera and some benthic varieties, suggesting a water depth of 200-500m.  Some 
bryozoa and echinoderm fragments are also present (Figure 6.22), but none of the coralline algae 
associated with shallow water depths lower in the profile.  A micritic mud infills voids between 
the fossil fragments and detrital grains, the latter comprising both biotite and quartz but totalling 
<2% of the sample.  The rock termed a micritic limestone. 
 The sample from 119m contains both benthic and planktic foraminifera (Figure 6.23), indicating 
a water depth of about 200m.  The sample contains detrital quartz and some biotite, but with little 
calcite cement, and the voids between grains and fragments of fossils are infilled by micritic 
mud.  There appears to have been a rapid shallowing in water depth between this sample and the 
one from 300mm further down the profile (Figure 6.24), indicating a possible unconformity, 
tectonic event or depositional break. 
 The sample from 118m contains mostly planktic foraminifera, together with molluscs of deep-
water affinity suggesting deposition at the edge of the shelf.  A water depth of 200m to 500m is 
inferred, and again there is a dominance of micritic mud rather than calcite cement.  Some very 
small fragments of detrital biotite are present (<1% of total), and the limestone is can be termed a 
‘wackestone’ (Figure 6.25). 
 The sample from the top of the rock talus apron (~75m amsl) is a shallow-water limestone from 
an inferred depth of 50m to 100m.  There is little micritic mud, and instead a well-developed 
calcite cement.  Fossil fragments comprise mostly bryozoa and some coralline algae, with in situ 
glauconite grains growing within fossil fragments (Figure 6.26).  Field observations indicated 
some cross-bedding within this part of the sequence. 
In terms of rock mass stability and geotechnical evaluation for rail management, the textures of the 
limestone samples discussed above are indicative of a strong and moderately indurated limestone, 
with limited calcite cement and significant micritic mud infilling voids.  These observations are 
consistent with a minimum unconfined compressive strength (UCS) of 40MPa from both core testing 
and point-load data (density ~2500kg/m
3
 and porosity in the order of 5%).   
Given the sub-horizontal bedding, which dips back into the face, and the absence of solutioning, long-
term stability is inferred based on the intact rock strength.  Only fracture-controlled flow of 
infiltrating water can be expected, and the few open fractures present ensure free drainage preventing 
pore pressure build-up.  It is appreciated that the large (~20,000m
3
) displaced block at SNL97.6km 
proves that large-scale block failures are possible, and textural analysis (Figure 6.26) suggests that it 
has been sourced from a mid to upper slope location. 
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6.4 Slope stability assessment 
This section presents a qualitative assessment of slope stability for the area defined on Figure 6.1 at 
Whitecliffs.  Slope failure mechanisms and triggering events are discussed in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, 
followed by future management considerations, including the speed restriction zone (Section 6.5). 
6.4.1 Slope failure mechanisms  
The mechanisms of failure that are applicable to Whitecliffs are rockfalls and/or topples.  The 
landslide inventory developed in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5) identified four events, considered to represent 
rockfalls, between SNL97 and 98km.  Two of these were listed as very small (<10m
3
) to small 
volumes (<100m
3
) at SNL97.50 and 98.00km, based on information from KiwiRail and aerial 
photograph interpretation respectively.   
Duckworth (1968) and Fitzpatrick (2007) both refer to rockfalls as a result of the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake, but no precise locations or volume estimates were provided.  The absence of any reported 
large volume rockfalls since the rail was completed at this end of the Lower Buller Gorge in the 
1940s, and the aerial photograph interpretation, indicates that the cliff has been relatively stable for at 
least the last 70 years.  This is supported by the following points: 
 The rail corridor at the eastern end of the Lower Buller Gorge only opened in 1942.  
Construction of the line would have required clearance of a section of the existing rock talus 
apron by blasting, or other methods, including around the large displaced block adjacent to 
SNL97.6km (Figure 6.17). 
 The limestone is generally flat-lying but does dip back into the face (north to northwest) at a 
shallow angle (measured between 5 and 14°, refer Table 6.2).  In comparison, the limestone 
outcrop adjacent to SH6 is dipping out of the face, which resulted in large-scale block failures in 
1968 due to seismic shaking. 
 The existing steep and blocky rock talus apron and vegetation cover at the base of Whitecliffs 
reduces the potential for rockfalls from the cliff-face to reach the rail corridor.   
 No limestone blocks greater than 3m3 in volume, which were not covered by lichen or moss, 
were observed during inspections of the talus apron between 2009 and 2011.  The only fresh 
rockfalls observed were at a remote distance from the rail, including around the eastern side of 
the large displaced block (total volume ~2m
3
 but individual blocks size only up to 0.5m
3
), and on 
the naturally formed ledge at the base of the cliffs/top of the talus apron (<1m
3
 volumes). 
 Fractures 1, 2 and 3 mapped at the top of Whitecliffs represent widely-spaced joint sets (>10m 
spacing, but slightly closer (~5m) between the western extent of Fracture 1 and Fracture 2). 
 No measureable offsets have been recorded during the monitoring of selected detached limestone 
blocks by KiwiRail at the top of Whitecliffs (first round completed in 1993, refer Appendix 1.3). 
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 There were no bedding plane shear zones observed during the descents of Profiles W1 and W2, 
and only two thin (~300mm thick) mudstone layers observed that could be prone to long-term 
slaking. 
 Analytical testing outlined in Section 6.3 indicates low porosity, high density and associated high 
intact rock strength that are applicable to the cliff-face profile. 
 The photographic record of the cliff-face profile provided by KiwiRail in the 1970s and 1980s 
does not show any visible changes to the present day (Chapter 3, Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
 Aerial photograph interpretation has not identified any changes in the cliff-face profile between 
1947 (earliest photograph) and present day, including a review of photographs flown in 1970 
approximately 15 months after the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake (Figure 6.28).   
In the absence of details regarding previous failures, the following slope stability assessment 
considers both of the dominant triggering mechanisms (rainfall and seismicity) in the Lower Buller 
Gorge, and the future susceptibility for rockfalls/topples.   
6.4.2 Rainfall-induced rockfalls or topples 
There have been no reported rainfall-induced landslides from bedrock sources at Whitecliffs to date.  
In considering the susceptibility of the limestone at Whitecliffs to rainfall-induced failures, Hoek 
(2007) lists the following triggering factors that may cause a slope to fail as a result of changes in the 
forces acting on a rock outcrop:  
 Pore water pressure increase (rainfall infiltration) 
 Rainfall-induced erosion of surrounding material  
 Freeze-thaw processes 
 Chemical degradation or weathering 
 Root growth or leverage by roots moving in high winds 
Pore water pressure increases are relevant to how a rock outcrop behaves but discontinuities present 
within rock masses prevent excessive water pressures during high intensity rainfall events as they are 
predominantly free draining slopes (Pantelidis, 2009).  This factor is directly applicable to the 
limestone outcrop at Whitecliffs where the joints and fractures in the rock mass preclude excessive 
pore water pressures during high intensity or long duration rainfall events, and the low porosity of the 
intact rock prevents significant infiltration even under prolonged rainstorm conditions.  Despite the 
free draining nature of many rock masses, Pantelidis (2009) does list the following five points in 
regards to how the presence of water can influence slope stability: 
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 Water pressure reduces slope stability by reducing the shear strength of potential sliding surfaces.  
 Water pressure in tension cracks, or near vertical fissures, reduces slope stability due to an 
increase in the sliding force.  
 Erosion of discontinuity infilling can result in a reduction in rock mass stability and also lead to 
sedimentation of other drainage paths.  
 Expansion of freezing water within discontinuities can result in degradation of the rock mass due 
to large diurnal temperature changes.  
 Freezing of surface water on slopes may block drainage paths resulting in the build-up of water 
pressure in the slope with a consequent decrease in stability. 
Potential sliding surfaces were not identified during the two abseiling descents (Profiles W1 and W2), 
and bedding was observed and measured as dipping back into the face at low angles (refer Table 6.2). 
This suggests that water pressure has very limited influence on reducing slope stability.  It is 
recognised that a complex sliding surface may be present made up of discontinuities and fractures 
through the intact rock (Wyllie and Mah, 2004).   
Erosion of discontinuity infilling is also not considered to influence slope stability at Whitecliffs as 
there were little or no fine material noted in the open fractures during abseiling.  The infilling of 
Fractures 1 to 3 at the top of Whitecliffs is also not experiencing erosion.  Freeze-thaw processes are 
not a major concern as the typically moderate temperatures experienced on the West Coast preclude 
the presence of snow or ice in winter months.  Moderate frosts are common during winter months, but 
are not considered as an influencing factor for slope stability at Whitecliffs. 
The main influence rainfall has at Whitecliffs is chemical degradation and weathering of the exposed 
surface.  The type of failure due to this process is shown in Figures 6.15 and 6.16, comprising small 
volume (<10m
3
) blocks being released periodically over time.  These blocks are not likely to reach the 
rail corridor as the talus apron is currently acting as a detention area.      
Based on the site model developed, and an understanding of the influence rainfall has at Whitecliffs, it 
is concluded that this potential triggering mechanism is not of concern for the future stability of the 
near vertical limestone cliffs.  A large seismic trigger (>M6) with a shallow hypocentre in close 
proximity to Whitecliffs (e.g. within a 10km radius) is considered to be the most likely scenario that 
could induce a failure of a scale to impact rail operations.  This is discussed further in the following 
section. 
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6.4.3 Earthquake-generated rockfalls or topples 
Earthquake-generated landslides, including rockfalls, have been reported in the Lower Buller Gorge, 
as summarised in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5).  The majority of these are related to the 1968 Inangahua 
Earthquake but reference was also made in Chapter 3, Table 3.5 to a ‘major slip’ and minor rockfalls 
adjacent to SH6 after the 1991 Westport Earthquakes (M6.0, 6.1 and 5.8).   
The susceptibility of Whitecliffs to seismic shaking has already been tested during the 1968 
Inangahua Earthquake.  Both Duckworth (1968) and Fitzpatrick (2007) refer to slope movement at 
Whitecliffs due to the earthquake but no details on volume or a precise location were recorded.  The 
aerial photograph flown in 1970 that covers Whitecliffs is reproduced from Appendix 3.4, which 
supports the conclusion that there were no large volume rockfalls or topples at Whitecliffs due to 
seismic shaking in 1968, either onto or immediately above the rail corridor (Figure 6.28).  
Earthquake-generated landslides are evident in the 1970 aerial photographs originating on slopes to 
the north of the rail corridor (circled on Figure 6.28) and many are visible adjacent to SH6.   
In the absence of a large (>1,000m
3
) failure at this time, impacts on Whitecliffs during the 1968 
Inangahua Earthquake appear limited to dilation of existing vertical to sub-vertical fracture sets.  The 
reference made by Duckworth (1968) to the fact that these fractures appeared due to the earthquake 
are not considered substantiated.   Impacts from the 1929 Buller Earthquake have not been identified 
since the rail was not constructed at the eastern end of the gorge at the time it occurred.   
Despite the absence of notable failures at Whitecliffs (adjacent to the railway) in 1968, the region is 
seismically active (refer Figure 2.6, Chapter 2).  It is understood that structural inspections are 
conducted in the event of an earthquake, as occurred recently in Christchurch and surrounding areas.  
These inspections will also determine whether landsliding has occurred.  Fault sources identified in 
the region are outlined in Table 5.5 in Chapter 5, based on research by Stafford (2006).  It was also 
concluded by Stafford (2006) that the historic record of observed seismicity in the Buller and 
Northwest Nelson region can be used for modelling future earthquake occurrence, and that previous 
research in this area has overestimated the degree of uncharacteristically high seismic rates. 
The block of limestone forward to the outside of Fracture 3 has the following approximate 
dimensions, based on Figures 6.4 and 6.17: 
 Plan area:  30m2 (triangular shape) 
 Trace length:  12m 
 Depth:  35m maximum (between 140 and 105m amsl) 
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Figure 6.28:  1970 aerial photograph in the vicinity of Whitecliffs and SNL97km to 99km 
(supplied by Aerial Surveys Limited). 
In the absence of more precise survey data, a volume of 1,000m
3
 ±200m
3
 is estimated.  This quantity 
could be dislodged by high horizontal acceleration during a major earthquake, with toppling onto the 
rock talus apron being geotechnically feasible.  There is no evidence to suggest that failures in this 
order of volume occurred during the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake, including the absence of such 
failures in photographs taken in the 1970s (Chapter 3, Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  Failure of the slope back 
to Fracture 1 or Fracture 2 is not considered feasible based on the assessment made in this thesis. 
99 
98 
97 
N 
Whitecliffs 
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6.5 Future management considerations and speed restriction zone 
The recommended approach for future management of the rail corridor at Whitecliffs, including the 
25km/hour speed restriction, is based on the research findings presented in this thesis.  The 
recommendations outlined are provided for KiwiRail to consider in conjunction with any risk 
tolerance or judgement values specific to their operations in terms of landslide risk management.   
One of initiating factors for conducting research in the project area was to review the Whitecliffs 
speed restriction.  Train speeds within rail corridors may be restricted for a number of reasons, 
including settlement or deflection of the track formation leading to possible derailments, and 
temporary restrictions are at time required in the Lower Buller Gorge due to localised embankment 
instability.  The permanent speed restriction of 25km/hour at Whitecliffs is considered as based on a 
perceived risk.  No documentation or knowledge regarding the implementation of the restriction has 
been identified to date.  There is no indication of an imminent failure at Whitecliffs that necessitates a 
speed restriction, particularly for the very short length of track specified by KiwiRail.  The present 
slope stability assessment of at Whitecliffs has concluded that there is no evidence for active slope 
movements, with only the potential for small (≤100m3) block failures reaching the talus apron, but it 
is accepted that on a longer timeframe (100-1,000+ years) large slope movements are possible due to 
natural weathering or earthquake-triggering events.  
A seismic trigger exceeding that of the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake is expected to be the only cause 
for failure of the limestone cliff of sufficient volume to impact rail operations in the short-term.  Track 
inspection protocols are assumed already in place in the event of seismic activity.  Based on the New 
Zealand research conducted by Hancox et al (2002), a magnitude 5 or greater earthquake is 
considered a minimum threshold for generating landslides.  This level (M5) is considered a 
conservative threshold for Whitecliffs but other areas in the Lower Buller Gorge will be more 
susceptible to seismic shaking, particularly if the earthquake occurred during a period of prolonged or 
intense rainfall.  Whitecliffs is not as susceptible to failure as other slopes inspected in the project area 
due to the structural controls, primarily being the dipping of strata back into the cliff-face and widely 
space joint sets. 
In response to the future risk of earthquake-generated rockfalls or topples at Whitecliffs, it would be 
possible to set up a real-time telemetered early warning system utilising extensometers.  The 
~20,000m
3
 limestone block at SNL97.6km indicates that large-scale failures have occurred prior to 
rail construction.  A failure of this magnitude would cause significant impacts to rail operations in 
terms of time and economics.  There is no feasible remedial measure available to reduce the impacts 
from a failure of this magnitude, but an early warning system would assist the continuation of safe 
operations.    
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CHAPTER 7:  TE KUHA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The area referred to as Te Kuha in Chapter 7 is located at the western extent of the Lower Buller 
Gorge.  As seen in Figure 7.1, the topography above the rail corridor is steep (typically ≥35°), with 
three main watercourses, originating in steep catchments, intersecting the rail corridor.  The 
25km/hour speed restriction at Te Kuha currently extends from SNL124.05 to 124.50km.  This 450m 
length of the rail corridor is indicated on Figure 7.1.  It is understood from discussions with rail 
personnel that the rationale and timing behind the speed restriction is not known with certainty, as 
outlined in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1:  Location of Te Kuha and speed restriction (25km/hour) between SNL124.05 and 
124.50km. 
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to present a site model for the Te Kuha section of the rail corridor 
between SNL124 and 126km.  Landslide hazard mapping and rock mass characterisation was 
conducted during numerous site inspections between 2009 and 2011 within this area.  The site model 
presented in this chapter can be adopted by KiwiRail to determine risk tolerance and judgement 
criteria in accordance with the Landslide Risk Management Framework adopted by Fell et al (2008a).   
7.2 Corridor geology  
Published geological maps presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) describe the lithologies present 
between SNL124 and 126km as: 
126 
125 
124 
25km/hour 
N 
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 Tuhua Granite:  Undifferentiated, massive or porphyritic, white, grey or pink potash-alkali or 
calc-alkali granite banded gneiss, adamellite, granodiorite and diorite (Bowen, 1964). 
 Rahu Suite:  Biotite granodiorite and tonalite (Nathan et al, 2002). 
In addition, Nathan (1978) describes these units as ‘Black biotite quartz diorite, locally foliated; areas 
containing abundant pink potash feldspar (introduced metasomatically)’.  It is accepted that granitic 
rocks are the predominant lithological unit in the Te Kuha area, but field mapping also identified areas 
of metamorphosed Greenland Group inclusions within the younger granites.  An outcrop adjacent to 
the eastern portal of Tunnel 6 at SNL124.208km shows the two distinct units (Figure 7.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the observations made at Te Kuha, xenoliths of Greenland Group have been incorporated 
into the granite at a number of locations and show significant recrystallisation to a mica-schist.  The 
main exposure occurs within a 70m long box cutting between SNL124.470 and 125.540km, as shown 
in Figure 7.3. 
Fill material is present around SNL124.578km (78m west of the speed restriction area), and was used 
to form an embankment.  The hillside is not located adjacent to the rail in this area and is not 
considered susceptible to landslides originating from upslope sources (as far as SNL125km). 
Figure 7.3:  Box cutting near SNL125.50km in 
metamorphosed Greenland Group bedrock. 
 
Figure 7.2:  Outcrop at SNL124.208km 
(eastern portal of Tunnel 6) showing granite 
overlying weakly foliated Greenland Group 
rock.  Contact is arrowed. 
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7.2.1 Thin sections 
Thin sections were prepared for a number of samples collected along the rail corridor at Te Kuha.  
Figures 7.4 to 7.8 show lithological details at a scale of 500µm from:  SNL124.00km; 124.50km; 
125.00km; 125.54km; and 125.63km respectively. 
 
Figure 7.4:  Thin section of slightly weathered granite from SNL124km showing quartz, mica 
and sericite-altered orthoclase feldspsar.  Note low porosity, interlocking texture, and general 
absence of weathering consistent with equivalent UCS strength >50MPa from Schmidt Hammer 
and point-load testing. 
  
Figure 7.5:  Thin section of slightly weathered 
schistose Greenland Group sample from 
cutting at SNL124.5km.  Note interlocking 
texture of quartz, biotite and slightly altered 
feldspar, and finer crystal size compared to 
sample of similar origin from SNL125.54km in 
Figure 7.7. 
Figure 7.6:  Thin section of slightly weathered 
granite from SNL125km showing interlocking 
quartz, mica and altered feldspar. Texture 
similar to sample from SNL124km in 
Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.7:  Thin section of slightly weathered 
schistose Greenland Group sample from 
SNL125.54km. Note interlocking texture and 
low porosity of foliated rock material 
containing quartz, biotite and slightly altered 
feldspar. 
Figure 7.8:  Thin section of slightly weathered 
granite from SNL125.634km showing 
interlocking quartz, mica and altered feldspar.  
Texture similar to granite samples from 
SNL124km and 125km (Figures 7.4 and 7.6). 
 
7.3 Landslide occurrence and susceptibility  
Landslide susceptibility mapping categorised the length of rail between SNL124 and 126km as ‘high’ 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4.4) based on steep topography, the presence of surficial colluvium/regolith 
overlying slightly weathered granite, and recorded landslide events.  The landslide inventory 
developed in Chapter 3 shows the following recorded events between SNL124 and 126 (listed from 
east to west), with modifications and comments where appropriate from site observations made in 
October 2011:  
 124.00:  small to medium volume landslide (track closed) reported by KiwiRail, triggered by 
rainfall on 30 July 2008.  Observations at this location did not indicate a feature considered to 
comprise a medium volume (100-1,000m
3
) landslide, but a feature near SNL124.16km was 
mapped as comprising ~150m
3
 of material released (Figure 7.15, Section 7.6). This is considered 
to represent the landslide referred to by KiwiRail as occurring in July 2008.  
 124.27:  large volume landslide reported by PGL (2007), triggered by rainfall.  This event 
correlates to the landslide observed near the western portal of Tunnel 6, and is discussed in 
Section 7.3.2. 
 124.40:  medium volume landslide observed in aerial photography flown in 2000.  Observations 
made at this location are presented in Section 7.3.2, and these have determined this event should 
be reclassified as ‘large to very large’. 
 125.00:  large volume landslide in January 1987 triggered by rainfall.  This event has to refer to 
the Windy Point landslide (SNL125.40km), as presented in Section 7.3.1 (see also below).  
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 125.40:  large volume landslide reported by PGL (2007).  This location also refers to the Windy 
Point landslide (Figure 7.9), and is considered a more accurate location based on site 
observations. 
 125.50:  train struck small volume landslide on 6 March 2011.  This location is within the box 
cutting shown in Figure 7.3 and based on observations made on site is considered to be within 
the very small volume category (<10m
3
). 
 125.80:  unknown volume landslide reported by KiwiRail on 23 April 2011.  Landslide 
observations made in October 2011 determined this feature to be within the small volume 
category (~80m
3
), as shown on Figure 7.16 (Section 7.6).  The location of the landslide is 
considered closer to SNL125.70km. 
While it is recognised that the examples listed above do not capture every landslide event, since the 
rail at this end of the corridor became operational in the mid-1920s, it does highlight that slope 
stability is an on-going operational challenge to KiwiRail, with at least two occurrences in 2011 alone.   
The close proximity of the rail to the adjacent hillslope has been identified throughout this thesis as a 
contributing factor to landslide susceptibility and impacts.  The travel distance component of the 
landsliding process does influence the ability of material from remote (upslope) sources to reach the 
rail alignment, but the majority of landslides observed have occurred in material from slopes 
immediately adjacent to the track formation.  Measurements made of the distance from the edge of 
rail to the adjacent slope are summarised below for representative locations between SNL124 and 
126km to illustrate the range present, and proximity: 
 124.000: 1.6m 
 124.451: 8.0m 
 124.500: 5.0m 
 124.528: 2.2m 
 124.578: 3.0m 
 125.000: 2.7m 
 125.020: 2.2m 
 125.146: 5.0m 
 125.634: 1.9m 
Within the box cutting (Figure 7.3), the distance from the rail to edge of the cut was consistently 
around 1.8 to 1.9m on both sides of the track between SNL124.470 and 125.540km.  Joint-controlled 
slab failures in this 70m long cut are not expected to exceed 10m
3
 in volume due to the high intact 
rock strength, and the fact that only localised wedge failures have been identified.  The presence of 
schistose Greenland Group meta-sediments in the cutting is not regarded as significant in terms of 
rock mass stability, as the foliation is not causing large (> 2m
3
) block release. Root penetration into 
joints can increase the slope susceptibility to small-scale failures over time.   
 122 
 
It is recognised that the cost of increasing the catch berm within the Te Kuha section is an expensive 
option, but due to the proximity of the cut slopes to rail it does not take a large volume of material to 
impact operations in the event of a train striking rock on the tracks.  This also applies to all areas 
within the project area with a short catch berm adjacent to a steep slope. 
Site observations made in February 2011, including a photographic record, and interpretation of slope 
stability for the area between SNL124 and 126km, are provided in the following sections based on 
actual landslide occurrences.  Volume terminology for landslides follows that used in this thesis. 
7.3.1 Windy Point landslide (SNL125.40km) 
The largest volume landslide documented in the Te Kuha section occurred at Windy Point, around 
SNL125.4km (~900m west of the speed restriction zone).  A photograph of this landslide, Figure 7.9 
taken from SH6, shows the extent of the material released.  Based on approximate dimensions of 
50m (height) x 120m (width adjacent to rail corridor) x 3m average depth, the failure was in the order 
of 18,000m
3, placing it within the ‘very large’ category (>10,000m3). 
 
Figure 7.9:  View from SH6 of rail alignment and landslide above Windy Point (Tunnel 7) that 
occurred in January 1987 around SNL125.40km.  The tunnel was subsequently daylighted. 
Access or 
bench at top 
of landslide  
Rail alignment  
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An access or bench across the top of the landslide is apparent in Figure 7.9, as indicated by the arrow.  
Re-vegetation of the landslide surface area over the last 24 years has effectively stabilised the 
majority of the slope and there is no evidence of headscarp regression.  The decision to daylight 
Tunnel 7 in 1987 was based on repeated slope failures above the rail corridor between 14-20 January, 
28-29 January and 3-4 February 1987, as reported Appendix 3.1.  This long-duration rainfall event 
also caused major disruption to other transportation routes in the region.   
Additional views of the Windy Point landslide are provided from rail level in Figure 7.10, including 
Insets A and B.  The box cutting referred to in Figure 7.3 (metamorphosed Greenland Group) is 
shown on Figure 7.10.  Exposed granite bedrock is highlighted in Figure 7.10 and Inset A.  The 
northern wall of Tunnel 7 remains partially intact (Figures 7.10 and Inset B).  The original length of 
Tunnel 7 was ~100m.  It is understood that inspection reports from 1987 regarding the Windy Point 
landslide were prepared (referenced by PGL, 2007), but these were not available for the current 
project. 
 
Figure 7.10:  View of Windy Point landslide looking west.  Inset A shows the exposed bedrock 
near the top of the landslide, and Inset B the remaining Tunnel 7 wall (view looking east).   
7.3.2 Western portal of Tunnel 6 
Two large volume landslides were observed near the western portal of Tunnel 6, which is located 
between SNL124.208 and 124.256km (48m in length).  These landslides occur within the current 
25km/hour speed restriction zone, as shown on Figure 7.11.   The failures are not visible from SH6, 
but photographs from rail level are provided in Figures 7.12 and 7.13. 
Tunnel 7 wall 
Box cutting 
(metamorphosed 
Greenland Group) 
A 
B 
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Figure 7.11:  Te Kuha speed restriction area.  Slope movements highlighted on the western side 
of Tunnel 6.  Arrows at higher elevations indicate other slope instability features and gullies.   
 
 
Figure 7.12:  Views of landslide near the western portal of Tunnel 6 (~SNL124.26km), including 
the landslide headscarp (A) and close proximity to the rail (B). 
TUNNEL 
6 
Image dated 2003, sourced from Google Earth. 
RECENT SLOPE 
MOVEMENT 
STEEP, NARROW 
GULLIES 
SNL124.0km 
SNL124.5km 
N 
Landslide 
headscarp  
A B 
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Figure 7.13:  Views of landslide ~100m west of feature shown in Figure 7.12 at ~SNL124.40, 
including landslide headscarp (A) and western lateral extent (B).  Note extensive re-vegetation.  
Both failures near the western portal of Tunnel 6 had similar dimensions:  ~50m in height and 80m 
width adjacent to the rail.  The depth of failure is difficult to estimate, but based on an average depth 
of 2.5m the volume of material released is in the order of 10,000m
3
 per landslide.  Granite bedrock is 
exposed in both of the landslides, but re-vegetation has covered most of the failure surface.  The 
difference in tree height at the top of the landslide in Figure 7.13 provides an indication of the age of 
the features, these being estimated at least 10 years old.  This is supported by the aerial photograph in 
Appendix 3.2 which shows landsliding in this area around 2000.   
PGL (2007) noted that the landslide at SNL124.27km has been present in rail operational records 
since 1995.  Sluicing loose debris from the landslide surface was conducted in 2003 to reduce impacts 
during future long duration or high intensity rainfall events.  Deposition of rock material onto the rail 
in January 2006 was reported by PGL (2007).  These observations indicate continuing instability for 
at least a decade around SNL124.40km. 
The failure mechanism for the two landslides near Tunnel 6, and the Windy Point landslide, is 
translational sliding comprising both colluvium and shallow regolith (weathered granite).  This mode 
of failure is applicable to all areas between SNL124 and 126km that have steep slopes (≥35°) 
immediately adjacent to the rail. 
 
Western extent 
of landslide 
A 
B 
Landslide 
headscarp  
 126 
 
7.4 Rock mass characteristics 
As part of the evaluation of the stability of the rail corridor between SNL124 and 126km, rock mass 
and material characteristics were defined, including Schmidt Hammer field tests and limited 
laboratory testing to determine porosity, density and point-load strength of representative rock 
samples.  Results from the field testing conducted are outlined in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. 
7.4.1 Intact rock strength from Schmidt Hammer 
Intact rock strength was determined using a Schmidt Hammer for comparative purposes only.  The 
instrument used was a Model L, and typically three or five readings were taken in the same location of 
exposed bedrock at outcrops between SNL124km and 126km.  After deleting erroneous low values 
the Schmidt rebound number (R) was averaged for each particular site, and the “R” values were also 
converted to equivalent MPa values using Figure 7 of the manual provided for the Model L 
instrument.  It is recognised that absolute values for intact rock strength would require either point 
load or unconfined compression testing, but this method allowed recognition of variability of exposed 
bedrock in the field.  Results obtained from the Schmidt Hammer testing are summarised in Table 7.1, 
and a brief interpretation of the data is given below. 
Table 7.1:  Intact rock strength indicative values from Schmidt Hammer testing 
Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Rock type 
Mean number (R) and number 
of tests averaged in brackets 
Equivalent UCS 
MPa value 
123.929 Granite 31.2 (5) 34 
124.000 Granite 48.5 (4) 60 
124.027 Granite 39.8 (5) 46 
124.037 Granite 32.8 (5) 36 
124.105 Granite 44.8 (5) 54 
124.123 Granite 42.2 (5) 49 
124.163 Granite 42.5 (4) 50 
124.208 Greenland Group 36.6 (3) 42 
Granite 46.6 (3) 56 
124.451 Granite 39.3 (3) 46 
Granite 39.2 (5) 46 
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Metrage 
(SNL km) 
Rock type 
Mean number (R) and number 
of tests averaged in brackets 
Equivalent UCS 
MPa value 
124.628 Granite 26.2 (4) 27 
125.000 Granite 34.0 (5) 38 
125.146 Granite 37.6 (5) 43 
125.200 Granite 34.6 (5) 39 
125.375 Greenland Group 32.8 (4) 36 
125.540 Greenland Group 39.8 (5) 46 
125.634 Granite 17.6 (5) 15 
125.700 Granite 33.2 (5) 37 
Note: Schmidt Hammer calibrated for good quality concrete, not weathered rock. Accordingly UCS values 
present are estimates only. 
Results for the segment of the rail corridor between SNL123.929 and 125.700km, as summarised in 
Table 7.1, indicate the following: 
 For granite the mean Schmidt Rebound (“R”) Numbers ranged between 17.6 and 48.5, which is 
equivalent to a UCS range of 15 to 60 MPa. Only one “R” value of 19 was below 25.   
 The variation in “R” values in the 16 granite test results is attributed to variable degrees of 
weathering, most being slightly weathered or moderately weathered in hand specimen. 
 Inclusions of metamorphosed Greenland Group within the granite gave a range in “R” values 
from 33 to 40, and were not significantly different from the equivalent granite data. 
 The Schmidt Hammer does not allow testing of strength anisotropy, which would be expected in 
schistose Greenland Group slope exposures, and this is further discussed in Section 7.5. 
This analysis demonstrates high intact rock strength for the entire length of the corridor, despite the 
limitation of not having actual unconfined compressive strength values.  This infers that slope failures 
that do occur are almost certainly defect-controlled, and do not involve failure through intact rock.  
Field observations indicate a close correlation between root penetration into joints within the rock 
mass, and general unloading and relaxation typical of steep terrain.  Natural slopes examined above 
the rail corridor in the Te Kuha section are predominantly ≥35°.   
At SNL125.5km (Figure 7.3) there is a box cutting up to 6m high, and wedge failures are evident on 
both sides of the track due to defect-controlled instability.  There is no evidence for potentially large-
scale rock block falls onto, or adjacent to, the track.  Assuming minimum intact rock strength of 
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25MPa, a critical height of slope of 1,000m can be estimated using the approach of Terzaghi (1962).  
It is therefore the rock mass characteristics, including defect spacing, orientation and persistence that 
are critical for slope stability. 
7.4.2 Defect orientation  
Measurements of defects were collected from accessible exposures of granite and metamorphosed 
Greenland Group outcrops between SNL124km and 126km to determine whether any preferential 
orientations existed.  A total of 56 poles to planes were measured, and after inspection this was treated 
as a single population.  Defect orientation measurements are summarised on Figure 7.14.  The 
Rocscience DIPS programme was used to display the data.  General comments applicable to the 2km 
section of rail are summarised below: 
 All measurements represent joint sets, with wedge-type failures being typical.   
 Joint surfaces were moderately rough for most measurement sites.   
 Joint spacing was consistently observed around 1.0 to 1.5m at or above track level.   
 Joint sets were typically penetrative for between 1m and 5m, occasionally greater. 
 Tree and other vegetation roots were observed within joints, causing dilation over time.   
Figure 7.14 shows three dominant joint sets, as follows, with orientation expressed as dip and dip 
direction: 
 Joint Set 1 – 77/280 
 Joint Set 2 – 60/015 
 Joint Set 3 – 53/182 
 
The maximum pole concentration of 9.8% relates to Joint Set 3, which strikes sub-parallel to the track 
(270°T) and dips downslope at about 50°.  This is the primary block release surface.  Joint Set 2 is a 
steeply-dipping (≥75°) defect set striking approximately normal to the track, and Joint Set 1 dips at 
60° back into the face, but in a similar strike orientation to Joint Set 3.  The clustering of the poles to 
these three orientations over the 2km length of rail corridor that is being assessed confirms the single 
population of rock mass defects between SNL124 and 126km.   
Rock mass characterisation has confirmed the importance of the dominant defect sets in controlling 
block release onto, or adjacent to, the rail corridor, with the generally strong intact rock surface acting 
to release colluvial or regolith materials, together with some loosened joint-controlled rock debris.  
An estimated ~56% of this 2km rail section is considered vulnerable to future small-large, shallow 
translational debris slides, and localised flows. 
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Figure 7.14:  Defect orientation (joints) between SNL124 and 126km. 
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7.5 Laboratory testing of rock materials  
In conjunction with the field mapping and outcrop Schmidt Hammer testing described in Section 7.4, 
the following laboratory testing was undertaken on selected samples from rock outcrops adjacent to 
the rail corridor between SNL124 and 126km, including: 
 Granite samples from SNL124km that displayed moderate weathering and some cavities due to 
partial solutioning of minerals; 
 Granite samples from SNL124.163km that were unweathered to slightly weathered; 
 Unweathered Greenland Group meta-sediments displaying well developed schistosity from the 
cutting at SNL125.5km; 
 Slightly weathered to unweathered granite from approximately SNL125.65km; and 
 Slightly to moderately weathered Greenland Group meta-sediments from within granite at 
SNL125.77km. 
These sites are considered representative of the 2km length of rail corridor, including the 450m length 
of speed restriction between 124.05 and 124.50km.  The in situ samples collected comprised rock 
broken from outcrops or batter exposures.  The materials recovered were tested by International 
Society for Rock Mechanics (ISRM) standard methods for porosity, dry density and point-load 
strength (Ulusay and Hudson, editors, 2007).   
7.5.1 Testing results 
The data obtained from testing are summarised in Table 7.2, and the mean results for each site are 
presented.  Because of variations in weathering and lithology, and the limited size of samples that 
could be collected, analysis of physical and mechanical properties was carried out as follows: 
 Three samples from each of the five sites listed in Table 7.2 were sawn into cubes, dried and 
weighed, and then saturated under vacuum.  Values for dry density and porosity were computed 
in accordance with ISRM Standards (Ulusay and Hudson, editors, 2007). 
 A total of 21 valid point-load strength values were determined using the irregular lump test 
(ISRM Standards), and gave limited data on each of the three granite sites (Table 7.2). 
 A total of 18 valid point-load strength tests were completed on Greenland Group samples from 
the two sites outlined in Table 7.2, again following ISRM Standards. 
Point-load test for the schistose Greenland Group samples were conducted both normal and parallel to 
foliation.  Data have been analysed in the following sections using the conventional ISRM method of 
rejecting the highest and lowest values for a single population, and by examining the trends 
observable for the variation in weathering and specimen anisotropy. 
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Table 7.2:  Rock materials testing results between SNL124 and 126km 
SNL Metrage 
(km) 
Lithology 
Mean 
porosity (%) 
Mean density 
(kg/m
3
) 
IS(50) (MPa) 
Equivalent 
UCS (MPa) * 
124.00 Granite 5.7 (3) 2,579 (3) 3.89 (8) 93 
124.63 Granite 3.5 (3) 2,667 (3) 2.54 (7) 61 
125.50 Greenland Group 1.5 (3) 2,839 (3) 
9.66 (8) 232 (2) 
#
 
3.43 (4) 82 (2) 
#
 
125.65 Granite 2.9 (3) 2,710 (3) 3.83 (6) 92 
125.77 Greenland Group 4.0 (3) 2,742 (3) 4.68 (6) 112 (3) 
##
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are numbers of valid tests  
- * Conversion based on equivalent UCS = 24 x IS(50)  
- # Schistose Greenland Group inclusions tested normal and parallel to mica foliation 
- ## Further subdivided on basis of weathering giving 2.5 and 6.9MPa for weathered/fresh samples 
7.5.2 Porosity-density data 
Results obtained (Table 7.2) reflect the weathering observed, and generally strong nature of the 
bedrock exposed along the rail corridor.  This has been supported by thin-section examination of 
selected samples (Section 7.2.1), and indicates that the slight variations in porosity (and 
corresponding density changes) are consistent between the sites.  Specific comments are: 
 The three granite sites (SNL124.0, 124.163 and 125.65km) show average porosity variations of 
2.9 to 5.7%, with corresponding dry densities between 2,710 and 2,579kg/m
3
.  These are 
consistent with weathering grades from unweathered to moderately weathered. 
 Samples from SNL124.0km had the highest porosity (4.8 to 6.4%), and displayed the presence of 
cavities due to solutioning of some unknown mineral (possibility a carbonate).  This was 
consistent with a comparatively lower density range of 2,550 to 2,608kg/m
3
.   
 The schistose Greenland Group xenoliths at the Te Kuha site (SNL125.50km) had the highest 
average density (2,839kg/m
3
) and the lowest porosity (1.5%).  The other site at SNL125.77km 
was more weathered, with lower dry density (2,742 kg/m3) and higher porosity (4.0%). 
Overall the metamorphosed Greenland Group and granite materials were strong, relatively 
unweathered, and had low porosities with corresponding dry densities.   
7.5.3 Laboratory strength data 
Insufficient large samples were collected for unconfined compressive strength (UCS) testing, and this 
was considered to be unnecessary given the high intact rock strength and defect-control of any rock 
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mass instability.  Limited point-load strength testing was undertaken, and average results are 
summarised in Table 7.2.  Specific comments are as follows: 
 The point-load strength (IS(50)) value for all granite samples tested ranged between 2.54 and 
3.89MPa, suggesting an equivalent UCS range of 61 to 93 MPa.  Treated as a single population, 
with the highest and lowest eliminated, the mean IS(50) value is 3.37MPa.  This converts to an 
equivalent USC value of 81 MPa using UCS = 24 x IS(50) (Bieniawski, 1976).   
 Treated as a single population, the mean IS(50) value for all Greenland Group meta-sediments was 
6.44MPa, after eliminating highest and lowest values.  This corresponds to an equivalent UCS 
value of 155MPa using UCS = 24 x IS(50).   
 Weathering differences and anisotropy due to biotite foliation were observed in the Greenland 
Group samples.  For the samples from SNL125.5km, the mean IS(50) values normal and parallel to 
foliation were 9.66 and 3.43MPa respectively.  This indicates an anisotropy index (normal to 
parallel) of 2.8, and although limited the IS(50) values are internally consistent.   
 Differences in weathering were also evident in the Greenland Group samples tested from 
SNL125.77km.  Although only six were tested, two distinct populations of moderately weathered 
and unweathered samples were evident having mean IS(50) values respectively of 2.5 and 6.9MPa.  
This indicates that the lowest equivalent UCS value is 60MPa for Greenland Group samples in 
this section of the rail corridor, ignoring any possible foliation-control of instability. 
7.6 Hazard identification and consequence evaluation 
Landslide characterisation and frequency analysis are the main components to consider for the hazard 
analysis component of the Landslide Risk Management framework outlined in Chapter 1, Figure 1.3 
(based on Fell et al, 2008a).  Landslide characterisation has been established for the Lower Buller 
Gorge project area in Chapter 5.  Specific comments relevant to the 2km length of rail at Te Kuha 
based on findings presented in Chapter 7 are: 
 The dominant mechanism of failure observed within granitic rocks is translational landsliding of 
regolith and colluvium over relatively unweathered and strong bedrock; 
 Minor topples have been observed from cut slopes, such as the box cutting at SNL125.5km 
(Figure 7.3), and debris flows may be associated with sediment mobilised in gullies; 
 Joint-controlled failures in slightly to moderately weathered bedrock at the regolith interface are 
not uncommon, but block sizes are typically less than 10m
3
 as shown in Figure 7.16;  
 The dominant joint sets (1, 2 and 3) are present in many bedrock exposures, and Joint Set 3 
(strike sub-parallel to track) is the primary control of bedrock failures by translational sliding; 
 Bedrock, where exposed, shows slight to moderate weathering only, and point-load testing 
indicates equivalent UCS values for granite ≥60MPa; 
 133 
 
 Intact rock strength for the metamorphosed Greenland Group exceeded 100MPa normal to 
foliation, and there was no field evidence for localised foliation-controlled instability; and 
 Previous landslide history, as documented since about 1985, indicates future potential for both 
large volume (>1,000m
3
) and smaller to medium (<10 to 1,000m
3
) landslides. 
AGS (2007) provide a summary table detailing the length of the historical record in terms of 
estimating return periods (in this case landsliding), and the resultant reliability.  The tabulated data 
was based on research by Lee and Jones (2004), and is reproduced in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3:  Length of historical record required to estimate return 
period events with 95% and 80% reliability 
Return period 
(years) 
Length of record (years) 
95% reliable 80% reliable 
2.33 40 25 
10 90 38 
25 105 75 
50 110 30 
100 115 100 
 
The historical record for this thesis starts from the 1920s, but the very limited information available 
from this time, up until 2004, could not be considered adequate for frequency analysis.  Information 
provided by KiwiRail was made available from 2004.  This data set is considered the most complete, 
even recognising the absence of technical descriptions or quantification of landslide data in most 
cases.  Based on the seven year record, return periods cannot be reliably calculated for landsliding in 
the project area, particularly for small to medium volume events (<1,000m
3
).  According to the 
guidance provided in Table 7.3, a minimum 25-year record is required for an 80% reliable estimation 
of 2-3 year return period events, and discussion of frequency in this thesis is therefore subjective. 
The frequency of large to very large volume landslides, as described in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2, is 
expected to be approximately every 10 to 20 years based on the very limited amount of information 
available over the operational history (approximately 90 years).  In comparison, the frequency of 
small to medium volume landslides is every 2 to 3 years based on the historic record.  It is noted that 
two small volume events were recorded by KiwiRail in 2011 alone, so this frequency can be expected 
to vary over time in response to climatic conditions.  Two examples of small to medium volume 
landsliding are provided in Figures 7.15 (~SNL124.16km) and Figure 7.16 (~SNL125.70km).   
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Figure 7.15:  Medium volume (~150m
3
) 
landslide in granitic regolith observed near 
SNL124.16km on 7 October 2011. 
Figure 7.16:  Small volume (~80m
3
) landslide 
in metamorphosed Greenland Group observed 
on 7 October 2011 near SNL125.70km. 
 
The Landslide Risk Management framework from AGS (2007) provides an example of factors to 
consider in terms of consequence analysis.  These include elements at risk (property; 
roads/communications; services; people; distance to the impacted area); temporal probability (for 
people and/or vehicles in the area); and vulnerability (relative damage; probability of injury/loss of 
life).  The following aspects are relevant to the Lower Buller Gorge project area: 
 Elements at risk:  Includes locomotive engineers, and other rail personnel, infrastructure and 
rolling stock.   
 Temporal probability:  Considered as the length of time in a specific area, in this case the 
exposure time of a train within a specific landslide susceptibility zone or defined length of the 
rail corridor.   
 Vulnerability:  There have been no reported injuries or loss of life as a direct result of 
landsliding within the Lower Buller Gorge.  The vulnerability to injury/loss of life is minimised 
by low exposure times and the nature of train movements.  The principal economic vulnerability 
is the SNL being relied upon for the transportation of coal to the port of Lyttelton.   
Other factors to consider in terms of consequence scenarios as a result of landsliding within the 
Te Kuha section are: 
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 Location:  SNL124 to 126km is located at the western end of the Lower Buller Gorge, closest to 
the Westport depot and with road access to Te Kuha (Figure 7.1).  This means that mobilisation 
of earthworks machinery for landslide clearance, or emergency vehicles, is comparatively easier 
than for more remote locations in the project area.  
 Visibility:  Track curvature limits visibility for locomotive engineers through most sections of 
the Lower Buller Gorge, including between SNL124 and 126km.  Visibility is particularly 
limited within the speed restriction zone (SNL124.05 to 124.50km), and between SNL125.2 and 
125.7km.  These two areas account for almost 1km of the 2km long Te Kuha section that would 
require a very short stopping distance (<250m) by trains in the event of encountering rock debris 
or vegetation on the rail.   
 Catch berms:  As discussed in Section 7.3, due to the close proximity of the steep slopes to the 
rail alignment (often around 2m), even small to medium volume landslide events have the 
potential to cause operational delays to KiwiRail. 
Large to very large landslides (>1,000m
3
) have the potential to block the track for days to weeks, and 
to cause either derailments (if the train cannot stop in time) or to impact the train as it passes.  Such 
landslides would be expected to be triggered by either severe earthquake shaking, or by prolonged or 
extreme rainfall.  In either case it is assumed that the track would be inspected prior to scheduled train 
departures to ensure the safety of infrastructure and clearance of any debris that has impacted the rail 
corridor.   
The consequences of large to very large landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge are not considered to 
pose a major threat due management procedures for track inspections, and the assumption that the rail 
corridor would be closed immediately for inspection.  It is understood that KiwiRail conduct regular 
‘wet weather runs’ using high-rail vehicles, but no triggering rainfall level has been specified to 
initiate an inspection.  Inspections are also required in the event of a large magnitude earthquake.  
Again, there does not appear to be a threshold level set, but the recent seismic activity in Canterbury 
illustrated the level of inspections undertaken, including structural inspections for all branch lines in 
the Canterbury and wider region.   
Small to medium (>10m
3
 to <1,000m
3
) volume events are considered to pose a greater risk in terms of 
personnel safety, and an increased probability for trains striking debris on the track and possibly 
derailments.  The absence of rainfall thresholds that may initiate landslides in the Lower Buller Gorge 
means that smaller magnitude events may not necessitate a track inspection, for example if they occur 
after a period of low intensity rainfall.  Difficulties in establishing site-specific rainfall thresholds 
exist due to the lack of rainfall gauges in the Lower Buller Gorge.  Correlating landslide occurrence 
with more remote rain gauge data (i.e. in Westport or Reefton townships) will not necessarily produce 
reliable thresholds since rainfall intensity and duration can vary over short distances.   
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Frequency and consequence analysis is developed further in Section 7.8, which includes a risk 
calculation example related to trains travelling through SNL124.05 to 124.50 at 25km/hour (current 
permanent speed restriction) in comparison to 50km/hour, and the probability of encountering debris 
on the track.  It is understood that 50km/hour is the maximum possible speed for laden coal trains 
travelling through the Lower Buller Gorge due to track curvature and grades.   
7.7 Te Kuha site model  
Details regarding landslide occurrences (Chapter 3, Table 3.5) have been correlated, and updated, 
based on site observations and mapping conducted in October 2011.  The updated summary table of 
recorded landslides between SNL124 and 126km is presented in Table 7.4.  These features are 
mapped on Figure 7.17, together with infrastructure details (Tunnel 6, Bridge 106 and culverts), 
topography,  the Lower Buller Fault, principal watercourses intersecting the rail corridor, and the 70m 
long box cutting around SNL125.50km. 
Table 7.4:  Updated landslide inventory for occurrences mapped on Figure 7.17 between 
SNL124 and 126km 
SNL Metrage 
(km) 
Date of occurrence Volume 
124.16 30 July 2008 Medium (~150m
3
) 
124.27 First recorded by KiwiRail in 1995 Very large (in the order of 10,000m
3
) 
124.40 
~2000 based on aerial photograph 
interpretation 
Very large (in the order of 10,000m
3
) 
125.40 18 January 1987 Very large (in the order of 18,000m
3
) 
125.50 6 March 2011 Very small (<10m
3
) 
125.70 23 April 2011 Small (~80m
3
) 
 
Table 7.4 indicates that six landslides are known from the 2km section of track at Te Kuha, although 
others almost certainly have occurred in the 80+ years since the railway opened from Westport.  Of 
these, three are very large volume events (≥10,000m3), and three are very small to medium (≤150m3). 
The three very large landslides are those associated with Tunnel 7 (daylighted in 1987), and the two 
close to the western portal of Tunnel 6 (which occurred between 1995 and 2000).  The three very 
small to medium volume landslides are indicated by numbered stars on Figure 7.17, and all three have 
occurred in or since 2008, which suggests others will also have occurred.  Areas where landslide 
susceptibility is considered low, in terms of impacting rail operations, are defined on Figure 7.17, and 
described below: 
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 Tunnel 6 (48m in length); 
 SNL124.55 to 125.13km due to an absence of source debris and/or a relatively wide clearance on 
the inside of the track (includes Bridge 106);  
 SNL125.75 to 126.00km, where source areas are well removed from the rail corridor.   
This suggests a total of ~ 880m (44%) of the Te Kuha section of track has a low susceptibility to 
landsliding that will impact rail operations, and that the remaining 1,120m (56%) has a moderate to 
high susceptibility to landsliding onto the track from upslope sources.  The implication is that it is 
difficult to justify the speed restriction zone between SNL124.05 and 124.50km given the comparable 
landslide susceptibility in the vicinity of the Windy Point landslide (Figure 7.17).   
7.8 Risk analysis example for the 25km/hour speed restriction zone  
The site model developed for Te Kuha shows that within the 450m long 25km/hour speed restriction 
zone between SNL124.05 and 124.50km (Figure 7.17) there have been at least two large volume 
landslides (near the western portal of Tunnel 6), and one comparatively more recent (2008) medium 
volume (~150m
3
) landslide near SNL124.16km.  Approximately 200m within this 450m speed 
restriction zone (or 50% if the 48m tunnel length is taken into consideration) has been impacted by 
landsliding within the last 15 to 20 years.  This high proportion, particularly related to the larger 
volume events, likely accounts for the decision to impose a permanent speed restriction.  The 
following basic risk analysis illustrates the exposure time variability to landslide occurrence within 
the 450m speed restriction zone for train velocities of 25km/hour and 50km/hour.   
Scope:  Calculate the risk of encountering a landslide for trains travelling through SNL124.05 to 
124.50 at 25km/hour in comparison to 50km/hour.   
Landslide characterisation:  The entire 402m length of rail corridor (excludes the 48m tunnel 
length) is considered as having the same (high) susceptibility to landsliding based on the consistency 
of steep slopes (≥35) adjacent to the track; geology; and defect orientation.  
Frequency analysis:  The average frequency of very small to medium volumes landslides is 
considered at 0.5 per annum (or 0.0014/day).  This frequency is conservative as it assumes one event 
every two years, which is more likely applicable to the 2km length of rail between SNL124 and 
126km (or more specifically the 1,120m of track considered susceptible to landsliding).     
Consequence analysis:  The temporal probability (P(S:T)) of a train occupying the length of rail onto 
which a landslide could occur is: 
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Figure 7.17:  Te Kuha site model between SNL124 and 126km showing the 25km/hour speed restriction zone, landslide occurrence, infrastructure features and areas defined as ‘low  landslide susceptibility’. 
 139 
 
 
 
Where:      = average number of trains per day  
 L   = average length of train (metres) 
     = velocity of train (km/hour) 
       =  0.011 at 25km/hour and 0.006 at 50km/hour 
The above calculation considers an average of six train movements per day in the Lower Buller 
Gorge, with each train having an approximate length of 500m (comprising 30 coal wagons and the 
locomotive).   
Vulnerability:  This is a subjective value applied to the rail corridor itself.  An example provided by 
AGS (2007) indicates a vulnerability value of 0.3 was applied to roads by Michael-Leiba et al (2002), 
and this value has been adopted for the current analysis.   
Risk estimation:  Considers annual probability of a train being struck by a landslide.  Calculated by 
multiplying:  Landslide frequency (0.5/annum) x        x Vulnerability 
= 1.67 x 10
-3
 per annum (25km/hour), and  
= 8.33 x 10
-4
 per annum (50km/hour) 
To evaluate the risk, tolerable levels need to be considered.  This is a judgement to be made by 
KiwiRail.  If the speed restriction were removed, and potentially doubled to 50km/hour, the exposure 
time is halved.  Inversely, there is a corresponding increase in the stopping distance at full-service 
brake application for any speed greater than the existing restriction.  
Analysis for a train, either laden or empty, hitting debris that has fallen or slid onto the track is not as 
simple.  To determine the risk of striking debris on the track at different speeds, consideration has to 
be given to all the following aspects (based in part on Barney et al, 2001): 
 Visibility distance around the relatively tight curves in the Lower Buller Gorge. 
 The delay between sighting something substantial on the track and application of the brakes. 
 The brake delay time between the command to the brakes and them becoming effective. 
 The deceleration available with full-service brake application once fully implemented. 
 The state of wear of the brake-pads and the air pressure available in the cylinders. 
 Other factors such as the track geography and the mass distribution of the train. 
      =
  
24
x
L
450
x
1
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Barney et al (2001) provide a sound method of calculating train braking distance for Queensland Rail, 
including development of a PC-based programme.  It is cautioned by Barney et al (2001) that 
calculating train braking distance has a number of uncertainties, and it is considered that a full 
quantitative analysis of this matter is more appropriately done by KiwiRail using their own specific 
input parameters now that the landslide hazard has been characterised. 
Given that much of the at-risk slope within the restriction zone has now failed, and the debris sources 
have been largely removed, there seems little justification in continuing with the speed restriction 
given the increased exposure from slower speeds.  It is accepted that the analysis carried out has been 
based on debris impacting the train from smaller more frequent events (<1,000m
3
 in volume), rather 
than the larger slope failures which are much less frequent on average (about once every 10-20 years) 
but which will result from events that are of such a scale that temporary track closure and immediate 
inspection is appropriate.  Analysis of the likelihood of a train being stopped or derailed by sudden 
smaller debris impacts onto the rail will require specific information on braking distance for the 
locomotives in use and the nature of the track, including maximum speed, curvature and visibility. 
7.9 Summary 
The rail corridor at Te Kuha is formed at the base of typically steep slopes (≥35°) in granitic rocks, 
with inclusions of schistose Greenland Group meta-sediments, and an average 2-3m thick regolith 
comprising weathered granite blocks with finer gravelly debris. Towards the slope base colluvium 
may be present and translational sliding at the bedrock interface results in episodic debris slides and 
occasional flows.  Minor rockfalls will occur from steeper bedrock outcrops close to the rail, and 
joint-controlled block release up to ~10m
3
 in volume occurs on a dominant defect set striking sub-
parallel to the track and dipping downslope at 45-50°.   Rock strengths are moderately high, typically 
greater than 50MPa and the intact rock will not fail.  Failures will locally be defect-controlled.   
Three large volume landslides are documented between SNL124 and 126km.  The frequency of small 
to medium volume landslides are considered to be around one every two years and it is these events 
that are considered to cause more risk to rail operations due to the absence of rainfall or earthquake 
triggering threshold values for determining track inspections.  It is assumed that wet weather 
inspections will occur after periods of high intensity or long duration rainfall and/or after a large 
magnitude earthquake with an epicentre close to the project area. 
It is difficult to justify the speed restriction zone between SNL124.05 and 124.50km given the 
comparable landslide susceptibility in the vicinity of the Windy Point landslide around 
SNL125.40km.  Any speed restriction should be based on the ability for the locomotive driver to stop 
or adequately slow the train following recognition of the hazard.   
 141 
 
 
CHAPTER 8:  FUTURE LANDSLIDE RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
8.  
8.1 Introduction 
The Landslide Risk Management framework (Chapter 1, Figure 1.3) follows on from analysis to the 
next stage of risk evaluation and mitigation.  As indicated on Figure 1.3, it is considered most 
appropriate for KiwiRail to establish and evaluate risk tolerance criteria, including value judgements 
and associated mitigation measures within their existing operational plans.   
Chapter 8 is provided as a general guide to the future management of the 30km long rail corridor 
through the Lower Buller Gorge in relation to landsliding onto the track from upslope sources, based 
on the research conducted for this thesis.  This includes failures originating from local cuttings that 
were completed as part of railway construction, and debris slides and flows sourced from steep (>20°) 
natural slopes in a number of different lithologies.  The structure of Chapter 8 follows the rail 
management options outlined in Table 8.1.   
Table 8.1:  Rail management options for the Lower Buller Gorge relevant to upslope-sourced 
landsliding 
Category Methodology 
Landslide inventory 
documentation and 
analysis  
 Compile existing records, in addition to those recorded in this thesis, 
noting landslide types, volume, run-out distance, and triggering 
mechanism (type and magnitude).   
 Use standardised terminology and develop a system or template for 
recording all relevant data for future landslide events.  
 Identify and analyse sites that experience recurring slope instability. 
Early warning systems 
and landslide 
monitoring  
 Rainfall:  Establish rainfall triggering levels to initiate rail corridor 
inspections (Chapter 5). 
 Earthquake:  Conduct rail corridor inspections in the event of a close 
source magnitude 5 or greater event (based on threshold considered 
conservative but realistic for New Zealand by Hancox et al, 2002). 
 Physical or electrical early warning systems can be adopted, but real-
time warning systems are required to minimise the response time for 
either triggering mechanism.   
 Monitoring of key slope instability sites by KiwiRail personnel, or 
contractors, familiar with the Lower Buller Gorge environment to 
determine any changes in slope morphology.    
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Category Methodology 
Protection at track level 
 Use of catch ditches or engineered bunds or benches, including 
vegetation.  Would require track widening or realignment in some places 
and it is recognised that due to access and topographic constraints this 
will not always be feasible or economically justifiable.   
 This also applies to site-specific design of rock avalanche shelters, or 
similar, at known recurring landslide locations, including Sinclair Castle 
and Cascade (Appendix 5.1) 
Slope modification 
 Remove colluvium/regolith at source and/or bench slopes for stability.   
 Implementation of horizontal drains or slot drains to control overland 
water flow.   
 Use of rock stabilisation measures (e.g. bolting or buttressing). 
All of the above options are noted as expensive.  The alternative is reactive 
remedial work in the event of a landslide.  To increase efficiency of 
response it is recommended that dedicated plant (excavators) is available for 
use at the Westport KiwiRail depot. 
Closure of rail corridor 
Re-vegetate and abandon rail alignment or convert to recreational use.  
Requires an alternative means of coal transport (shipping) and is not 
considered further in this chapter. 
8.2 Landslide inventory and documentation 
The first component recommended in Table 8.1 is the requirement for an updated and live version of a 
landslide inventory for the purpose of establishing frequency of events of varying volumes in 
response to rainfall or earthquake triggering mechanisms.  It is already recognised that landslide 
susceptibility does vary through the 30km length of rail between SNL96 and 126km, but in order to 
quantify the hazard for each occurrence, or section of rail, detail on frequency and consequences 
requires documentation.  This thesis has identified this data gap as the main limitation for detailed 
landslide hazard analysis. 
Recording of landslide events impacting the SNL has improved since 2004, but the absence of robust 
documentation of landslide events in New Zealand is recognised in other comparable studies.  The 
example provided in this section by Smith (2004) was chosen to illustrate the approach taken in 
regards to the rail and highway corridors between Arthurs Pass and Greymouth, where it was 
identified that only limited information on the type of landsliding, volumes and triggering mechanism 
was available.  By combining data from several sources, including Tranzrail Limited and Transfield 
Limited, Smith (2004) was able to compile a database that could be interrogated or updated. Smith 
(2004) used the following five major categories in assembling her database, which was termed ‘The 
West Coast Historical Mass Movement Inventory’: 
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 Time:  Included the date of the landslide event, and where there was a sequence of events the 
first was always identified.   
 Location:  For the Midland Line this included the distance from Christchurch, but these were not 
always accurate and some confusion arose with changed line names. 
 Mass Movement:  Type of landslide, volume estimate, and triggering mechanism (earthquake, 
rainfall, unknown).  Volumes were frequently the amount of debris removed from the highway or 
the railway, rather than the actual volume of the slope failure itself. 
 Damage:  Nature of the damage, the period of closure, the number of fatalities (if any), and 
solutions/comments pertaining to the specific event. 
 Logistical:  This field refers to a unique identified number for the event, the record number, the 
source of the information, and the availability/inclusion of any photographs. 
Smith (2004) incorporated 1072 mass movement events in the database that comprised 805 with a 
definite rainfall trigger, 139 with a probable rainfall trigger, 80 that were of unknown origin, 35 that 
were attributable to earthquake, and 13 that were placed in various “other” categories.  Railway 
records spanned a period from around 1920 to 2004.  Highway records only began in the 1960s, and 
the above listing included railway and highway closures or damage. Analysed simplistically, 88% of 
all entries relate to rainstorm triggering, and 3% to earthquake triggers. The implication of the 80 
mass movements of unknown origin (7.5% of the total) is that available records were neither 
consistent nor detailed enough for a fuller analysis. 
It is recommended that a similar inventory system is adopted for the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor, 
with information recorded under each of the five main fields listed above.  This should be designed as 
a railway-specific inventory since there are differences between the types and extent of landsliding on 
each side of the Buller River.  In addition, rainstorm triggers are often quite localised, and there are a 
number of issues (such as a network of rain gauges) that need to be considered.  It is important that 
the system adopted is suited to non-technical personnel doing the recording on a basis and at a 
frequency that suits the number of train movements and the consequences of derailments. 
Once a systematic recording system is established, and refined by trial and error, it will be possible to 
undertake correlations with rainfall, establish thresholds for inspection or immediate track closure, 
and put in place a series of protocols to manage the impacts of landsliding affecting the rail corridor. 
Culvert maintenance, fill batter performance, and sites of erosion potential impacting the formation, 
could also be incorporated.  
 
 
 144 
 
8.3 Early warning systems 
Warning systems can be considered under three broad groupings in regards to the Lower Buller Gorge 
rail corridor, as follows: 
 Rail management protocols that involve temporary track closure and physical inspection by 
trained staff once certain threshold values of either rainfall intensity or earthquake shaking are 
reached.   
 Physical warning devices or alarms that are triggered and provide immediate advice to rail 
operators that inspection and/or track clearance is required.  Such systems need to be robust, 
simple to operate and interpret, and not subject to erroneous outputs (Macfarlane et al, 1996). 
 Speed restrictions on train movements that are based on hazard recognition, and for which 
reduced train speed (with increased exposure time) is justified by the threat to operations or 
personnel.  Such speed restrictions presently exist at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha. 
Implementation of management protocols based on threshold levels of rainfall or earthquake shaking 
are both feasible and appropriate for the Lower Buller Gorge.  Establishing operational protocols for 
earthquake response is relatively straightforward, but rainfall triggers do require further research and 
the establishment of a network of gauging sites as discussed in Chapter 5.  
In terms of developing models for specific warning or alarm systems, the most important factor to 
consider is that the output from any form of modelling is only as robust as the input data.  Capparelli 
and Versace (2010) itemise the following components as critical for an effective early warning system 
related to slope movements: 
 Landslide susceptibility maps;  
 Impacts (scenarios) from events;  
 Monitoring data for key parameters, including real-time data transmission;  
 Mathematical modelling (for current hazard evaluation and future forecasting);  
 Warning models;  
 Emergency plans; and  
 Established decision-making procedures.  
While a landslide inventory is not specified in the above list, the reference to landslide susceptibility 
maps infers that an inventory exists.  Impacts or scenarios listed by Capparelli and Versace (2010) are 
the equivalent of consequence analysis within the Landslide Risk Management framework (Fell et al, 
2008a).   
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In terms of mathematical modelling, examples were provided by Capparelli and Versace (2010) that 
were developed for assisting in early warning of rainfall-induced landslides.  The two models, 
developed by the authors, both consider triggering factors.  The titles and summary of each are 
detailed below: 
 Forecasting of Landslides Induced by Rainfall (FLaIR) – provides a general framework for 
modelling the relationship between rainfall and landslides.  Actual rainfall data is used in this 
model, and it can be applied to real-time prediction for landslide occurrence when used in 
conjunction with a rainfall stochastic generator.   
 Saturated Unsaturated Simulation for Hillslope Instability (SUSHI) – local model with two 
modules:  (1) hydrological-hydraulic module for investigation of subsoil water circulation; and 
(2) geotechnical module for evaluation of slope stability. 
Future research to establish rainfall thresholds can then be linked to alarm systems, such as electrical 
circuitry that is activated by a debris slide or rockfall event.  Appropriate techniques are detailed in 
various well-known references (for example, Turner and Schuster, 1996; Wyllie and Mah, 2004), and 
do not form part of this thesis project.  Such monitoring and alarm systems are well established in 
both mining and civil engineering practice, and site-specific development of alarm systems is 
considered appropriate for the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor in conjunction with the establishment 
of threshold levels of landslide triggering.  
Emergency plans and established decision-making procedures are the final component for an effective 
early warning system.  These components are critical to ensure any system implemented is acted upon 
immediately in the event of landslide initiation.  Procedures need to be in place to respond and 
mitigate the hazard.  For the project area, it has been identified already that having dedicated plant 
available at the Westport KiwiRail depot for landslide clearance, or other emergency works, is 
recommended. 
8.4 Protection at track level 
From a rail management perspective, the landslide volume is just as critical for smaller events 
(<100m
3
) blocking the track as the comparatively larger, but less frequent events.  A train travelling at 
a maximum speed of 50km/hour will strike the material in areas with very limited visibility regardless 
of the volume.  The catch berm for debris on the inside of the track is regularly ≤2m (from the nearest 
rail), and partial blockage of the track has therefore to be anticipated as a normal operating condition.  
Relevant engineering solutions that can be used at track level to control debris accumulation onto the 
rail are: (1) The use of catch ditches, bunds or benches to limit debris reaching the formation itself; or 
(2) Construction of engineered sheds or avalanche-type shelter structures. 
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The latter option is expensive and site-specific, but has been quite widely used in North America and 
Europe (Turner and Schuster, 1996).  Aside from Sinclair Castle where debris preferentially travels 
down defined gullies, it is unlikely that such an engineering solution could be justified on a cost-
benefit basis.  Given the steep and narrow nature of the Lower Buller Gorge it is also unlikely that it 
would be feasible to construct ditches or bunds, except very locally where there was adequate width 
for construction.  Benching into the immediate slope is likely to aggravate instability in most cases by 
undercutting the regolith-covered slope, and the use of corridor maintenance, based on a landslide 
triggering threshold approach, is favoured as the most practical risk management method. 
8.5 Modification of slope 
This technique is well documented in research dealing with rock mechanics, soil mechanics, and slope 
stability, and is at least technically feasible in the Lower Buller Gorge.  Slope stabilisation can be 
broadly classified under three main methods: 
 Removal of source regolith materials or loose rock by excavation and benching into slope; 
 Slope drainage measures, either using site-specific horizontal drains or surface slot drains; or 
 Use of stabilisation techniques, including rockbolting, buttressing or slope reinforcement. 
In very localised situations these techniques can be adopted, and have recently been used effectively 
at Sinclair Castle where loosened rock was removed manually from upper slope source areas.  The 
tunnel constructed above Cascade to divert a watercourse is a further example of the use of such 
methods, but provision is also required for long-term maintenance once implemented.  Given that 
access for earthmoving machinery does not exist to sites above the rail at many locations, and the 
dependence on rail-mounted equipment, it is considered that slope modification will only be feasible 
at a limited number of sites if or when required. 
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CHAPTER 9:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Thesis objectives and methodology 
Landslide hazards are recognised in the Lower Buller Gorge rail corridor that have impacted rail 
operations in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.  The instigating factor for conducting 
this research was an interest from KiwiRail in determining whether two 25km/hour permanent speed 
restrictions applied for short lengths of rail at Whitecliffs and Te Kuha could be removed.   
This thesis has incorporated these two areas into an overall landslide risk management approach and 
evaluation for the entire 30km length of rail between SNL96 and 126km in the Lower Buller Gorge.  
A framework for landslide risk management outlined by AGS (2007) and Fell et al (2008a) has been 
used as a guideline document to ensure consistency with international best practice. 
9.2 Landslide risk management 
The project area is characterised by high annual rainfall (>2,000mm per year), and steep topography 
(slopes typically ≥20°) adjacent to the rail corridor that is susceptible to rainfall-induced landsliding.  
The Lower Buller Gorge is also located in a seismically active area, characterised by reverse faults.  
Two large earthquakes occurred in close proximity to the eastern extent of the project area in 1929 
(Buller or Murchison, magnitude 7.8) and 1968 (Inangahua, magnitude 7.1).   
The 30km rail corridor through the Lower Buller Gorge is located on the north bank of the Buller 
River, which encompasses various geological units, including basement sedimentary rocks (mapped 
as Greenland Group), various granites, and sedimentary breccias (Hawks Crag Breccia).  Tertiary 
sedimentary rocks are present at the eastern end of the project area, including limestone that forms the 
outcrop at Whitecliffs, around SNL97.5km.  Quaternary alluvial deposits, sourced from the Buller 
River and its catchment, form the most recent geological units.   
9.2.1 Landslide inventory 
The main limitation identified during the research for this thesis was the absence of consistent record-
keeping of landslide occurrences over time in the Lower Buller Gorge.  Since the rail corridor became 
fully operational in the 1940s, 60 landslide events have been identified that are associated with 
specific location references.  The information obtained enabled a qualitative assessment of landslide 
susceptibility to be applied to the rail corridor, but the absence of reliable temporal and frequency data 
restricted the ability to quantify the landslide hazard. 
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The volume of landslide material that can impact rail operations from upslope sources can range from 
a single rock to many thousands of cubic metres.  To reflect the presence of comparatively smaller 
magnitude events, a project-specific logarithmic classification of landslides based on volume was 
adopted.  Very small landslides are classified as being <10m
3
; small 10-100m
3
; medium 100-1,000m
3
, 
large 1,000-10,000m
3
; and, very large 10,000m
3
.  Susceptibility mapping in Chapter 4 further reduced 
these categories to small (<100m
3
), medium (100-1,000m
3
), and large (>1,000m
3
).  
9.2.2 Landslide susceptibility 
The rail corridor can be broken into four segments based on the dominant geological unit present, 
topographic features, and the inventory of landslide occurrence.  This has served as the basis for 
qualitative landslide susceptibility zonation, as follows: 
 SNL96.0 – 99.0km:  Moderate landslide susceptibility - dominant flat-lying indurated 
limestones, with sub-vertical joint-controlled cliff escarpments to 80m in height and the 
development of a steep (35-50°) rock talus apron). 
 SNL99.0 – 103.5km:  Low landslide susceptibility – alluvial floodplains of the Mackley River 
and Muddy Creek. 
 SNL103.5 – 110.0km:  Moderate to high landslide susceptibility – steep topography (typically 
≥20°, with some areas ≥35°) developed predominantly on Greenland Group bedrock and bedded 
Kaiata Formation mudstones and sandstones. 
 SNL110.0 – 126.0km:  High landslide susceptibility – steep topography (typically ≥35°) 
developed predominantly on granitic rocks, breccias and low rank meta-sediments, with minor 
schist. 
The assessment based on landslide susceptibility has shown that all large (>1,000m
3
) landslides have 
developed from the steep (≥20°) slopes west of SNL107.5km, and that there is no direct correlation 
with any of the lithologies present.  Only one medium volume (100-1,000m
3
) landslide has been 
identified east of this location (near SNL96km), while small and very small (<100m
3
) landslides are 
distributed essentially throughout the 30km rail corridor.  The floodplains of the Mackley River and 
Muddy Creek, between SNL99 and 103.5km, as expected show no significant landsliding.  
9.2.3 Landslide hazard 
Rainfall-induced and earthquake-generated slope failures both have the potential to impact rail 
infrastructure within the project area.  Approximately 78% by length of the rail corridor (SNL96.0-
97.0km and 103.5-126.0km) is subject to shallow translational landslides developed in typically 2-3m 
thick regolith-colluvium overlying strong, jointed, and relatively unweathered bedrock.  Volumes 
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range from <10m
3
 (very small landslides) to some exceeding 10,000m
3
 (very large landslides), and 
are triggered either by rainfall events or seismicity.   
Bedrock failures are limited to joint-controlled block movements generally less than 10m
3
 in volume.  
At Sinclair Castle (SNL118.8km) and Cascade (SNL121km), bedrock blocks from the upslope source 
areas periodically mobilise as channelised debris that have historically impacted rail operations, and 
can be expected to continue in response to climatic triggers. 
9.3 Speed restriction zone – Whitecliffs  
Concerns about open jointing in the rock mass at Whitecliffs (SNL97 to 99km) have resulted in a 
short speed restriction being applied, which has been evaluated as part of this thesis. There does not 
appear to be any documentation or institutional knowledge as to the timing or specific purpose of the 
nominal 20m restriction length.  A comprehensive literature review related to impacts on the rail 
corridor from the 1968 Inangahua Earthquake, in conjunction with detailed historic aerial photograph 
reviews, has established that no failures originated from the pre-existing open joint-controlled 
fractures in the limestone cliff.  It is recognised that some dilation of these joint-controlled fractures 
likely occurred.  Earthquake-triggering of fracture-controlled block failures up to ~1,000m
3
 in volume 
are considered geotechnically feasible based on measurements derived from the southernmost fracture 
identified closest to the rail corridor (Fracture 3). 
Detailed mapping and logging, including two abseil traverses down the 65m high limestone cliffs, as 
well as sampling and materials testing, has established that there is no evidence for active slope 
movement.  The assessment undertaken has shown that a combination of bedding dip into the face, 
relatively high intact strength (>40MPa), widely-spaced (≥10m) sub-vertical joints, and stable pin 
arrays since implementation in 1993, together provide confidence in long-term stability.  It is 
recommended that the speed restriction zone be removed, and consideration given to a real-time early 
warning system based on monitoring of a network of extensometers or similar.   
9.4 Speed restriction zone – Te Kuha 
A 450m long 25km/hour speed restriction zone has been established at Te Kuha between SNL124.05 
and 124.50km.  There is no knowledge or documentation as to the reasons for this zone, but it is likely 
related to the large (~18,000m
3
) landslide that occurred in 1987 at Windy Point (SNL125.4km). The 
2km section at Te Kuha between SNL124.0 and 126.0km was evaluated by field mapping, Schmidt 
Hammer testing, sampling and laboratory evaluation of the exposed granite (with minor schistose 
Greenland Group inclusions). 
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Slopes are steep (≥35°) for much of this part of the rail corridor, and the strong and relatively 
unweathered bedrock is covered by regolith-colluvium typically 2-3m thick.  Three very large but 
shallow translational landslides ≥10,000m3 in volume have occurred since 1987, affecting the rail 
operations and exposing stable bedrock.  Smaller landslides, including some joint-controlled failures 
in bedrock ≤10m3 in volume, have also impacted the rail corridor at Te Kuha, and there is potential for 
on-going rainfall-induced failures at this location. 
The risk analysis example undertaken indicates a relatively high annual probability of slope failures at 
Te Kuha (of the order of 10
-3
), but these can be expected over a distance of some 1,120m (or 56% of 
the corridor length evaluated).  It is concluded that continuation of the speed restriction is not 
justified, as much of the shallow debris within the 450m section has been removed by landsliding in 
the past 20 years.  It is recommended that the speed restriction be removed, and that proactive 
management be further implemented based around adoption of a rainfall threshold approach to 
minimise future risk. 
9.5  Future landslide risk management 
The principal conclusion from this thesis project is that there is on-going risk to rail operations from 
shallow translational landsliding in regolith-colluvium materials at numerous sites from SNL96.0-
97.0km, and SNL107.5-126.0km.  The majority of these will be generated by long-duration or intense 
rainfall events.  Development of a threshold-based method for effective track management is 
recommended, including the establishment of a rain gauge network through the Lower Buller Gorge. 
Although track protection, maintenance and related measures remain important for rail management, 
high capital cost measures such as benching, bunding or avalanche-type shelters are unlikely to be 
justified on a cost-benefit basis. 
At Whitecliffs the implementation of a real-time warning system based around measurement of 
fracture dilation or movement is considered appropriate.  Further modelling and evaluation of seismic 
response to large magnitude earthquake events may assist, but as with the rainfall-induced landslide 
triggering threshold approach elsewhere in the gorge, protocols for temporary line closure and 
immediate inspection are considered to be the most appropriate.  It is therefore recommended that 
proactive identification of potential hazard areas based on an inventory system be adopted, and that 
this be compiled into a database and available for both long-term analysis and day-to-day 
management requirements.    
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Appendix 1.1 
Flowchart for Landslide Risk Management (AGS, 2007, pg 6) 
 
  
 
Appendix 1.2 
Definitions of terms used by Fell et al (2008a) in regards to landslide zoning and risk 
management 
 
Acceptable risk — A risk for which, for the purposes of life or work, society is prepared to accept as 
it is with no regard to its management. Society does not generally consider expenditure in further 
reducing such risks justifiable. 
Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) — The estimated probability that an event of specified 
magnitude will be exceeded in any year. 
Consequence — The outcomes or potential outcomes arising from the occurrence of a landslide 
expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, in terms of loss, disadvantage or gain, damage, injury or loss 
of life. 
Danger — The natural phenomenon that could lead to damage, described in terms of its geometry, 
mechanical and other characteristics. The danger can be an existing one (such as a creeping slope) or 
a potential one (such as a rock fall). The characterisation of a danger does not include any forecasting. 
Elements at risk — The population, buildings and engineering works, economic activities, public 
services utilities, infrastructure and environmental features in the area potentially affected by 
landslides. 
Frequency — A measure of likelihood expressed as the number of occurrences of an event in a given 
time. See also Likelihood and Probability. 
Hazard — A condition with the potential for causing an undesirable consequence. The description of 
landslide hazard should include the location, volume (or area), classification and velocity of the 
potential landslides and any resultant detached material, and the probability of their occurrence within 
a given period of time. 
Individual risk to life — The risk of fatality or injury to any identifiable (named) individual who 
lives within the zone impacted by the landslide; or who follows a particular pattern of life that might 
subject him or her to the consequences of the landslide. 
Landslide inventory —An inventory of the location, classification, volume, activity and date of 
occurrence of landsliding. 
Landslide activity —The stage of development of a landslide; prefailure when the slope is strained 
throughout but is essentially intact; failure characterized by the formation of a continuous surface of 
rupture; post-failure which includes movement from just after failure to when it essentially stops; and 
reactivation when the slope slides along one or several pre-existing surfaces of rupture. Reactivation 
may be occasional (e.g. seasonal) or continuous (in which case the slide is “active”). 
Landslide intensity — A set of spatially distributed parameters related to the destructive power of a 
landslide. The parameters may be described quantitatively or qualitatively and may include maximum 
movement velocity, total displacement, differential displacement, depth of the moving mass, peak 
discharge per unit width, kinetic energy per unit area. 
 
  
 
Landslide susceptibility — A quantitative or qualitative assessment of the classification, volume (or 
area) and spatial distribution of landslides which exist or potentially may occur in an area. 
Susceptibility may also include a description of the velocity and intensity of the existing or potential 
landsliding. 
Likelihood — Used as a qualitative description of probability or frequency. 
Probability — A measure of the degree of certainty. This measure has a value between zero 
(impossibility) and 1.0 (certainty). It is an estimate of the likelihood of the magnitude of the uncertain 
quantity, or the likelihood of the occurrence of the uncertain future event. There are two main 
interpretations: 
i. Statistical-frequency or fraction — The outcome of a repetitive experiment of some kind like 
flipping coins. It includes also the idea of population variability. Such a number is called an 
“objective” or relative frequentist probability because it exists in the real world and is in 
principle measurable by doing the experiment. 
ii. Subjective probability (degree of belief) — Quantified measure of belief, judgement, or 
confidence in the likelihood of a outcome, obtained by considering all available information 
honestly, fairly, and with a minimum of bias. Subjective probability is affected by the state of 
understanding of a process, judgement regarding an evaluation, or the quality and quantity of 
information. It may change over time as the state of knowledge changes. 
Qualitative risk analysis — An analysis which uses word form, descriptive or numeric rating scales 
to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and the likelihood that those consequences will 
occur. 
Quantitative risk analysis — An analysis based on numerical values of the probability, vulnerability 
and consequences, and resulting in a numerical value of the risk. 
Risk — A measure of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to health, property or the 
environment. Risk is often estimated by the product of probability×consequences. However, a more 
general interpretation of risk involves a comparison of the probability and consequences in a non-
product form. 
Risk analysis — The use of available information to estimate the risk to individuals, population, 
property, or the environment, from hazards. Risk analyses generally contain the following steps: 
Scope definition, hazard identification, and risk estimation. 
Risk assessment — The process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
Risk control or risk treatment — The process of decision making for managing risk, and the 
implementation or enforcement of risk mitigation measures and the re-evaluation of its effectiveness 
from time to time, using the results of risk assessment as one input. 
Risk estimation — The process used to produce a measure of the level of health, property, or 
environmental risks being analysed. Risk estimation contains the following steps: frequency analysis, 
consequence analysis, and their integration. 
Risk evaluation — The stage at which values and judgements enter the decision process, explicitly or 
implicitly, by including consideration of the importance of the estimated risks and the associated 
social, environmental, and economic consequences, in order to identify a range of alternatives for 
managing the risks. 
Risk management — The complete process of risk assessment and risk control (or risk treatment). 
  
 
Societal risk — The risk of multiple fatalities or injuries in society as a whole: one where society 
would have to carry the burden of a landslide causing a number of deaths, injuries, financial, 
environmental, and other losses. 
Susceptibility — see Landslide susceptibility. 
Temporal–spatial probability — The probability that the element at risk is in the area affected by 
the landsliding, at the time of the landslide. 
Tolerable risk — A risk within a range that society can live with so as to secure certain net benefits. 
It is a range of risk regarded as non-negligible and needing to be kept under review and reduced 
further if possible. 
Vulnerability — The degree of loss to a given element or set of elements within the area affected by 
the landslide hazard. It is expressed on a scale of 0 (no loss) to 1 (total loss). For property, the loss 
will be the value of the damage relative to the value of the property; for persons, it will be the 
probability that a particular life (the element at risk) will be lost, given the person(s) is affected by the 
landslide. 
Zoning — The division of land into homogeneous areas or domains and their ranking according to 
degrees of actual or potential landslide susceptibility, hazard or risk. 
  
  
 
Appendix 1.3 
KiwiRail monitoring programme and results at Whitecliffs between 1993 and 2011 
 
Metal pins are located across selected displaced limestone blocks at the top of Whitecliffs for the 
purpose of monitoring any gradual movement over time.  Figures 1.3A and 1.3B show the typical 
environment at the top of Whitecliffs where the pins are located, marked with metal tags.  
Displacement monitoring has generally been undertaken annually since December 2001, with the first 
monitoring round conducted in January 1993.  A tape measure is used to measure the distance 
between the centres of each set of pins.  A summary of the measurements taken to date is provided in 
Table 1.3A, which indicates there was no gradual block displacement between January 1993 and 
February 2011.  The method adopted for the monitoring has an error of up to approximately +/-14mm, 
with results more typically in a range of +/-1 to 6mm between monitoring rounds.   
The frequency of monitoring and absence of telemetered information will not enable an early warning 
of large scale cliff collapse but has been useful to show that the seemingly precarious blocks at the top 
of Whitecliffs are relatively stable under current environmental and climatic conditions for at least the 
past 18 years.   
 
 
Figure 1.3A:  Top of Whitecliffs (elevation ~140m above mean sea level).  
Limestone block displacement monitoring location 
Pin location  
Fracture open 
400mm 
  
 
 
Figure 1.3B:  Limestone block displacement monitoring location 
Table 1.3A:  Pin measurements recorded between 1993 and 2011 
Monitoring date 
Pin set references and measurement (mm) 
A1 - A2 B1 - B2 B2 - D1 C1 - D1 C1 - C2 C2 - D1 
January 1993 990 1200 2165 1765 792 1665 
December 2001 996 1202 2164 1765 791 1662 
December 2002 998 1202 2167 1767 792 1662 
December 2004 990 1200 2170 1764 791 1662 
February 2007 988 1200 2166 1764 792 1661 
December 2008 984 1200 2163 1764 791 1662 
August 2009 984 1200 2161 1764 790 1662 
September 2010 984 1202 2156 1762 792 1655 
February 2011 985 1200 2164 1768 792 1663 
Minimum measurement to 
Feb-2011 
984 1200 2156 1762 790 1655 
Maximum measurement to 
Feb-2011 
998 1202 217 0 1768 792 1665 
Maximum difference 
between all rounds (mm) 
-14 -2 -14 -6 -2 -10 
Difference between Jan-1993 
and Feb-2011 (mm) 
5 0 1 -3 0 2 
  
Fracture open 
300-500mm 
Pin location  Pin location  
  
 
Appendix 1.4 
Glossary for forming names of landslides from Cruden and Varnes (1996) 
 
Table 1.4A:   Glossary for Forming Names of Landslides (reproduced 
from Cruden and Varnes, 1996, p38)  
   
ACTIVITY       
 
STATE DISTRIBUTION STYLE   
 
Active Advancing Complex 
  
Reactivated Retrogressive Composite 
  
Suspended Widening Multiple 
  
Inactive Enlarging Successive 
  
- dormant Confined Single 
  
- abandoned Diminishing 
   
- stabilised Moving 
   
- relict 
    
     
DESCRIPTION OF FIRST MOVEMENT     
 
RATE WATER CONTENT MATERIAL  TYPE 
 
Extremely rapid Dry Rock  Fall 
 
Very rapid Moist Soil Topple 
 
Moderate Wet - earth Slide 
 
Slow Very wet - debris Spread 
 
Very slow 
  
Flow 
 
Extremely slow 
    
     
DESCRIPTION OF SECOND MOVEMENT     
 
RATE WATER CONTENT MATERIAL  TYPE 
 
Extremely rapid Dry Rock  Fall 
 
Very rapid Moist Soil Topple 
 
Moderate Wet - earth Slide 
 
Slow Very wet - debris Spread 
 
Very slow 
  
Flow 
 
Extremely slow 
    
Note:  subsequent movements may be described by repeating the above descriptors as             
many times as necessary 
  
  
 
Appendix 1.5 
Rock mass classification system from Pantelidis (2009) 
 
 
Classification of rock slope mass 
 Type of failure related factors 
(e.g. dip and orientation of 
discontinuities) 
 Factors related to the condition 
of rock mass and discontinuities 
 
 
Condition of rock 
cutting 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROCK 
CUTTING 
INSTABILITY 
INDEX 
    
Climatic conditions 
 Precipitation height and freezing 
periods.  Return period of critical 
climate conditions. 
 
 
 
Triggering 
mechanism relative 
to the presence of 
water in slope 
 
   
Drainage condition of slope 
 Aperture/infilling of joints, 
permeability of topsoil at the 
upslope of cutting etc. 
  
    
Earthquake characteristics 
 Magnitude of earthquakes.  
Return period of critical 
earthquakes. 
 
Triggering 
mechanism relative 
to earthquakes 
 
   
Distances 
 Distance from epicentre and 
focal depth. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Appendices 3.1 to 3.4 
 
Literature references relevant to this appendix are incorporated within the main references section 
(Pages 151 to 156) 
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Note:  The following sections are based on information sourced to complement the limited 
landslide inventory data available from KiwiRail.  The structure of Appendices 3.1 to 3.4 
follows that defined in Chapter 3, Table 3.1.   
A3.1  West Coast Regional Council records 
DTec Consulting Limited (2002) prepared a report for the West Coast Regional Council (WCRC) that 
provides a general overview of natural hazards relevant to the West Coast Region of New Zealand.  
This report was reviewed as it includes two inventories (flooding and landslide events) specific to the 
region.  Both inventories are noted as incomplete and further research was recommended at the time 
of the publication.  The majority of entries are based on a detailed search of the Greymouth Evening 
Star news publication and Benn (1990). 
Each entry in the two inventories was reviewed to determine the frequency of reported incidents 
specific to the rail corridor in the Lower Buller Gorge.  Recorded landslides and flooding events often 
only refer to the road infrastructure.   The occurrence of landslides impacting the Lower Buller Gorge 
is unlikely to always be confined to one side of the Buller River only.  Accordingly, the summary 
table of reported incidents (Table A3.1.1) includes detail specific to the rail corridor and SH6 between 
Inangahua Junction and Westport.  The information is based directly on entries from DTec Consulting 
Limited (2002) and is presented in chronological order between 1925 and 2002, including the incident 
date, triggering event/cause and detail available.  The rail corridor was only fully completed in the 
1940s so entries up to this date are included for determining the frequency of events, despite there 
being potentially no impacts to rail operations.   
Table A3.1.1:  Flooding and landslide inventory for the Lower Buller Gorge (road and rail 
transportation corridors) between 1925 and 2003 (based on DTec Consulting Limited, 2002) 
Date  Detail 
22 September 1925 
Cause:  Rain (two weeks of rain in Buller).  Roads around Westport and Buller 
blocked by slips and washouts.  Westport completely isolated. 
30-31 October 1926 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips blocked roads in Westland and considerable damage to 
roads in the Buller Gorge (SH6). 
16 June 1929 
Cause:  Buller earthquake (M7.8, MM10-11 in epicentral region).  Severe slips 
throughout region, especially in the upper Buller catchment.  Many rivers 
blocked by slips forming earthquake dammed lakes.   
7-10 October 1930 Cause:  Rain.  Many slips in the Westport area. 
3 April 1931 Cause:  Rain.  Many roads blocked by slips.  Fatality at Tiroroa (SH6). 
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Date  Detail 
20 February 1935 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips (and washouts) caused severe road damage throughout the 
West Coast.   
8-9 January 1938 Cause:  Rain.  Slips (and washouts) blocked many main roads in Buller. 
4-8 April 1942 
Cause:  Rain.  Numerous slips on roads throughout the region, including Buller, 
Westport to Murchison. 
12-13 July 1942 
Cause:  Rain.  Several coalmines idle due to slips on their rail lines.  Buller 
Gorge Road (SH6) blocked by slips. 
10 February 1944 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips on rail line in Buller Gorge.  Train ran into slip 20km from 
Westport, losing 13 wagons of coal.   
29 July 1944 Cause:  Rain.  Buller Gorge Road (SH6) blocked by several slips. 
16-19 February 1955 
Cause:  Rain (Inangahua - 90mm in <48 hours).  Slips blocked road between 
Inangahua Junction and Westport.  Buller Gorge Road (SH6) blocked by slips 
at Husband Hill.  Rail car ran into a slip in the Buller Gorge on the 18th, no 
injuries. 
26-27 February 1955 
Cause:  Rain.  Widespread serious slip damage.  Buller Gorge Road (SH6) 
blocked by slips.  All rail services to coast cut by slips (and flooding).  Slips 
caused serious damage to the Cascade Mine at Denniston - buildings and 
equipment was buried and over 11km of fluming leading to the mine was 
carried away by slips. 
7-10 November 1961 
Cause:  Rain.  SH6 in the Buller Gorge cut by slips and floodwater.  Buller 
Gorge rail line cut by slips. 
24-25 March 1964 Cause:  Rain.  Slips blocked Buller Gorge railway 28km west of Inangahua. 
26-27 April 1966 
Cause:  Rain (Westport - 63mm and Inangahua - 51mm in 24hrs).  Slip closed 
the Buller Gorge railway near Rahui. 
10-12 March 1967 Cause:  Rain.  Upper and Lower Buller Gorge roads (SH6) closed due to slips. 
26-27 April 1967 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips closed SH6 between Inangahua and Westport, and between 
Tiroroa and Rahui. 
2-4 July 1967 Cause:  Rain (Inangahua - 73mm).  A few minor slips in the Buller Gorge. 
24 May 1968 
Cause:  Inangahua earthquake (M7.1, MM10).   Thousands of slips throughout 
the region.  Buller District and Buller Gorge severely affected.  All roads and 
rail links around Inangahua and through the Buller Gorge blocked by slips.  
Slip killed a person at Whitecliffs in the Buller Gorge.   
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Date  Detail 
11-13 August 1968 
Cause:  Rain.  Upper and Lower Buller Gorge roads closed due to slips – likely 
re-activation of Inangahua earthquake slips.   
22-23 October 1968 
Cause:  Rain.  Rain re-activated Inangahua earthquake slip at the Cascade Mine 
and blocked Cascade Creek.  Creek backed up and flooded mine causing 
considerable damage to plant ($2,000).  Bins, compressor electric pumps and 
other equipment lost. 
28-30 October 1968 
Cause:  Rain.  Many roads around Westport cut by slips (and floodwaters), as 
were rail links. 
28-31 August 1970 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips blocked rail links between Greymouth and Westport and 
closed roads in the Buller Gorge (SH6). 
17 September 1970 
Cause:  Rain.  Most major highways affected by slips and flooding.  Lower 
Buller Gorge (SH6) closed by slips and floods. 
29-31 March 1975 
Cause:  Rain  (Westport - 80mm/Buller Gorge - 130mm in 24 hours).  Lower 
Buller Gorge (SH6) covered by many slips.  Westport to Inangahua section 
closed for 36 hours.   
18-19 January 1977 Cause:  Rain.  Slips blocked the rail line between Tiroroa and Westport. 
13-14 April 1978 Cause:  Rain.  Numerous slips cut rail links.   
3 December 1979 Cause:  Rain.  Slips blocked the Buller Gorge rail line. 
29 April 1981 Cause:  Rain.  Many slips reported in Inangahua Junction and Ngakawau.   
14-20 January 1987 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips caused major disruption to transport routes.  A major slip 
destroyed half of the Windy Point rail tunnel in the Buller Gorge on the 20th. 
28-29 January 1987 Cause:  Rain.  Windy Point rail tunnel again blocked by slips. 
3-4 February 1987 Cause:  Rain.  Buller Gorge rail again closed by slips at Windy Point Tunnel. 
19-20 May 1988 
Cause:  Rain (prolonged heavy rain after driest April on record).  Numerous 
slips throughout region - three slips cut the Westport to Greymouth rail line. 
29 January 1991 
Cause:  Westport earthquakes (M6.0 and M6.1 - two distinct shocks).  Major 
slip (80m long) blocked SH6 at Tiroroa, along with numerous slips in the 
Buller Gorge.   
15 February 1991 Cause:  Westport earthquake (M5.8).  Minor rockfalls in the Buller Gorge. 
7 August 1991 
Cause:  Rain.  Slips closed SH6 for short periods, including the Lower Buller 
Gorge. 
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Date  Detail 
13-14 June 1993 
Cause:  Rain.  Major flooding in Buller District.  Buller River levels highest 
since 1970s.  Buller discharged 7,800m
3
s
-1
, peaking at 5:23pm and coinciding 
with high tide.  Westport sandbagged, Buller Gorge road (SH6) submerged 
under 2m of water in places, and the lower Buller Gorge closed on the 13th and 
14th. River flowing very fast and full of logs.  
7-8 November 1994 
Cause:  Rain.  Widespread flooding.  The Buller River peaked at 10.7m at 
Te Kuha, 8.7m above normal.  Flooding closed SH6 at Inangahua Junction 
(water 1.5m deep on road). 
12-23 November 1994 
Cause:  Rain.  Buller hardest hit.  First Civil Defence emergency in the Buller 
District since the Inangahua earthquake in 1968.  Buller river peaked at 10.7m 
at Te Kuha.  SH6 closed by floodwaters at Hawk’s Crag in the Buller Gorge – 
0.5m of water over the road, and between Inangahua Junction and Inangahua 
Camp.   
26 September 1995 Cause:  Rain.  Buller River 6m above normal. 
15-16 December 1997 
Cause:  Rain.  SH6 closed at Inangahua Junction and Hawk’s Crag due to 
flooding. 
1-3 July 1998 Cause:  Rain.  SH6 closed for 12 hours at Inangahua Junction due to flooding. 
20 October 1998 Cause:  Rain.  SH6 closed at Inangahua Junction.   
27-29 October 1998 
Cause:  Rain.  The Buller River reached road level at Hawk’s Crag.  900mm of 
water flooded SH6 at Inangahua Junction. 
19-20 March 2002 Cause:  Rain.  SH6 in the Buller Gorge closed due to flooding.   
 
The inventory presents general event details only.  There is no information regarding exact locations 
of landslides, type of slope failure or volumes of material released.  Despite the lack of technical 
detail, the inventory does highlight the challenges faced in the region due to high annual rainfall and 
being located in a seismically active area.  Of the 46 entries over the 78 year period between 1925 and 
2003, 42 of these list rain as the triggering factor with the remaining four entries relating to seismicity.  
There are no temporal trends evident from the data.  Only one entry refers specifically to rockfalls in 
the Buller Gorge (as a result of a magnitude 5.8 Westport earthquake on 29 January 1991).   
Research into triggering levels for initiating slope movement in response to rainfall has not been 
quantified to date in the Lower Buller Gorge, or within the wider region.  This was an area that DTec 
Consulting Limited (2002) identified as requiring further research.   
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A3.2  Historic aerial photography review  
To understand the geomorphic changes in landform appearance over time, aerial photographs are a 
useful tool for determining any large-scale slope movement features.  In terms of developing a 
landslide inventory, aerial photographs are a key component to ensure a robust assessment of historic 
data is presented.  Historic aerial photographs were ordered from NZAM for this purpose.  Stereopair 
contact prints obtained are detailed in Table A3.2.1.  The photograph sets were chosen based on 
complete project area coverage, scale and range of dates flown.   
Table A3.2.1:  NZAM aerial photographs 
Date flown Scale 
Survey 
reference 
Photograph  numbers Detail 
1 November 1947 1:16,000 SN265 1459/5 to 1459/10 
1460/11 to 1460/21 
1459/22 to 1459/27 
23 contact prints, covering 
entire project area. 
7 October 1959 1:44,000 SN1249 2647/6 to 2647/15 8 contact prints, covering 
entire project area. 
27 November 1985 1:5,500 SN8575 Q/1 to 14; R/2 to 11; S/3 
to 7; T/1 to 4; U/3 to 6; 
V/3 to 7; W/3 to 7; X/3 to 
6; Y/2 to 9; Z/3 to 4 
74 contact prints, covering 
entire project area. 
 
The 1947 aerial photographs represent the rail corridor as it existed not long after completion, 
particularly at the eastern end of the project area that was only completed in the early 1940s.  The 
aerial photograph coverage from 1947 is shown on Figures A3.2.1 and A3.2.2 with SNL metrage 
locations overlain.  Due to the comparatively more recent track formation between Cascade and 
Buller, the aerial photographs regularly exhibit land clearance adjacent to the rail corridor.  The scale 
of 1:16,000 is adequate for viewing comparatively larger scale slope failure surfaces.   
The 1959 aerial photographs also cover the entire project area and were chosen as the most recent data 
set available prior the 1968 Inangahua earthquake.  Detail is difficult to define within the rail corridor 
as a result of the scale (1:44,000) and shadow effects on the rail side of the Buller River.  The 
photographs do show progressive re-vegetation of the land adjacent to the track formation that was 
disturbed during construction stages and absence of any large-scale slope failures between the period 
1947 and 1959.   
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 Figure A3.2.1:  1947 aerial photography between SNL96km and 109km.  Refer Table A3.2.2 for inset descriptions.  
Inset A:  96km 
Inset D:  108.6km 
Inset C:  99km (1959) 
Inset B:  98.0 and 98.5km 
96 
97 
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99 
100 
101 
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107 
108 
109 
96 
N 
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Figure A3.2.2:  1947 aerial photography between SNL110km and 126km.  Refer Table A3.2.2 for inset descriptions. 
Inset E:  111 to 112km 
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Inset M:  121.5km 
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116.5km 
(1985) 
Inset I:  
116.5km 
(1959) 
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Inset K:  119km 
N 
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The scale of the 1985 aerial photographs (1:5,500) allows a comparatively more detailed inspection of 
the slopes adjacent to the rail.  Some areas are impacted by shadow effects but the data set from 1985 
is very useful for determining landslide features that do not appear in the 1947 images.  Insets on 
Figures A3.2.1 and A3.2.2 show examples of changes related to slope movement between the 1947 
and 1985 imagery. 
A3.2.1  Aerial photograph interpretation 
Detail viewed using aerial photography specific to landslides typically relates to changes in 
morphology, vegetation, and drainage characteristics of a particular slope (Soeters and van Westen, 
1996).  Stereoscopic views provide the most robust method for assessing aerial photographs and a 
stereoscope was used throughout the review.  A summary table of terrain features, and the associated 
aerial photograph characteristics in terms of slope stability, is provided at the end of this appendix for 
reference (from Soeters and van Westen, 1996). 
Different scales, shadow effects and vertical distortion in aerial photography can cause limitations in 
interpretation, particularly when viewing steep slopes.  Despite these limitations the review identified 
numerous features, as detailed in Table A3.2.2.  Examples of slope movement features are shown on 
Figure A3.2.1 (SNL96km to 109km) and Figure A3.2.2 (SNL110km to 126km).  SNL metrage 
references are considered accurate to approximately +/-50m. 
Table A3.2.2:  Aerial photograph interpretation  
SNL metrage 
(km) 
Description Inset reference, 
date and figure  
96.0 Shallow regolith failures in the vicinity of 96km have occurred 
between 1959 and 1985.  Recent shallow, small-scale, regolith 
failures were also noted during field work in February 2011 (refer 
Chapter 4). 
Inset A, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.1) 
97.5 No large-scale failure at Whitecliffs evident between 1947 and 
present day.  A detailed discussion of Whitecliffs and relevant 
photographs is presented in Chapter 6. 
No inset         
(Figure A3.2.1)  
98.0 Unvegetated detached block evident in 1985 photograph (circled 
feature on right-hand side of Inset B), not visible in 1947 or 1959. 
Inset B, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.1) 
98.5 Recent small landslide upslope of rail evident in 1985, and 
vegetation on southern side of rail corridor that denotes the stream 
location has become more dense (left-hand side of Inset B). 
Inset B, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.1) 
99.0 Access road adjacent to power pylons, and the Mackley River, 
north of the rail corridor first evident in 1959 photographs. 
 
Inset C, 1959 
(Figure A3.2.1) 
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SNL metrage 
(km) 
Description Inset reference, 
date and figure  
108.6 Small landslide evident to the west of Payne Creek in 1985, not 
visible in 1947 or 1959.  Historic landslide also evident on State 
Highway 6 in 1985 photograph. 
Inset D, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.1)  
111.0 Small-scale landslide above the rail at 111km in 1985.  Additional 
small-scale features indicating slope instability are also evident 
moving west from 111km to 112km. 
Inset E, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2)  
113.0 Old (pre-1947) landslide feature evident, rail corridor has been 
constructed through this formation. 
Inset F, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2)  
113.8 Large pre-1947 landslide on western side of tunnel through 
Hawks Crag Breccia. 
Inset G, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2)  
114.0 Large pre-1947 landslide.  Potentially an area that becomes 
reactivated as the Buller River bank profile appears consistent 
since 1947 but a fresh scar is evident upslope of the rail in 1985. 
Inset H, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2)  
116.5 Scar visible above the rail corridor in 1959 aerial photography.  
Also signs of slope instability on the southern side of the Buller 
River, adjacent to State Highway 6 in 1985, based on fresh scar in 
the landscape and encroachment of a landslide into the Buller 
River.   
Inset I, 1959 
Inset J, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2) 
118.6 to 119.5 Slope movement features visible in 1947, 1959 and 1985 aerial 
photographs, associated with large historic landslide and on-going 
issues associated with Sinclair Castle.  Inset K (Figure A3.2.2), 
provides an example from 1985 around 119.0km.  Landslide 
features are also adjacent to SH6. 
Inset K, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2) 
120.0 Recent material disturbance adjacent to rail, possibly related to a 
landslide above the rail alignment. 
Inset L, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2) 
121.5 Slope movement near Cascade Creek on the western side of 
Tunnel 5 evident in 1985.  No fresh scars visible in 1947 or 1959 
photography. 
Inset M, 1985 
(Figure A3.2.2) 
 
From around 122km to the western extent of the project area at 126km there are numerous steep 
gullies and streams that intersect the rail corridor.  At 122.4km in 1985 the discharge from one of 
these streams is evident (refer arrow on Figure A3.2.3).  Recent landslides are evident in 1985 that 
have impacted SH6 (opposite SNL125.5km, Figure A3.2.4), and a fresh scar west of the Tunnel 6 
entrance.  
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Figure A3.2.3:  Steep gullies adjacent to the rail corridor and stream discharges creating small 
alluvial fans in the Buller River.  Example shown from 1985 (indicated by arrow). 
 
 
Figure A3.2.4:  Small slope movement feature above ~124.50km (indicated by arrow) in 1985 
and slope instability issues adjacent to SH6. 
 
123km 
xTunnel 6 entrancex   
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The review of aerial photography from 1947, 1959 and 1985 has identified a number of comparatively 
large-scale, pre-1947 landslides that the rail corridor was formed through.  Most notable is the failure 
surface at Sinclair Castle, around SNL119km (Figure A3.2.2, Inset K).  Comparatively more recent 
failure surfaces can be seen in the aerial photography, including the highlighted features in Figures 
A3.2.1 and A3.2.2.  The rate of re-vegetation limits these typically smaller-scale landslides, in terms 
of date of occurrence, to closely preceding the date the photograph was flown (on the scale of years).  
Accordingly, detail incorporated into the landslide inventory presented in Chapter 3 from the aerial 
photograph review has a slight bias towards the dates the photographs were flown. 
A3.2.2  Google Earth and MapToaster Topo New Zealand 
Additional aerial imagery is available from Google Earth and MapToaster Topo New Zealand.  Full 
colour photography available from Google Earth for the project area is summarised below (SNL 
metrage and date flown): 
 96 – 99km: 5 September 2007 
 99 – 107km: 18 January 2008 
 107 – 126km: 4 January 2003  
The colour changes in Figure A3.2.5 denote the different aerial flight dates outlined above.  The 
quality of the Google Earth images is variable.  Large topographic features can be viewed but a 
detailed review is not feasible in the absence of stereo coverage.   
 
Figure A3.2.5:  Oblique photograph showing aerial imagery available from Google Earth 
 
Te Kuha  
Sinclair Castle 
Whitecliffs 
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No slope movement features are visible on Google Earth associated with Whitecliffs.  The 1987 
landslide at Windy Point is visible.  Other features include the landslide at SNL108.60km seen in 
1985 photographs (Figure A3.2.1, Inset D) is still visible in Google Earth (2003), and recent slope 
movement west of Tunnel 6, near SNL124.40km.  The images from 2008 are poor quality.   
Aerial images available from MapToaster Topo New Zealand were flown in 2000/2001, and cover the 
Lower Buller Gorge from near SNL111km to 126km only.  Image quality is average, as seen in 
Figure A3.2.6, which shows the only recent slope movement feature immediately adjacent to the rail 
alignment at the same location as in Google Earth (2003) at ~SNL124.40km.  This feature is not 
visible in 1985 (refer Figure A3.2.4).   
 
Figure A3.2.6:  Slope movement in 2000/2001 near SNL124.40km.  Tunnel 6 is visible on 
right-hand side of aerial photograph.   
A3.3  1929 Buller earthquake 
The rail corridor was not completely formed in 1929 so this section outlines any detail available 
regarding landslide occurrence in the general region.  The 1929 Buller earthquake has been well 
researched.  Literature relevant to this thesis includes:  Henderson (1937); Hancox et al (2002); and 
Dowrick (1994).  In addition, the Buller District Council commissioned a lifelines study that was 
reported in 2006 (Buller District Council, 2006).  This study adopted an Alpine Fault Earthquake 
scenario and incorporated impacts from both the 1929 and 1968 earthquakes.  This section is based 
predominantly on information from this study and the other sources listed above.       
The Buller earthquake occurred on 17 June 1929 and measured Ms7.8.  The epicentre was located 
approximately 15km northwest of Murchison in a remote and sparsely populated area.  Vertical 
displacement of 4.5m occurred on the White Creek Fault approximately 11km west of Murchison.  
Horizontal displacement was measured up to ~2.5m.  Due to the steep and heavily vegetated 
environment around the epicentre the measured surface rupture only extends for 8km, in an 
approximate north to south alignment (Figure A3.3.1), but it is estimated that the total rupture length 
was in the order of 30-50km (Dowrick, 1994).  The style of failure was predominantly reverse 
faulting.   
 13 
 
 
Figure A3.3.1:  Modified Mercalli Intensities from the 1929 Buller earthquake (from Buller 
District Council, 2006).  Project area location indicated by arrow.  Inset A shows an example of 
damage to rail near Murchison (sourced from:  http://mp.natlib.govt.nz/detail/?id=40138). 
Project 
area 
Inset A 
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Westport had a population of around 4,000 in 1929.  Impacts to key lifelines in Westport are 
summarised by Dowrick (1994), and include loss of electricity for 13 hours; water supply lost for nine 
days; and, the telephone exchange was unavailable for three days.  Road and rail links were 
significantly impacted due to landslides, as discussed in the following section. 
A3.3.1  Earthquake-generated landslides 
Modified Mercalli Intensities (MMI) experienced in the Buller Region are shown on Figure A3.3.1, 
which indicates a shaking intensity of MMVIII in the area between Westport and Inangahua.  The 
generation of landslides is an almost certain consequence for this shaking intensity level.  Seventeen 
fatalities resulted from the 1929 earthquake, of which 14 were due to landslides, two due to rockfalls 
in mines and one indirect death due to transportation delays in receiving medication (Dowrick, 1994).   
The railway line through the Lower Buller Gorge was not fully constructed in 1929 and there is no 
detail available on damages sustained on the section that was formed near Te Kuha.  Damage to 
bridges and spreading of embankments were the predominant issues noted (Buller District Council, 
2006).  Rail services were functional again from 24 June 1929 (seven days after the earthquake).  In 
comparison, the road network took a considerably longer time to reinstate, including 22 months in the 
Upper Buller Gorge. 
A comment was made in regard to SH6 at Whitecliffs that required a temporary detour due to 
rockfalls in 1929 (Buller District Council, 2006).  Discussion in the Buller District Council (2006) 
report indicated that the comparatively low damage sustained to the rail network was due to the 
majority of railways being located away from steep slopes and the associated landslide-prone areas.  
A similar event today could result in many weeks of disruption as the Lower Buller Gorge due to 
landslides and rockfalls (Buller District Council, 2006).  Aftershocks and rainfall were also noted as 
causing continued delays to repair work in 1929 as more landslides were generated or reactivated. 
A3.4  1968 Inangahua earthquake 
A literature review identified a large amount of information available regarding impacts and research 
related to the 1968 Inangahua earthquake.  Key publications reviewed include Anderson et al (1994); 
Adams et al (1968); and, Adams and Lowry (1971).  Invaluable information was also obtained from 
the Inangahua Earthquake Museum.  Available aerial photographs flown in 1970 were reviewed to 
determine any visible, large-scale landslides that directly impacted the rail corridor. This section 
summarises relevant information obtained from the above sources, focussing on damages sustained to 
the road and rail corridor as a result of earthquake-generated landslides.   
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A3.4.1 Background  
The magnitude 7.1 Inangahua earthquake occurred on 23 May 1968 at 1724 (UT).  The local time was 
0524 on 24 May 1968 (Downes, 1995).  The epicentre was approximately 15km north of Inangahua, 
as shown on Figure A3.4.1 (defined by Anderson et al, 1994).  Greater than 800 aftershocks were 
recorded within six weeks of the main event, including 12 with magnitudes greater than 5 (Adams and 
Lowry, 1971).  Three fatalities occurred, including two related to the collapse of limestone cliffs at 
Whitecliffs, adjacent to SH6.  The shaking intensity caused railway lines to twist, buckle, derailed two 
trains, and resulted in approximately 100km of tracks that had to be replaced (Buller District Council, 
2006).   
Figure A3.4.1:  Modified Mercalli Intensities from the 1968 Inangahua earthquake (based on 
Anderson et al, 1994).   
The MM shaking intensities shown on Figure 3.4.1 indicate the project area received MMX at the 
eastern end, down to MMVIII near Te Kuha.  The delineation of MMX areas is similar between the 
two isoseismal maps (Figures A3.4.1 and A3.4.2).  Anderson et al (1994) shows a slightly larger area 
that experienced MMIX compared to Buller District Council (2006) who derived their isoseismals 
from Hancox (2002) and Dowrick et al (2003). 
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Figure A3.4.2:  Modified Mercalli Intensities from the 1968 Inangahua earthquake (based on 
Buller District Council, 2006).  Project area location indicated by arrow.  Inset A shows an 
example of the damage sustained to rail near Inangahua (sourced from:  http://www.geonet. 
org.nz/earthquake/historic-earthquakes/top-nz/gallery.html). 
Project 
area 
Epicentre 
Inset A 
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A3.4.2 Inangahua Earthquake Museum 
The Inangahua Earthquake Museum contains a variety of information including eye-witness accounts 
of the 1929 and 1968 events, flooding events, newspaper articles, figures, photograph displays and 
numerous technical reports.  Impacts to the rail network were most concisely reported in a letter 
provided to the earthquake museum regarding restoration work, and a detailed work log, by 
JC & P Fitzpatrick Limited, dated 30 March 2007 (Fitzpatrick, 2007).  The following discussion is 
based on this document and any direct quote are italicised.   
The SNL was opened 40 days after the main, 24 May 1968, event and was recorded as ‘wrecked and 
unusable’ for 20 miles (~32km) either side of Inangahua.  It took five days to complete the initial 
assessment of damage to the rail corridor, which included over 40 landslides, collapsed embankments 
and one major bridge to repair.  
When reopened, speeds were restricted to 15 miles per hour (mph) (~24km/hour) with some areas 
reduced to 6mph (~10km/hour).  To increase train speeds to 30mph (~48km/hour), 100 miles 
(~160km) of track needed re-ballasting and the equivalent of 40 additional landslides remediated.  
Landslides encountered during the restoration work were described as varying from ‘extensive cutting 
collapses’ to ‘rock outcrops which had simply fallen from a considerable height onto the track 
shearing the steel railway like a guillotine’.   
Relevant contents of this letter report, in terms of landslide occurrence, are summarised in Table 
A3.4.1.  Locations in the letter reported were in units of miles, these have been converted to current 
SNL metrage locations (km).  Reference was made to the 61 mile peg as being located ‘under the 
cliffs west of Inangahua’.  This distance correlates to SNL98.170km, near the western extent of 
Whitecliffs. 
Table A3.4.1:  Landslide occurrence in the Lower Buller Gorge based on restoration works 
completed after the 1968 Inangahua earthquake (based on Fitzpatrick, 2007) 
Date (1968) Detail (direct quotes in italics) 
Location 
Miles SNL (km) 
26 May Travelled to first slip and then walked to 69m peg 
recording location and size of slips. 
69m 111.044 
31 May  Blasting a section of rock (or rocks) that had fallen at 
73m was unsuccessful.  Also a large block at 72m70c 
that required blasting.  Slip at 72m40c was larger than 
previously assumed.  Issues around Tunnel 3.   
73m     
72m70c 
72m40c 
117.482 
117.280 
116.677 
2 June More movement observed at a slip at 72m78c. 72m78c 117.441 
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Date (1968) Detail (direct quotes in italics) 
Location 
Miles SNL (km) 
3-6 June Slip at 73m referred to on numerous occasions, more 
movement observed on 4 June.  New slip at same 
location on 5 June.  Comment made ‘trolleyed through 
to Whitecliffs’ on 5 June – no mention of any landslides 
at this stage.  Slip at 73m cleared on 6 June. 
73m      117.482 
7 June Crib log wall was constructed to stablilise toe of slip at 
73m.  Minor slip at 76m6c. 
76m6c 122.430 
8 June First slip at Whitecliffs clear.  No further detail provided 
or precise location.  68m culvert was noted as requiring 
clearance.  6mph restriction applied between Tiroroa and 
Rahui.   
68m 109.435 
9-28 June The restoration work logs provided detail regarding the 
dispatch of machinery but no specific locations or works 
involved were noted between 9 and 28 June.    
NA NA 
29 June Slips noted at 69m and 59m50c.  No further details 
provided. 
69m 
59m50c 
111.044 
95.957 
 
A newspaper article referred to rail damage to Tiroroa, which likely correlates to the main landslide 
referred to in Table A3.4.1 at SNL117.482km.  The newspaper source and date are unknown, and no 
specific details were provided.  A Nelson Evening Mail article, dated 25 May 1968, refers to 
landslides at Windy Point, which is near the original location of Tunnel 7 in the Lower Buller Gorge 
(daylighted in 1987 due to landslide damage).  Significant loss of ballast at Rahui was also noted.   
The locations referred to in Table A3.4.1 are limited in terms of a full inventory for landslide 
occurrence, but do provide confirmation that blocks were displaced at Whitecliffs that impacted the 
rail.  Attempts were made to contact the author of the letter directly but no response was received.   
A3.4.3  1970 aerial photography 
To determine whether there were any additional direct impacts of large-scale earthquake-generated 
landslides to the rail corridor after the 1968 Inangahua earthquake, aerial photography flown in 1970 
was ordered from Aerial Surveys Limited (ASL).  The images obtained do not cover the entire project 
area, but the east-west run does incorporate Whitecliffs and other locations of the rail corridor as far 
west as SNL122km.  A total of 15 contact prints were viewed at a scale of 1:15,000 (photograph 
reference numbers 37046 to 37061).   
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There were no direct landslide impacts to the rail corridor evident in the photographs viewed from 
1970 (approximately 15 months after the main earthquake event) but fresh scars in the landscape were 
present north of the rail alignment.  Three photographs are shown in Figures A3.4.3 to A3.4.5 that 
provide an example of landslides that were most likely generated by seismic shaking north of 
Whitecliffs (Figure A3.4.3); in the vicinity of SNL108km to 111km (Figure A3.4.4); and, on the 
northern facing slopes north of Sinclair Castle (Figure A3.4.5).  There were consistently more slope 
movement features visible on the southern side of the Buller River in all photographs viewed, which 
highlights the vulnerability of SH6 in particular to a future seismic event of similar or greater 
magnitude. 
 
Figure A3.4.3:  1970 aerial photograph in the vicinity of Whitecliffs and SNL97km to 99km. 
99 
98 
97 
N 
Whitecliffs 
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The detached block at SNL98km shown on Figure A3.1.1 from 1985 (Inset B) is also visible in the 
1970 photograph (directly above the SNL98km location on Figure A3.4.3).  No other slope movement 
features are visible adjacent to the rail corridor at Whitecliffs.  In comparison, widespread landslides 
and rockfalls are clearly visible on the southern side of the Buller River, adjacent to SH6 and the 
slopes above.  The circled area on Figure A3.4.3 highlights recent slope movement associated with 
the western side of the hillslope north of SNL98km.   
 
Figure A3.4.4:  1970 aerial photograph in the vicinity of SNL108km to 111km. 
A large landslide is visible on Figure A3.4.4 that crossed SH6 (southernmost circled location).  There 
are no large-scale slope movement features visible that directly intersect the rail corridor in this area 
but landslides are visible to the north.  Circled locations north of the Buller River show landslides 
associated with the north to northeastern sides of the two highlighted hillslopes.  Comparatively 
smaller fresh scars in the landscape, than those highlighted on Figure A3.4.4, are also present on both 
sides of the Buller River but particularly associated with SH6. 
 
N 
110 
109 
108 
111 
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Sinclair Castle is shown on Figure A3.4.5.  There are no visible slope movement features associated 
with the steep topography at Sinclair Castle but the shadow in this area may obscure comparatively 
smaller scale failures.  There are also no direct impacts from landslides visible between SNL117km 
and 121km.  The highlighted area shows fresh scars in the landscape associated with the northern 
facing slope north of Sinclair Castle. 
 
Figure A3.4.5:  1970 aerial photograph in the vicinity of Sinclair Castle and SNL117km 
to 121km. 
A3.4.5 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, 1968 
Duckworth (1968) described a number of landslides that he observed had impacted the rail corridor.  
The volume of material required to be removed due to landslides in the rail corridor (including the 
SNL west of the project area) was around 30,000 cubic yards (~23,000m
3
).  General comments made 
by Duckworth (1968) regarding rail construction included that construction batters accentuated the 
pre-existing steepness of the slopes that the rail was attached to, and no benching was undertaken 
during the original formation of the corridor.  The implication of these construction practices is that a 
thin (typically 1-3m thick) colluvium unit remained in place and had the potential to regress upslope.   
N 
Sinclair 
Castle 
119 
118 
117 
120 
121 
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An annual rainfall of 164 inches (>4,000mm) was referred to that created additional challenges in the 
catchments above the rail corridor due to weakening of soil surrounding loose boulders up to 10 long 
tons (or 10 tonnes) that could be released during periods of long duration and/or high intensity rainfall 
events.  Landslides witnessed by Duckworth (1968) included: 
A. Limestone Bluffs (Whitecliffs at 60m58ch or 97.737km): 
According to Duckworth (1968), prior to the Inangahua earthquake the cliff face profile at Whitecliffs 
consisted of a near vertical face.  The earthquake resulted in the appearance of vertical cracks and 
large blocks were dislodged onto the ground below (some >100 tonnes).  This is the first and only 
reference to a major rockfall that has been reported for Whitecliffs due to seismic shaking during the 
Inangahua earthquake.  Fitzpatrick (2007) refers to ‘slips’ at Whitecliffs that impacted the rail corridor 
in 1968 but no detail was provided to indicate that the failures represented large-scale instability or 
cliff-face damage.   
B. Mudstone (67m40ch or 108.630km): 
At 67m40ch (108.630km) Duckworth (1968) observed rock slides that were predominantly comprised 
of mudstone, and described as ‘large shattered rock’.  Batters at this locality were near-vertical, as 
indicated by Figure A3.4.6 from Duckworth (1968).  There is a discrepancy between the labelling of 
Figure A3.4.6 as ‘greywacke’ and the text description of ‘mudstone’.  The geological unit at this 
location is mapped by Bowen (1964) as Greenland Group (Figure 2.3, Chapter 2). 
 
Figure A3.4.6:  Sketch diagram from Duckworth (1968) showing a landslide at SNL108.630km 
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C. Hawks Crag Breccia (73m peg or 117.482km): 
Landslide material at this location consisted of massive, hard conglomerate (granite and greywacke 
within a sand/silt matrix) with boulder sizes up to 50 tonnes.  The landslide occurred in an area that 
had failed historically, and was reactivated by the Inangahua earthquake.  Batter slopes were indicated 
by Duckworth (1968) at approximately 1:1 (Figure A3.4.7). 
 
Figure A3.4.7:  Sketch diagram from Duckworth (1968) detailing a landslide at SNL117.482km. 
 
Remedial works at this location encountered major issues when removal of the rock slide toe support 
triggered additional slope movement, exposing a progressively wider and higher failure surface.  A 
‘crib log’ retaining structure was constructed to stabilise the slope in this area.  This event correlates 
to the references made by Fitzpatrick (2007) around the same location (refer Table A3.4.1). 
A3.4.6 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, 1969 
The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering collated a report titled ‘A Preliminary Report 
on the Inangahua Earthquake New Zealand, May 24, 1968’ in January 1969, which provides some 
detail specific to landslide types observed in the region.  Landslide distribution was predominantly in 
a 10 mile radius (~16km) of Inangahua with noticeably fewer to north and northwest.  Mechanisms of 
slope failure within the region included (Lensen and Suggate, 1969; Falconer and Lenson, 1969): 
 Rockfalls in Tertiary limestone (particularly at Whitecliffs, adjacent to SH6). 
 Slides within Upper Tertiary sediments (released on bedding planes). 
 Defect-controlled rock slides (on joint surfaces) were reported as common in granite. 
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 Slides originating from very steep slopes that consisted of blocky/weathered surficial material.  
 Numerous debris slides within near-surface material at weak crush zones in granite. 
 Earthflows of weathered muddy sandstone Upper Tertiary material, particularly at Inangahua. 
 Low number of rotational slides in Upper Tertiary sediments (mostly mudstone). 
Major Inangahua Earthquake damage to the road network within the Lower Buller Gorge was 
reported by Douglas (1969) as extending from Inangahua to Windy Point, which comprises almost the 
entire gorge.  Douglas (1969) also provided an estimate of the total assessed volume of landslide 
material that had to be removed from all road networks in the region after the Inangahua earthquake 
as exceeding 400,000 cubic yards (>306,000m
3
). 
A3.4.7 New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence, 1970 
The New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence (NZMCD) collated an 87 page report on the Inangahua 
Earthquake in 1970 (NZMCD, 1970).  The rail corridor in the Lower Buller Gorge was referred to 
briefly but no specific details on landslides were recorded.  Approximately 40 miles (~65km) of rail 
became twisted due to ballast movement, which corresponds with the letter report discussed in 
Section 3.8.2.  Reference was made to damage to combined road-rail bridge approaches (outside of 
the project area) at Inangahua, Waitahu, Boatmans and Landing.   
A3.4.8 University of Canterbury, 1970 
Shepherd et al (1970) noted that by the time an inspection of the rail line was conducted by a 
University of Canterbury survey team in August 1968, the line was reopened and any direct impacts 
from landslides to the rail itself were obscured.  No comments were made in regards to the surface 
features related to slope movement aside from mention of four ‘slip surfaces’ on the railway side of 
the Lower Buller Gorge.  These four slips were measured and plotted, together with 14 slips adjacent 
to SH6, to show the slope of every slip with respect to slope orientation.   
 
 
  
Appendix 5.1 
Case studies for three key risk sites (107.5, 118.5 and 121.0km) 
 
Three key risk sites were identified from the historic record of landslide occurrences in the project 
area, and these were inspected during numerous site visits between 2009 and 2011.  It is recognised 
that the combination of steep terrain and high rainfall result in many sites within the project area that 
are prone to episodic slope failures, and the risk of substantial impacts from future earthquakes 
remains an issue in the management of operations.  The specific sites discussed in Appendix 5.1, 
which displayed large to very large (>1,000m
3) and/or relatively frequent (≤2-year) instability, are 
detailed below: 
 SNL107.5km – bedding-controlled failures have occurred in Kaiata Formation sandstones and 
mudstones that dip towards the railway line; 
 Sinclair Castle (SNL118.5km) – large but now inactive pre-historic landslide is evident on the 
northern bank of the Buller River.  This area is subject to episodic debris slides and flows 
originating in granitic source areas above steep gullies, particularly associated with the eastern 
side of the original pre-historic failure; and 
 Cascade (SNL121.0km) – frequent (~once every 2 years) debris slides and flows that originate 
in steep catchments, and sourced from granite, above the rail corridor.  The resultant impacts 
have required on-going remedial works and monitoring by KiwiRail.   
The following approach has been adopted in assessing the landslide susceptibility for each site, with 
the primary purpose being to identify the geological and topographic controls on landscape 
development that influence slope instability and the potential effects on rail operations: 
 Geological, geomorphological and hydrological setting; 
 Past and/or present slope instability impacting rail operations; 
 Remedial measures undertaken to improve line security; and 
 Future management issues and recommended practices. 
The three sites represent on-going slope stability challenges to rail operations.  Landslide risk 
management is a tool that will enable KiwiRail to assess the slope stability risk further, with a 
consistent approach, past this initial risk analysis stage.   
 
 
  
CASE STUDY 1:  Bedded Kaiata Formation at SNL107.50km 
 
Landslides have resulted in impacts to rail operations in the vicinity of SNL107.50km.  A derailment 
occurred in 2004 within the circled red area on Figure A5.1.  No information was made available 
regarding details of the landslide.  The geological map shown in Chapter 4, Figure 4.3, indicates that 
bedrock in the vicinity of SNL107.50km comprises Hawks Crag Breccia, with Greenland Group 
outcrops to the north (based on the mapping of Nathan et al, 2002).  As seen in Figures A5.2 to A5.3, 
the unit at this location is actually Kaiata Formation mudstone and sandstone.  This is indicative of the 
limitations of the geological mapping available and the comparatively detailed nature of the rail 
corridor that is being evaluated in this thesis.  The nearest mapped Kaiata Formation exposure is 
approximately 2km from SNL107.50 (Chapter 4, Figure 4.3). 
Remedial works after the 2004 landslide comprised benching the slope and removal of loose rock 
along an approximate length of 150m adjacent to the rail, as seen in Figures A5.2, A5.4 and A5.5.  
The photograph of the coal train in Figure A5.5 shows the close proximity of the cut slope to the 
railway.  The bench surface is near level, and loose rock observed in the catch area at the base of the 
slope indicates the rock trajectory is at times sufficient to impact the rail corridor.  The distance 
between the edge of rail and base of the cut slope averages less than 2m, and the surrounding area is 
heavily vegetated.  It is possible that the presence of Kaiata Formation may not have been recognised 
until the 2004 slope failure that impacted the rail operations. 
 
Figure A5.1:  Location and topography in vicinity of                                                              
SNL107.50km (half metrage mark indicated by red circle).                                                        
Inset shows an aerial view from 1985. 
N 
  
 
 
 
Figure A5.2:  View of rock outcrop near 
SNL107.50km.  Bench tapers out on the 
eastern (right-hand) side of photograph. 
Figure A5.3:  Close-up view of Kaiata 
Formation interbedded sandstone (A) and 
mudstone and minor shear zone in batter (B). 
 
 
  
Figure A5.4:  Base of slope (view looking 
south-east) with bedding daylighting out of 
slope, dipping around 40-45°. 
Figure A5.5:  Scale of batter and proximity to 
coal train movements.  Note the limited 
visibility around the track curve.   
 
A 
B 
  
Rock material and rock mass characteristics 
Figures A5.2 to A5.5 show bedding dipping around 45° and striking sub-parallel to the railway 
(295 ± 10° True) for a distance of approximately 100m.  Measured strikes varied between 184 and 
305°, and dips between 39 and 53° to the south, as depicted by the close concentration of 29 poles to 
bedding in Figure A5.6.   
 
 
Figure A5.6:  Bedding orientation measured in Kaiata Formation at SNL107.50km 
 
 
  
Bed thickness measured along the exposed face ranged between 150 and 400mm at the western end, 
and up to ~500mm at the eastern end of the cutting.  The sandstone interbeds are thicker than the 
musdstones and siltstones, which are more closely laminated. Following the New Zealand 
Geotechnical Society (2005) the Kaiata Formation rock material can be described as:  “greyish-
brown, interbedded sandstone, siltstone and mudstone; slightly to moderately weathered; moderately 
thin to moderately coarsely bedded; weak to moderately strong”. 
The principal rock mass defect is bedding, which is moderately widely spaced, and persistent for 
greater than 10m in the cut face.  Joint sets normal and parallel to the strike of bedding are evident, 
and are also persistent for more than 10m.  The joint sets are variably spaced from 0.1m to greater 
than 1.0m.  Minor shear zones cross-cutting bedding were recognised (Figure A5.3B), but no 
significant offset of bedding was noted.  Shear zones observed will act as localised release surfaces 
for relatively small bedding-controlled slabs (up to about 2m
3
 in volume). 
In addition to bedding- and joint-release of blocks, the Kaiata Formation mudstones typically undergo 
slaking from wet-dry cycles. This is evident in the finer-grained units within the rock mass, and 
blocks of variable dimensions up to about 0.5m
3
 in volume accumulate on the intermediate bench and 
adjacent to the rail.  Over time, fretting from the bedded rock mass can be expected to take place due 
to a combination of slaking and slabbing, and regression of the steeper cut batter in overlying gravels 
is also anticipated.   
Site hydrology and hydrogeology 
As seen in Figure A5.1, a tributary to Browns Creek flows irregularly down the slope above 
SNL107.50km.  This stream is located in the bush above the cut face.  Seepage may occur onto the 
formed batter face.  Access limitations and time constraints working within the rail corridor prevented 
a detailed inspection of this water feature.  Intact Kaiata Formation rock material has a very low 
hydraulic conductivity but fracture-controlled seepage flows would enable some water infiltration via 
the surficial gravel unit into the underlying bedrock (Wyllie and Mah, 2004).  Progressive reduction 
of the intact rock strength due to slaking and slabbing could be expected as a result of water 
infiltration (Bell and Pettinga, 1983).   
Trees at the top of the remediated section will also over time fail due to intense or prolonged rainfall 
event, and the catch berm is expected to become filled with debris and/or failed vegetation in the 
longer term (≥ 5 years).  Some debris can be expected to periodically reach the rail level, in spite of 
the measures undertaken to stabilise the slope.  Control of stormwater, and monitoring of seepage by 
periodic inspection, are considered necessary for this site where measures have been implemented 
already to improve overall stability along a relatively short section of track. 
  
Present and future stability 
The measures undertaken since the 2004 slope failure at 107.50km were required because the bedding 
strike is almost parallel to the rail alignment. The slope has been cut parallel to the ~45° dip of the 
Kaiata Formation bedding, with a single bench around 7-8m above the rail level and a similar height 
cut above this to the tree line in gravels.  To the west the rail curves back to the north and cuts the 
bedding obliquely, enhancing overall stability.  In terms of Landslide Risk Management, the 
following matters are considered important for understanding the hazard and minimising the risk of 
future impacts from slope failures at this locality: 
 Over time the Kaiata Formation bedrock will undergo slaking, and slabbing will occur from 
relatively thin (<1m thick) small volume (typically less than 2m
3
) blocks released on bedding. 
This material will accumulate on the bench, and at rail level. 
 Localised collapse of the weathered outwash gravels at the tree line can be expected to occur 
over time, which will progressively fill the intermediate bench with debris. Trees will be 
undercut, and may at times reach track level during high intensity or long duration rainfall 
events. 
 Regular inspections of the site could be carried out to ensure that the catch berm has adequate 
capacity, and that stormwater drainage has not been compromised by debris accumulation or 
vegetation collapse.  
 Extending the bench another 50m to the east to improve the ability to intercept debris above track 
level would be beneficial but it is recognised the cost for these works may not be considered 
economic. Consideration could also be given to a second bench at the level of the gravels to 
improve long-term stability. 
Remedial works completed at SNL107.50km have reduced the potential impacts from future landslide 
events.  Increasing the berm angle of the benched area, back into the slope, would provide a more 
efficient catch area for slabs of rock and the overlying gravel and vegetation to be captured in the 
future.  Increasing the bench towards the east would also increase efficiency but the volume of rock 
required to be moved may prevent this as a feasible mitigation option.  Routine monitoring and 
maintenance of this area will minimise the build-up of source material that could mobilise during high 
intensity or long duration rainfall events.   
Long-term mitigation measures at SNL107.50km are a matter for KiwiRail, and the options identified 
here are provided as part of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the works undertaken to date within 
the framework of Landslide Risk Management. 
 
 
  
CASE STUDY 2:  SNL118.50km – Sinclair Castle 
 
Sinclair Castle is repeatedly referred to within this thesis and in discussions with any person having 
background knowledge of the project area.  The location and elevation of Sinclair Castle is shown on 
Figure A5.7, including the geomorphic expression of what is interpreted as a pre-historic, re-vegetated 
landslide that impacted the course of the Buller River.  The rail has been formed through the toe of the 
pre-1947 landslide, this being the earliest dated aerial photography available on which the much older 
landslide is evident.  Gully-controlled smaller slope instability features on the older, and seemingly 
stable, landslide are of concern to railway operations. These are evident through the trees within the 
“Pre-1947 Landslide Area”, as shown in Figure A5.7, and they episodically reactivate during intense 
rainstorms to release rock debris towards or onto the rail corridor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5.7:  View of Sinclair Castle (from Google Earth, image dated 1 April 2003) 
Geology and geomorphology 
Figure A5.8 shows the interpretation made by Tulloch and Kimbrough (1989) of the southwest tilting 
Pororari Group beds (dot/dashed lines) into the detached segment (heavy-dashed lines).  High-angle 
normal faults within the Pororari Group are represented in Figure A5.8 by the comparatively lighter 
dashed lines.  The oblique aerial view looking upstream shows the position of Sinclair Castle as a 
prominent outcrop of “granitoid basement” (terminology from Tulloch and Kimbrough, 1989), and 
the steep southeast-facing slopes forming the rear of the “Pre-1947 Landslide Area” are evident on the 
upstream side of Sinclair Castle in Figure A5.7. 
SNL119km 
“Pre-1947 landslide area” 
  
The granite in this location is assumed to have a high intact rock strength typical of other granite 
outcrops (unconfined compressive strength >50MPa).  Joint spacing is variable, but typically of the 
order of 0.5 to 5.0m with persistence of metres to tens of metres, and there is no preferred orientation. 
In the vicinity of Sinclair Castle the intact rock is slightly to moderately weathered, with little 
penetration of chemical alteration away from the often iron-stained joints.  The displaced bedrock 
within the “Pre-1947 Landslide Area” is slightly to moderately weathered, but still strong (UCS 
>50MPa) with steep slopes (>35°, refer Chapter 4, Figure 4.2).  The rock behaves geotechnically in a 
similar manner to the granite exposed in the headscarp area, with gully-controlled features having 
formed in more closely fractured zones towards the eastern limit of the pre-1947 landslide. 
 
Figure A5.8:  Aerial view from Tulloch and Kimbrough (1989) of Sinclair Castle looking 
towards the east up the Lower Buller Gorge.  Refer text for description. 
Slope Stability Assessment 
Weathering processes, defect-controlled block release from the steep to very steep slopes, and the 
high annual rainfall have combined to trigger numerous block slides and debris avalanches since the 
construction of the rail in the early to mid-1940s. These are particularly associated with the eastern 
extent of the “Pre-1947 Landslide Area” failure shown in Figure A5.7, and involve block detachment 
from the upper source areas (Figure A5.8).  The most recent failures occurred in 2011 and remedial 
works in December 2011 were aimed at temporary mitigation of the slope failure by scaling loose 
rocks, and by assessing the requirements for longer term stability. Deep-seated movement is not 
occurring, and instability is only indirectly related to the “Pre-1947 Landslide Area” (Figure A5.7). 
  
 
Figure A5.9:  View of failure surfaces outlined by orange and red dashed lines (source areas) at 
Sinclair Castle and travel path (track zone) of material that intersected the rail corridor.  The 
red dashed lines indicate a comparatively more recent event in 2011, including the inset location 
at rail level. 
The view in Figure A5.9 identifies the nature of present instability at Sinclair Castle. The source areas 
are very steep (>35°), and episodically release granite blocks up to 5m
3
 in volume by near-surface 
weathering processes and joint-controlled dilation.  These blocks then progress by a combination of 
falling, bouncing and/or sliding through the track zone mid-slope, with potential flows in gully areas 
closer to the railway (inset in Figure A5.9).  The run-out zone extends naturally downslope to the rail 
corridor.  Episodic release of rock debris by either earthquake shaking or rainstorm-induced regolith 
instability will continue to cause localised problems at the foot of the steep vegetated slopes, and there 
are no simple or inexpensive remedial options. 
Long-term Management 
To address the continuing hazard to rail operations in the vicinity of Sinclair Castle around 
SNL 118.50km, it is necessary to document and analyse the past and present instability, and in 
particular to identify the run-out zones that are affecting safe movement of trains (including the 
examples shown on Figure A5.9 by the black arrows).  As with similar landsliding problems on 
transportation routes (Turner and Schuster, 1996), the following options for remediation are available: 
 Removal or stabilisation of loose granitic rocks within the source area, with associated safety 
considerations such as temporary closure and protection of the railway. 
  
 Construction of check structures within the track zone above the railway, particularly across 
gullies if these prove critical.  The absence of a formed access to enable machinery to implement 
this option is recognised. 
 Avalanche-type chutes that route debris over the railway.  Similar examples exist in North 
America (Turner and Schuster, 1996), and New Zealand (State Highway 73 in the Otira Gorge). 
 Construction of a shelter structure over a section of the railway line, if the severity and/or 
frequency of track closure warranted such measures (although this is an expensive option). 
 Acceptance of the risk to rail operations, and implementation of a series of protocols for regular 
inspection, culvert clearance and minor works to minimise closure time. 
 Any combination of these measures, commensurate with the perceived risk and economic 
consequences of rail closure (for example, after a large-magnitude earthquake). 
Given the extent of rail traffic, and the consequences of closure, it is suggested that a combination of 
regular inspection, culvert clearance, minor works, and source area stabilisation are evaluated as the 
preferred short-term solution at SNL118.50km.   
CASE STUDY 3:  SNL121.00km – Cascade  
 
The location referred to as Cascade in this section is shown in Figure A5.10, and it specifically 
includes the catchment area immediately above the rail at SNL121.0km that has sourced numerous 
blocky debris slides and flows since the rail became operational.  This section of rail was first 
developed in the early 1900s to transport coal from Denniston Plateau, which was flumed down 
Cascade Creek. The original coal bins are still visible a short distance along the siding adjacent to 
Cascade Creek. In the 1940s the railway line was constructed through to Inangahua Junction, and 
linked through to the Reefton line from Stillwater Junction. 
Hazard description and remedial works 
In response to frequent (typically once every two years) disruption to rail operations, a diversion 
tunnel was constructed after flooding events in the 1980s to direct the flow of water from one gully to 
another.  This effectively relieves the accumulation, and subsequent mobilisation, of rock debris 
within the catchment immediately above SNL121.00km.  The indicative location of the diversion 
tunnel is shown by the star symbol in Figure A5.10.  A manually constructed boulder dam was 
established to divert water into the tunnel.  Annual inspections are carried out to ensure the tunnel 
entrance does not become blocked. 
 
  
 
 
Figure A5.10:  Topographic contours in the vicinity of Cascade (top) and photograph taken 
from SH6 looking towards the catchment influencing slope stability at Cascade (bottom).  Star 
indicates approximate location of the diversion tunnel.   
Catchment Geology and Geomorphology 
The steep slopes (typically ≥30°) at SNL121.0km are formed on granites, and the tunnel portal 
(Figure A5.11) exposes jointed granite that can be described as: “brownish grey,  fine-grained 
granite; slightly weathered; strong and hard; joint-spacing 0.5 to 2m”.  The thickness of regolith 
development is variable, but typically less than 3m thick except where localised accumulation of 
weathered debris has resulted from shallow translational landsliding.  Figures A5.11 and A5.12 
illustrate the typical blocky debris that has accumulated from joint-controlled erosion of granite, and 
the stream morphology near the diversion tunnel.  The finer-grained material is the result of in situ 
weathering of the granite, and subsequent colluvial accumulation on the steep slopes. 
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Figure A5.10 shows the steep nature of the bush-covered slopes above SNL121.0km, and the extent 
of the catchment that feeds the partly incised gully system on the lower slope. The size of the granite 
blocks that have been transported through the system is evident in Figures A5.11 and A5.12, and 
boulders exceeding 1m
3
 were present upstream of the tunnel portal site.  Areas of slope movement in 
the upper catchments are visible in Figure A5.10 (arrowed), and localised shallow failures in near-
surface weathered granite were evident in the vicinity of the diversion tunnel itself.  This is part of the 
normal weathering cycle in granite bedrock on steep slopes with high annual rainfall, and episodic 
extreme storm events involving regolith saturation and translational sliding at the bedrock interface.  
The decision to undertake stream diversion in the 1980s by constructing an approximately 35m long 
tunnel was carried out to improve the control of overland water flow.  One incident was recalled post-
1990 (per comms, Gary Hegan, September 2010) that involved the diversion tunnel becoming blocked 
and associated overtopping of the manually constructed boulder dam.  This incident impacted rail 
operations and tunnel clearance was carried out as soon as practicable.   
   
Figure A5.11:  Diversion 
tunnel entrance (~1.5m in 
height) 
Figure A5.12:  View looking 
upstream from diversion 
tunnel 
Figure A5.13:  View looking 
downstream and edge of rock 
boulder dam 
 
Hazard and Consequence Evaluation 
The hazard at the Cascade site (SNL121.0km) is the mobilisation of blocky debris by slide-flow 
processes within a steep (≥35°) catchment, and the transfer of this material through the gully system 
during extreme storm conditions causing culvert blockage and track damage affecting rail operations. 
Anecdotal data from KiwiRail suggests a frequency of about once every two years for such events, 
and this was the basis for diversion of the stream to a more easily controlled outlet.  Debris volumes 
of tens to hundreds of cubic metres may be involved in individual storm events, and the block size 
suggests potentially significant impacts to rail operations.  
  
An annualised probability of 0.5 justified the measures undertaken above Cascade, and anecdotal 
information from KiwiRail indicates that the frequency of track closure at this site has been reduced 
to less than once every 20 years (p < 0.05) by the measures implemented. Were the diversion tunnel 
portal to block, the previous rail management problems would recur, and there is no access to the 
tunnel site for earthmoving machinery in the event of an emergency.  Given the size of block evident 
in the stream bed and at the tunnel portal (Figures A5.11 and A5.12), the consequences of blockage 
are such that improved future management practices will likely still be required.   
This case study highlights the difficulties in managing the railway corridor in such steep rugged 
terrain, where extreme runoff can result in debris mobilisation within the catchment both by shallow 
landsliding on riparian slopes and by reactivation of debris within channels or banks. The 
consequences of rapid channelised debris movement on slopes ≥35° justify measures such as those 
carried out to minimise the impacts on rail operations and the safety of KiwiRail staff and contractors. 
Future Site Management 
The key aspect of the present diversion tunnel construction is that rapid slides and flows of blocky 
debris within the steep (>35°) stream channel above SNL121.0km have been effectively prevented, 
and therefore the immediate risk to rail operations has been minimised. The remedial works do not 
preclude future failures within other nearby gullies, or additional slope failures affecting track 
operations.  In terms of long-term Landslide Risk Management at Cascade, the following points 
should be considered: 
 The absence of machine access to the diversion tunnel precludes remedial measures, other than 
manual, to maintain the site, or to repair, as required, the non-engineered boulder dam that is 
currently controlling water flow (Figure A5.13).  
 Annual maintenance inspections are inadequate in the event of an extreme (for example 1 in 
10-year return period) storm event, and protocols are advised for such situations.  
 Redesign and armouring of the existing boulder dam, with provision for storm overflow, should 
be undertaken as a priority, together with a detention basin upstream of the tunnel inlet. 
 Large boulders removed from the tunnel inlet (Figure A5.11) could be used for armouring as 
required, the granite blocks being hard, strong and durable materials suitable as armour. 
In summary, the importance of maintaining the successful diversion is emphasised due to the 
susceptibility for blockages as a result of either extreme storm events or large magnitude earthquakes.  
Joint-controlled block failures around the diversion tunnel may occur under severe shaking 
conditions, and the consequences of renewed debris movement down the former stream channel 
would disrupt rail operations as it has in the past.    
  
Appendix 5.2 
Distribution of magnitude 6 and greater earthquakes in the South Island during the period 
January 1997 to August 2011 
 
 
 
  
  
Appendix 6.1 
Background information regarding the LiDAR survey conducted at Whitecliffs 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
